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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the representation of pro-animal thought in literary 
fiction published over the last thirty years. 
Recently, critics have begun eclectically to trace animal rights 
arguments in past literature, attaching criticism to politics in a familiar way 
(considering the recent history of the literary academy). However, they have 
neither explained the holistic picture of human-animal relations in 
individual texts, nor how such questions relate to a specific literary context. 
This thesis, on the other hand, involves more a pinpointing of the particular 
value of literary works for extending the horizon of current ethical debates 
about animals than a partisan mobilisation of literary criticism in the service 
of animal rights. To that end, each chapter offers a thoroughgoing reading of 
an important text in the story of contemporary fiction's ethical encounter 
with the animal. I contextualise these extended readings with more succinct 
discussion of the wide range of contemporary authors who represent pro-
animal thought. 
This approach requires several theoretical methodologies, though all 
are within the realm of feminist post-structuralism. Butler's work on the 
discursive production of sex illuminates the ethical representation of species 
in Atwood's Surfacing. The representation of animals (both literary and 
political) in Walker's The Temple of My Familiar is explained by situating the 
animal within feminist debates about the relation of literary writing to the 
discursive formation of race. Levy's avant-garde representation of the animal 
in Diary of a Steak is explained by placing a literary-theoretical reading 
inspired by Bakhtin and Irigaray within a broader cultural study of the BSE 
crisis. Derrida's recent work on ethics and the question of the animal helps 
me explore the literary representation of ethical vegetarianism in Coetzee's 
The Lives of Animals. 
My concluding remarks suggest how the results of my research might 
impact on the future role of animal ethics in literary criticism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
FROM PRO-ANIMAL LITERARY CRITICISM TO 
READING THE LITERARY REPRESENTATION OF PRO-ANIMAL THOUGHT 
For a long time the first sentence of this thesis was going to be 'this is a work 
of pro-animal literary criticism'. The project began as an exercise in 
politicised literary-history of the contemporary period. I was convinced that 
in the years since Peter Singer published his seminal essay , Animal 
Liberation' in 1973, there must have been literary writers who had used the 
resources of fiction to engage with the subject of humans' ethical 
relationships with animals. Singer's essay was the genesis of a book by the 
same name that would go on to motivate the global animal rights 
movement.1 Yet when I began researching there seemed (and there was) little 
prospect of finding criticism of contemporary writing that would even 
discuss, let alone champion, contemporary 'pro-animal literature' in the way 
that over the last thirty years or so there has been a body of work (however 
diverse) that delineated fields of study around contemporary feminist 
literature, post-colonial literature, or working-class literature, to name a few. 
As a result, I perceived a need to uncover contemporary texts that it would 
become important to consider from the point of view of their literary 
1 'Animal Liberation', review of Animals, Men and Morals, edited by Stanley Godlovitch, 
Rosalind Godlovitch and John Harris, New York Review of Books, April 5 1973; Animal 
Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon, 1975). 
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representation of animal ethics, in the way that a reader interested in those 
more established fields would very quickly find themselves led to read 
(confining oneself to a British context alone) Angela Carter's Nights at the 
Circus (1984), for example, or Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses (1988), or 
James Kelman's How Late It Was, How Late (1994). 
It goes without saying that such socio-cultural groupings of literary 
texts, amongst other things, chart the rise of identity politics and its effect on 
the politicisation of the literary academy. And of course the animal rights 
movement, as a social formation in English-speaking cultures at least, is far 
from immune to the workings of identity politics, as much evidence from the 
tactics of image-conscious pro-animal groups like People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) to the increasing availability on supermarket 
shelves of products specifically designed to promote 'vegetarian' 
consumption suggests.2 Yet despite the apparently conducive environment 
portrayed in this quick sketch-and it is not my intention here to delve 
further into either the sociology or the institutional politics-it is clear that 
specifically pro-animal discourses have made little impact on established 
patterns of academic literary reading, or (more pertinently) publishing.3 
2 I do not want to imply that contemporary pro-animal thought has no historical roots; these 
are charted (for British society at least) in Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political and Social 
Change in Britain since 1800 (London: Reaktion, 1998). The modem movement is well defined 
by Gary 1. Francione, Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996). I will say more about vegetarian identities in 
chapter four. 
3 This is not of course to say that there is not interest in animals per se, which we can find in 
some studies such as David Salter's Holy and Noble Beasts: Encounters with Animals in Medieval 
Literature (London: D. S. Brewer, 2001); Christine Kenyon-Janes's Kindred Brutes: Animals in 
Romantic-Period Writing (London: Ashgate, 2001); and Margot Norris's Beasts of the Modern 
Imagination: Darwin, Nietzsche, Freud, Kafka, Ernst and Lawrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985). In fact, there has been a profusion of work on animals in cultural 
studies over the last ten years, much of which I will mention in this thesis. When it comes to 
addressing animal ethics square-on, however, cultural studies as a whole lags far behind 
other disciplines, in particular analytic ethical philosophy, sociology and geography. Work 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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Of course, uncovering important contemporary texts is only one strand 
m the complex weaving of feminist (or any other politicised) literary 
criticism. Amongst other methodologies involved are the discovery of 
progressive patterns of meaning in literatures of the past, and, perhaps more 
importantly, reading key texts as symptomatic examples of the ways that 
entrenched social hegemonies have worked their way into (and out of) 
established literary texts and genres. These other methodologies can be 
found in the work over the past ten years or so of a few critics-Marian 
Scholtmeijer, Randy Malamud, John Simons, and Cary Wolfe-which marks 
the beginning of pro-animal literary criticism.4 
At this point it is worth clarifying what such a thing as 'pro-animal 
literary criticism' might entail; and there are two main reasons for doing so. 
In purely practical terms, I can explain this hyphenated adjective, which is 
not prevalent either in the work of these writers or in more popular 
discourses that still tend towards the terminology of animal rights, yet will 
be used consistently in this thesis. I will also set out very briefly some other 
key terms in my discussion. More importantly, though, I want to delineate 
my own intentions by quickly describing my salient differences from these 
few models that do exist of literary criticism with a pro-animal approach. 
published under the aegis of the journals Environmental Ethics and Society & Animals 
consistently signifies this difference. 
4 Scholtmeijer, Animal Victims in Modem Fiction: From Sanctity to Sacrifice (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1993); Malamud, Reading Zoos: Representations of Animals in Captivity 
(Hound mills: Macmillan, 1998); Simons, Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation 
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002). Although I will refer to Wolfe's work as it originally appeared 
in a variety of journals, he has very recently published it in modified form as Animal Rites: 
American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003). Two important books of criticism written from a pro-animal 
perspective, which I will not discuss because they addresses different disciplines (history and 
popular culture studies respectively), are Erica Fudge'S Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts 
in Early Modern English Culture (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000) and Steve Baker's Picturing the 
Beast: Animals, Identity, and Representation (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001). 
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The easiest way to define the phrase 'pro-animal' is by comparing it 
with analogous political signifiers. Cary Wolfe, discussing Singer's work, 
speaks of the important concept in animal rights of 'speciesism'; this concept 
'like its cognates racism, sexism, classism-discriminates against another 
based only on a generic description and not on what we actually know about 
its needs, interests and capabilities'.5 The approaches that I refer to as pro-
animal share a common disagreement with speciesism as it is described here. 
As such-to build a comparison on just one of the cognates Wolfe 
mentions-as an adjective, pro-animal is to species ism as feminist is to sexism. 
My use of the term pro-animal stems from a discomfort with the language of 
rights that is the most readily available discourse for speaking about anti-
speciesist thinking. The reasons for that discomfort will become clear in the 
course of this thesis, particularly in my lengthy discussion in chapter one of 
pro-animal feminism-one of the key sites of the critique of rights discourse 
in pro-animal thought. Yet it should come as no surprise to anyone versed in 
recent debates, which can be loosely grouped under the umbrella of 
postmodernism, about the theoretical legacy of Enlightenment humanism. I 
should, however, make it quite clear that it is not at all my intention to get 
bogged down in justifying the basis of pro-animal thinking, from whichever 
theoretical standpoint; this is something which has been, and continues to be, 
done effectively in other critical environments.6 I have sidestepped actually 
5 Cary Wolfe, 'Old Orders for New: Ecology, Animal Rights, and the Poverty of Humanism', 
Diacritics, 28.2 (1998), 21-40 (p. 31). 
6 Notably, of course, in analytic philosophy; the canonical book-length discussions are Singer, 
Animal Liberation and Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983); valuable recent additions to these are Evelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond 
Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Non-Human Animals (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1995) and Mark Rowlands, Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence 
(Hound mills: Macmillan, 1998). Legal Studies is another key locus for such debates, see Gary 
L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995) and 
Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Animals (London: Profile, 2000). 
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debating the pros and cons of animal rights in order more fully to discuss 
how recent literary texts have represented positive conclusions in that 
debate. 
The four pro-animal critics I mentioned can be grouped in two sections 
in terms of their broad methodologies. While their specific thematic interests 
are different, Scholtmeijer, Malamud and Simons all make their pro-animal 
stance clear at the outset of their work; they then proceed to read examples 
from a disparate range of literary texts with the broad intention of explaining 
how they either confirm that stance, or can be criticised because of it. One of 
the main benefits of this approach, which uncovers many progressive 
possibilities in past literature, is eclecticism - between them, Scholtmeijer's 
study of representations of animals that are subject to human violence and 
Malamud's of literature about animals in captivity, discuss almost one 
hundred late nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts. Simons's book is more 
thematically arranged, taking in areas such as anthropomorphism or the 
animal as symbol; within these themes he is able to juxtapose writers from 
Apuleius through Chaucer to Robert Bums, Virginia Woolf and Will Self. 
However, leaving aside whether or not such ahistoricism can be theoretically 
justified, the most telling negative implication of these eclectic methods is 
that they have a generalising tendency about them. It is difficult not to see 
this as rooted in the fact that each critic is looking from a predetermined 
perspective to extract fairly well-established modem political meanings from 
material of great diversity, both historically and in literary quality. More 
often than not this is done with no attention to that material's historical or 
literary context.? The texts discussed lose their specificity, much of their 
7 I offer a wider critique of Scholtmeijer's book in 'Animal Form: Can Realism Serve the 
Cause of Animals?' (unpublished master's thesis, University of Sheffield, 1997), pp. 5-7. 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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contextual significance and, most crucially, their ability to suggest nezo 
possibilities of ethical meaning under the gaze of the critic's immoveable pro-
animal approach. 
What these critics collectively do not manage to show is how individual 
texts might holistically offer a coherent set of questions about human-animal 
relations, nor indeed how such questions might inter-relate within the 
context of a literary period. This problem distinguishes them from Wolfe, 
whose exacting and thorough readings of individual creative texts I tum to 
repeatedly in this thesis. Wolfe mobilises a high level of theoretical erudition 
and complexity-he works amongst the theorisations of the animal by a 
veritable who's who of continental philosophers-to read novels by Ernest 
Hemingway and Michael Crichton and Jonathan Demme's film Silence of the 
Lambs. He does so with an eye to analysing how these are subtended by what 
he terms 'the discourse of species'. For Wolfe, this phrase defines a logic and 
a set of linguistic practices by which the other is marginalised or objectified 
along species lines, and by which 'the human' is delineated by means of its 
difference from and superiority over 'the animal'. One thinks here, as an 
example, of the derogatory usage by humans about other humans of the 
word 'beast'. By understanding that the discourse of species thus 
simultaneously structures hegemonic views of human and animal others 
Wolfe is able to offer textual readings that attend to how representations of 
the animal contain a broad range of socio-political implications. This in tum 
allows him, unlike the previously mentioned critics, to work within a very 
well-defined cultural-historical framework, and to situate readings that are 
Similar key points to the ones I make there are elaborated in Sue Walsh, 'Child/Animal: It's 
the "Real" Thing', YES, 32 (2002), 151~2. I say more about Simons's book in my review for 
Society & Animals, 10 (2002), 324-26. 
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inspired by pro-animal thought within topical critical debates about post-
humanism, ethics and the representation of gender, sexuality and race. 
This desire to map pro-animal discussion over such a theoretical terrain 
is the most immediate difference between Wolfe and the other group of 
critics, who either gloss over theory of a post-structuralist stripe (Malamud, 
pp. 1-49), generally ignore it but have at least some ambivalence 
(Scholtmeijer, pp. 87-91), or are downright hostile towards it (Simons, pp. 
61-84). A more implicit difference is that the aim of Wolfe's work is to 
theorise the complex discursive workings of speciesism as they are found 
symptomatically in texts he discusses, rather than to elucidate the pro-animal 
meaning found within them. As such, rather than being immanent to the 
texts Wolfe reads, any specifically pro-animal meaning is strictly a function 
of his critique of them. 
This thesis aims to steer a path between these two kinds of critical 
practice. My methodology is similar to that of the first group of critics to the 
extent that I am interested in analysing the pro-animal content of literary 
works. However, I want to avoid the problems I have outlined in their 
methodologies: of ahistorical generality and of analysing texts to explain how 
they match pre-established pro-animal meanings. To that end, each of the 
chapters in this thesis is an extended reading of what I regard as an 
important text in the story of contemporary fiction's ethical encounter with 
the animal; indeed, each chapter is designed to stand in its own right as a 
contribution to scholarship on the specific text at hand. Moreover, the thesis 
as a whole involves more a pinpointing of the particular value of recent 
literary texts for extending the horizon of current ethical debates about the 
human-animal relationship than a partisan mobilisation of literary criticism 
in the service of animal rights. This approach has much more in common 
with Wolfe's theoretically-inflected criticism; except that instead of 
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diagnosing the hegemonic discourse of species ism in symptomatic texts, I am 
interested in exploring how contemporary literary fiction has responded 
positively to the ethical claim of animals. 
Chapter one offers a reading of what I term the 'animal politics' of 
Margaret Atwood's Surfacing (1973); by which I mean the way that the text 
distributes power, literally as well as literarily, between humans and animals. 
Surfacing was published in the same year as Singer's original' Animal 
Liberation' article, so it can be taken as a valuable starting point for our 
understanding of pro-animal thought in literature.8 Through a detailed 
analysis of the linguistic and narrative fabric of the text, I explain how the 
novel's narrator, a young Canadian woman, progresses towards, and yet is 
finally forced to discard, an ethical identification with animals. This process, I 
argue, plays an integral part in the wider concerns of the novel's 
development: the narrator's attempt to forge an individuated self and sexual 
identity in relation to her absent parents and within the general context of 
entrenched gender power-relations amongst her companions. My reading of 
the animal politics of the novel complicates consensual readings that have 
discussed it terms of 1970s French feminism, placing it instead in the context 
of my own critique of recent pro-animal feminism, a critique that is rooted in 
the work of Judith Butler. Feminist thought has played an important role in 
contemporary pro-animal theory-Singer's 'animal liberation' is a deliberate 
echo of women's liberation - and the theoretical influence of feminism 
(particularly in Butler's post-structuralist reconfiguration of it) is deeply 
8 Such line-drawing can never avoid unfortunate exclusions; one might cite, for example, 
Brigid Brophy's HackenJe/ler's Ape (1956) as a novel which deserves attention. Brophy is a 
major figure in the development of animal rights in Britain. She published an important 
article on 'The Rights of Animals' in The Sunday Times, 10 October 1965, which is reprinted in 
her Reads (London: Cardinal, 1989), pp. 123-34. 
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rooted in this thesis. In Atwood's novel, the human-animal relation is played 
out in terms of a series of concepts-language, gender and the body-that 
are central to Butler's work. This work allows me to explain the ethical 
implications for animals of the discursive formation of sex, and in turn that 
of species, in Surfacing. 
Although not explicitly cited, Butler's work also underpins my analysis 
in chapter two of Alice Walker's The Temple of My Familiar (1989); this is a 
book that extends some of Surfacing's key concerns about the hierarchical 
evaluation of language and the body, and how it affects animals. The key 
difference with Walker's novel is the addition of the issue of racial identity to 
this conceptual mix. My reading explains that the novel uses various 
strategies such as a parodic rewriting of Judeo-Christian mythology and a 
privileging of imaginative oral storytelling over written history to 
deconstruct this opposition of language and the body. In doing so, it 
structurally aligns the speciesist abuse of animals with specific human 
oppressions and allows thus othered humans to speak for animals. This 
creates the conditions whereby an apparently unbridgeable gap between the 
species-of which the animal's lack of language is emblematic-can be 
crossed. 
My third chapter changes direction slightly in order to examine the 
animal politics of Deborah Levy's Diary of a Steak (1997), an avant-garde work 
about what is perhaps, in Britain at least, the single most important incident 
in the recent history of human relations with animals: the BSE/CJD crisis. 
Although I spend some time contextualising Levy's highly confected and 
defamiliarising representations of BSE within more popular discourses on 
the subject, the main thrust of the chapter explains the pro-animal 
possibilities suggested by the text's avant-garde style. Diary of a Steak, almost 
unbelievably, manages to combine a grotesque description of the realities of 
9 
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the meat industry and an erudite feminist critique of psychotherapeutic 
medicine within a profoundly disjunctive use of language and form. This 
combination configures the interpretive relationship between the reader and 
text so that it becomes analogous to others represented within the text-
between the psychoanalytic doctor and his hysterical patient and between 
the meat-eating consumer and the consumed animal. This at times makes for 
uncomfortable reading from a pro-animal perspective, since it is difficult to 
ground such a perspective when reading the text is likened to consuming the 
animal within it. To explicate these quite convoluted patterns of meaning 
requires the interpolation of various theorists-from Luce Irigaray, Helene 
Cixous and Catherine Clement to Mikhail Bakhtin, Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard 
and Jacques Derrida. As we saw with Wolfe, there is much to be gleaned 
from theorisations of the animal by post-structuralist philosophers; Derrida, 
in particular, has recently dedicated prolonged attention to the question of 
animal ethics, and I tum to his work in more detail in chapter four. 
I should say in parenthesis that there is one very pregnant post-
structuralist theoretical possibility that I do not explore in this thesis: the 
work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, specifically their idea of 
'becoming-animal'.9 The reasons for this exclusion are two-fold. First, their 
work is simply too philosophically dense, its implications too wide-ranging, 
and its exposition too elaborate, for me to do justice to it here (not that these 
are bad things). To extract the animal-focussed work from its place in 
9 For Deleuze and Guattari's theory of becoming-animal in general, see A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: Athlone, 1988), chapter 10. Their attention to animal 
issues is varied and complex and it influences discussion of several major conceptual arenas 
in their work, for example the unconscious (pp. 26-38); language (p. 77); the face (pp. 170-
71); and the rhizome (pp. 11-21); see Brian Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 93-
106. 
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Deleuze and Guattari's wider project would risk misreading it. Indeed, not 
surprisingly, very few attempts have been made to follow through the 
implications of their animal-related work in the area of literature.1o The 
second reason is suggested by Deleuze and Guattari themselves when they 
explain that the politics of becomings-animal are' extremely ambiguous' (p. 
247). This is a position with which my reading inclines me to agree, despite 
the progressive statements the writers make elsewhere, especially on the 
subject of political 'minorities' (p. 292). 
This is not to say that their work does not suggest many intriguing 
issues for those who are, like me, interested in thinking about animals and 
ethics in the aesthetic arena. l1 However, the aim of the present thesis is to 
explain and interrogate the representation of pro-animal thought, something 
that requires a certain degree of political stability. So, while I am not in the 
business of simplifying contemporary literature's ethical encounters with the 
animal, there remains a need to work through at length the politics of the 
becoming-animal concept, something that makes it unhelpful for the present 
as a cri tical tooL 
It is when compared in these terms to Deleuze and Guattari that 
Derrida's work appears all the more useful, since it very fruitfully reworks 
the conventional terms of discussion about animals and clearly does so 
within an ethico-political mode. In chapter four, I marshal many of Derrida's 
10 See Susan McHugh, 'Marrying My Bitch: J. R. Ackerley'S Pack Sexualities', Critical Inquiry, 
27 (2000), 21-41 and Cary Wolfe, 'Faux Post-Humanism, or, Animal Rights, Neocolonialism, 
and Michael Crichton's Congo', Arizona Quarterly, 55 (1999), 115-53. 
11 See Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion, 2000), pp. 99-152 and 'What 
Does Becoming-Animal Look Like?' in Representing Animals, ed. by Nigel Rothfels 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 67-98. Lynda Birke and 
Luciana Parisi offer an introduction to 'becoming-animal' in the context of eco-feminism in 
'Animal, Becoming', in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life, ed. by H. Peter 
Steeves (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 55-74. 
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conclusions about human-animal relations in order to interrogate the 
representation of animal ethics in the work of J. M. Coetzee, particularly his 
recent work The Lives of Animals (1999). Although it is rarely noticed by his 
critics, Coetzee more than any other contemporary writer has addressed 
himself to representing the complexities of humans' omnipotent power over 
animals, as well as to the dilemmas that this omnipotence poses for the 
writer of fiction. My analysis of The Lives of Animals explains how it portrays 
in its content and enacts through its form a countermanding of the speciesist 
logic that conditions the broad social realm. While Coetzee's text does not 
appear, to use Roland Barthes's term, as 'writerly' as Levy's, it even more 
profoundly works with the formal resources available to fictional writing to 
make pro-animal meaning.12 The pro-animal meaning it makes is of a very 
particular kind, however, since a primary effect of the text is to undermine in 
the first place the very possibility of a purely moral literature. A 
methodology designed to uncover pro-animal literary texts, the one with 
which I set out on this project, necessarily bases itself on such a possibility. 
So, to close this introduction by revisiting the comments with which I 
opened it, it can be recognised that to characterise literary texts in political 
terms such as 'feminist', 'post-colonial', 'pro-animal' might well be useful for 
focussing attention on unknown or ignored texts, for identifying their shared 
or key concerns, comparatively evaluating them, and isolating the most 
important and valuable among them-in short, the techniques of canon-
building. However, pigeonholing individual texts with such a univocal 
characterisation can rapidly come to constrict the very ethical potential that it 
hopes to unleash. This is something that the literary works I discuss in this 
12 See Barthes, 5/2: An Essay, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1974), p. 4. 
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thesis as a whole strive against, and is precisely what I do not intend to do. 
Therefore, this thesis is not a work of pro-animal literary criticism; it offers 
readings in the literary representation of pro-animal thought. 
13 
CHAPTER ONE 
IIDENTIFYING WITH THE ANIMALS': 
LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY AND THE ANIMAL POLITICS 
OF MARGARET ATWOOD'S SURFACING 
Introduction 
Animals are prevalent in Margaret Atwood's early work, whatever the genre. 
Images of identification with slaughtered cows and hunted rabbits proliferate 
throughout The Edible Woman, and in Lady Oracle a 'con-create artist' makes 
sculptures from squashed animals that prefigure the contemporary animal-
based art of Damien Hirst, Mark Dion and Bruce Nauman. Atwood discusses 
'animal victims' as paradigmatic in Canadian literature in her critical work 
Survival, and she insists in 'Don't Expect the Bears to Dance' that 'zoos make 
her nervous'. Perhaps most ubiquitously in her poetry, Atwood provides 'a 
multitude of animals of diverse generic and aesthetic kinds,' as Kathleen 
Vogt has noted.1 Despite this recurring fascination with the animal in 
Atwood's work, there has yet to be an exploration of the animal politics of 
1 Margaret Atwood, The Edible Woman (1969) and Lady Oracle (1976) in The Margaret Atwood 
Omnibus (London: Andre Deutsch, 1991); Survival (Toronto: Anansi, 1972). On contemporary 
animal-based art see Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal. On zoos, Atwood is quoted in 
Kathleen Vogt, 'Real and Imaginary Animals in the Poetry of Margaret Atwood' in Margaret 
Atwood: Vision and Forms, ed. by Kathryn van Spankeren and Jan Garden Castro (Carbondale 
and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), pp. 163-82 (p. 163) and her 
poetry described by Vogt on p. 164. 
Chapter One 'Identifying with the Animals' 
her fiction. It is often noted that Atwood's protagonists, in Barbara Hill 
Rigney's words, 'find it difficult to eat animals', a fact which probably lies 
behind Atwood's comment that 'people are always asking me if I'm a 
vegetarian [and] they are astonished when I tell them that I am carnivorous'.2 
However, thus far no one has explored the discrepancy indicated by this 
vignette to ask how Atwood's world might contain such opposing 
possibilities. This is my aim here, for I want to argue in a discussion of 
Surfacing that Atwood's novel entails an animal politics that is remarkably 
complex and instructive primarily because it is marked by the vital 
importance of language to the production of human subjectivity; and 
secondly because it traces the implications of this fact for our relationships 
with animals. My intention, in the second section of this essay, is to read 
these animal politics in part through the lens of Judith Butler's influential 
work on the discursive production of sex and sexuality. To facilitate this 
discussion, though, I first introduce the terms at issue here by exploring the 
implications of Butler's work for pro-animal theory as expounded by the 
feminist writers Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan. 
I. Pro-animal Politics, Feminism and the Body 
Adams and Donovan explain the reasoning behind the influence of feminism 
on pro-animal theory that has developed throughout the 1990s: 
2 Barbara Hill Rigney, Margaret Atwood (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 54-55 and Margaret 
Atwood, Conversations, ed. by Earl G. Ingersoll (London: Virago, 1992), p. 47. I have discussed 
vegetarianism in The Edible Woman at length in 'Animal Form', pp. 29-48. 
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It could be argued that theorising about animals is inevitable for 
feminism. Historically, the ideological justification for women's 
alleged inferiority has been made by [approximating] them to 
animals: from Aristotle on, women's bodies have been seen to 
intrude upon their rationality.3 
The key critical term here, of course, is the body. Feminist writings of the 
1970s and 1980s reappraised cultural notions of the body by disputing the 
masculinism and somatophobia inherent in enlightenment humanism; these 
writings have proved of paramount worth in constructing contemporary pro-
animal theory. Indeed, as Adams herself writes, the problem is not just that 
'women are equated with animals' bodies, for instance in pornography, but 
also that animals are equated with their bodies'.4 This focus on the wholesale 
repudiation of all bodily matters in the construction of the hegemonic idea 
(or, perhaps more accurately, ideal) of humanity as essentially rational 
ensures that the body serves as the all-important ground for a politics that 
appeals to an even wider constituency than feminism per se. Stating that the 
'connections between the abuse of women and the abuse of animals make 
explicit that somatophobia applies to species as well as gender, race and class 
3 Introduction to Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Speculations, ed. by Carol ]. Adams 
and Josephine Donovan (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 1. 
Notwithstanding influential ecofeminist theorists like Val Plumbwood and Karen J. Warren, 
Adams and Donovan can rightly be called the motivating figures of contemporary feminist 
pro-animal theory. See in this regard their other edited collection Beyond Animal Rights: 
Towards a Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals (New York: Continuum, 1996), 
which includes Donovan's influential feminist critique of the enlightenment-rationalist basis 
of conventional animal rights' Animal Rights and Feminist Theory', pp. 34-59; and Adams's 
The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (New York: Continuum, 1990). 
The influence of these writers and an indication of the changes they have brought to pro-
animal thought is helpfully detailed in a review essay on these books by Steve Baker for 
Society & Animals, 4.1 (1996), 75-89. 
4 Neither Man Nor Beast: Feminism and the Defence of Animals (New York: Continuum, 1994), p. 
152, her emphasis. 
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interactions' (p. 152), Adams argues for a pro-animal politics based on the 
recognition of 'interlocking systems of domination': racism, sexism, classism 
and speciesism. The intersection of these systems is visible precisely because 
of the perception of somatophobia as foundational for each. An apt 
condensation of Adams's 'progressive, anti-racist defence of animals' (pp. 
78-84) can be found in her belief that I dismantling somatophobia involves 
respecting the bodily integrity of all who have been equated with bodies' (p. 
161). Given its roots in feminist body politics, we might helpfully think of 
Adams's view, then, as an animal-body politics. 
Looking a little more closely at Adams's conceptualisation of the body, 
though, the first thing I want to note is the way that the body is posited as 
having an 'integrity' that is prior to and then obscured by somatophobic 
discourse. This discourse, she argues, underpins the oppressive logic of 
Western culture. Derrida has provided an abbreviated term for this logic in 
the word 'phallogocentrism' though this term is rarely if ever explicitly used 
by Adams and Donovan.s That the functioning of Adams's pro-animal 
feminism requires a notion of the body-before-discourse becomes clear if we 
consider that she thinks of her methodology as ideological critique, exposing 
the flawed, obfuscatory or contradictory logic inherent in Western culture's 
hierarchical denial of the (animal) body. Her stated intention in Neither Man 
nor Beast is to expose the 'ideology that ontologises animals as usable' and to 
make 'the ideology and material reality of corpse production visible, to 
denaturalise it'. Such consciousness-raising exposition allows Adams to posit 
that 'when the concept of species is seen as a social construction, an 
alternative social construction that recognises animals as a subordinated 
S Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone, 1981), pp. 48-49. 
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social group, rather than naturally usable, becomes apparent' (pp. 15, 114). 
Here, Adams is aware enough of her own implication in this usage of 
ideological critique to recognise that she cannot simply appeal to an extra-
discursive truth, noting instead the social construction of her own pro-animal 
position. Nonetheless, theories of ideology require a ground on which such 
social constructions are built and Adams serves notice that this ground is the 
ontological and ethical integrity of the body; in her clear statement of the 
feminist pro-animal position, she argues: 
We reject a cultural construction of some bodies as so completely and 
solely matter that their bodies become immaterial, unimportant. 
Animals' bodies do matter. [ ... J We affirm that we all share the same 
universe in which we are a community of subjects-no matter how 
fragmented the notion of the subject-not a collection of otherwise 
objects. In this way we respond with integrity, respecting bodies (p. 
13, my emphasis). 
Thus Adams reclaims the integrity of the animal body from speciesist 
ideological constructions. Theoretically, her argument echoes the reclamation 
of the female body through the division of sex and gender that facilitated 
second-wave feminism's critique of traditionally conceived femininity. 
Adams also invokes the bodily essentialism for which the division of sex and 
gender has come under increasing scrutiny in the past decade or so. 
Therefore, it is particularly fascinating (if perhaps unintentional) that 
Adams's affirmation so clearly evokes the title of Judith Butler's 1993 book, 
Bodies that Matter. This work is itself prefaced by the notion not only that 
gender, but that the supposedly natural category of biological sex itself is 
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constructed, that 'bodies are in some way constructed'.6 Butler's compelling 
(and by now famous) thesis radicalises the theory of social construction at 
issue in my discussion thus far, placing a question mark over both the 
straightforward critique of speciesism as ideology and the concomitant pro-
animal appeal to the integrity of the animal body. Her thesis also goes some 
way towards explaining the inadequacy of such ideological critique fully to 
capture the socio-discursive othering of women and animals. 
Rapidly to recapitulate Butler's thesis, gender is not simply an 
ideological imposition upon the uncodified human body; rather, 'the matrix 
of gender relations is prior to the emergence of "the human'If (p. 7). The key 
point is that, indeed, we are not always-already human, but that in order to 
'be' at all, we must 'become' human by passing through the enculturating 
mechanism of gender. Biological sex, then, is 'not simply what one has, or a 
static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the 
"one" becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the 
domain of cultural intelligibility' (p. 2). Butler's development of this claim is 
worth quoting at length, not least for its focus on the conceptual category of 
the human-always important for theorising the animal, the most persistent 
other of humanity: 
The construction of gender operates through exclusionary 
means, such that the human is not only produced over and 
against the inhuman, but through a set of foreclosures, 
radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused the 
possibility of cultural articulation. Hence, it is not enough to 
claim that human subjects are constructed, for the 
construction of the human is a differential operation that 
6 Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (London: Routledge, 1993) p. x, her 
emphaSiS. 
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produces the more and less 'human,' the inhuman, the 
humanly unthinkable. These excluded sites come to bound 
the 'human' as its constitutive outside, and to haunt those 
boundaries as the persistent possibility of their disruption 
and rearticulation. (p. 8) 
The point here is not just that the category of 'the human' or 'humanity' 
is a cultural construction, in which one specific type of biologically marked 
body is valued via a set of arbitrarily positive-coded cognitive abilities (for 
example rationality, language, or tool-use);7 this recognition has been a 
touchstone for pro-animal thought, and is something that animal advocates 
who would see political advantage in the point that 'humans are animals too' 
have long recognised. Rather, Butler's analysis further indicates that such 
easy equations of human and non-human animal, based as they are on a 
fantasy of essential communion between the two on the level of the ethical 
integrity or equality of the body, miss a fundamental point. Indeed, 
'becoming human' - if we take that to mean developing even the most basic 
form of identity within the social field of human interaction - requires passing 
into 'that field of discourse and power that orchestrates, delimits, and 
sustains that which qualifies as "the human'" (p. 8). To make explicit this 
7 Of course, to this list could be appended other attributes supposedly exclusive to human 
beings such as self-consciousness, deceptive behaviour, peacemaking, aesthetic interest, trans-
generational culture, and altruism. These are listed, sourced and this issue discussed at more 
length than I can here in Marian Scholtmeijer, 'What is "Human"? Metaphysics and 
Zoontology in Flaubert and Kafka', in Animal Acts: Reconftguring the Human in Western 
History, ed. by Jennifer Ham and Matthew Senior (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 127-44 (p. 
127). Cary Wolfe follows SchoItmeijer in noting the way that such attributes retain 
philosophical and cultural cachet while the exclusive human-ness of each has been 
ethologically disproved, in 'Faux Post-Humanism, or, Animal Rights, Neocolonialism, and 
Michael Crichton's Congo', Arizona Quarterly, 55 (1999), 115-53 (p. 116). 
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exclusionary logic: being-human in a fundamental sense means not-being-
animal. 
For Butler, whose main interest is the functioning of compulsory 
heterosexuality, the primary effect of this field of discourse is seen most 
clearly when we look to 'those abjected [human] beings who do not appear 
properly gendered; it is their very humanness that comes into question' (p. 
8). All of us are compelled to become 'properly' gendered, because otherwise 
we would not become 'properly' human: such is the logic of the discursive 
production of sex. This thesis has two unstated implications, however. The 
first is that it is absolutely unavoidable that we become human, for it is only by 
the force of this inevitability that subjects can be compelled towards' correct' 
gendering. The second is that this necessity is cultural rather than biological: 
our being-human is not simply a function of species but instead is a cultural 
imperative, just like gender, to which we are necessarily obliged to accede. 
Bearing this in mind, the focus of the pro-animal theorist will be slightly 
different from Butler's analysis of gendering. She somewhat rests on her 
laurels in that she fails to extend the critique of heterosexism inherent in the 
binary gendering of human beings to the speciesism of a field of discourse 
that relies on the category of the 'inhuman' to police that effective gendering. 
This is surprising, since one of Butler's most powerful claims, which 
prefigures Adams's emphasis on interlocking systems of domination noted 
earlier, is that she does 'the important work of thinking through the ways in 
which [ ... ] vectors of power deploy each other for the purposes of their own 
articulation' (p. 18).8 Extending Butler's purview, I would want to look for 
8 See Adams, Neither Man, chapter four. For an analysis of contemporary identity polities that 
exhaustively follows through this claim with respect to the discourses of race, ethnidty, 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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ways to work against the suggestion that our becoming-human is 
unavoidable. For, to paraphrase Butler, it is surely possible to find people in 
the realm of pro-animal politics (ethical vegetarians, for example) who are 
'not properly humanised', at least in the sense that to become human is to 
become the other of the animal. Notwithstanding this blind spot regarding 
speciesism, however, Butler's consistent focus on the productive exclusionary 
power of discourse itself suggests an important critical development for the 
pro-animal feminism I have described. 
For as Butler makes clear, not all beings of the human species get to enter 
the 'community of subjects' which Adams would like to see include humans 
and animals. Indeed the very notion of a community of fully human subjects 
is founded on exclusion: not only of animals but also of a whole gamut of 
social alterities. A list (which is, logically speaking, limitless if every 
community is founded on exclusion) would extend well beyond the oft-cited 
class, gender, race and sexuality to include any others who do not match the 
conventional typology of humanism: children, criminals and the mentally ill, 
for example. Butler's reading, then, marks a shift from an understanding of 
social injustice based on ideology. Following her, I have suggested that 
speciesism is inherent to the discursive production of the human. Ideological 
critique, on the other hand, imagines that speciesism as a cultural ideology 
obfuscates a 'truer' relationship to the reality of the animal world. For pro-
nationality, gender and sexuality as well as centring on species, readers could do no better 
than consult Susanne Kappeler's 'Speciesism, Racism, Nationalism ... or the Power of Scientific 
Subjectivity', in Animals and Women, ed. by Adams and Donovan, pp. 320-52. A light-hearted, 
if quite disturbing example of such an intersection happened to me when, on being given a 
vegetarian meal by a family friend, he said to me (with an uneasy laugh) 'Here's your lesbian 
food'! The economical condensation of the twin disavowals of lesbian sexuality and pro-
animal consciousness leaves one in no doubt as to the efficiency of such discursive 
intersections. 
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animal feminism as I have described it, such a relationship is the equality of 
humans and animals due to the integrity of the body-before-discourse. It is 
this relationship that provides the bedrock for a community of equal subjects 
based on total inclusion: essentially a community of sameness, rather than 
one that accepts otherness, whether it is of species or sexuality. Rejecting 
these implications of ideological reasoning, Butler's analysis offers instead 
the hint of a pro-animal politics that responds to her insistence that' every 
discourse operates through exclusion' (p. 189). Such a politics will no longer 
have the notion of the integrity of the body on which to rely but my claim is 
that it will be all the more rigorous for that. 
The reconfiguration of the influential pro-animal feminism of Adams 
and Donovan via Butler is amongst other things, then, a readjustment in 
critical focus from 'the body' to 'discourse'. This shift inevitably involves a 
parallel change in register towards that of a post-structuralist and 
psychoanalytically influenced feminism that is the critical method that most 
consistently inquires into the relationship between discourse and the body. 
As my analysis thus far makes clear, this relationship is fundamental to any 
reading of the politics of human-animal relationships. To be sure, such a 
development has its drawbacks, as theories such as Butler's that insist on the 
discursive nature of social relations of power have a tendency to slide into a 
linguistic essentialism that in one way is not all that far from the humanism 
they would critique. This slippage itself presupposes (or indeed enacts) the 
exclusion of animals from the 'community of subjects' that the pro-animal 
critic attempts to redress. Butler asks in a later text: 'can we imagine a subject 
apart from his or her linguistic bearing?'. She concludes that 'it seems that 
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this linguistic bearing might well qualify as something essential [ ... ] without 
which they could not be said to exist'.9 Such a circumscribing of subjectivity 
within the human-linguistic realm would seem to ignore the many 
developments in understanding of primates' and other species' subjectivities, 
even though these results of studies in primatology or cognitive ethology 
have found broad cultural recognition via the discourse of popular natural 
history. Nonetheless, pro-animal theory can benefit profoundly from Butler's 
sophisticated brand of feminist discussion. Therefore, my aim in the next 
section is to delineate the ways in which the animal politics of Surfacing 
exemplify the problems inherent in the appeal to an ethics of the body-
before-discourse. In my third and final section, I will look to the alternatives 
that the novel offers for pro-animal theory, chiming as they do with Butler's 
notion of a politics that acknowledges how all communities of subjects are 
formed through exclusion. 
II. Language, 'Being Human' and the Sacrifice of the Animal: 
The Animal Politics of Surfacing 
During the 1980s, in resonance with the feminism of the time, the critical 
focus on Surfacing was valuably shifted from a blunt reading of the novel as a 
revision of myth and indigenous religion or as an analysis of Canadian 
cultural nationalism; instead, critics saw this novel as a feminist search for the 
maternal body in language. Sherrill Grace aptly condenses this theme in 
describing the book as a drama of the 'discovery, articulation and recovery' 
9 Excitable Speech: Towards a Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 28, 30. 
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of the 'lost, silent mother' .10 This is an apt description, as far as it goes. 
However, Grace does not explore the way in which the possibility of 
eventually achieving such a conclusion is delicately tested by Atwood. In fact, 
the novel counterpoints to this maternal quest the female narrator's search 
for her father, one that also leads her away from her mother. For in the good 
tradition of the psychoanalytic description of Oedipal subject development, if 
the narrator's mother equates to the maternal body always-to-be recovered 
by the speaking subject, the search for her father in Surfacing figures her drive 
towards a place in the symbolic order of language. Now, complicating this 
tidy Lacanian schema, and of vital importance to my reading, is Atwood's 
insinuation into it of the narrator's tentative and confused search for an 
ethical relationship with animals. Surfacing resonates profoundly with my 
earlier reading of feminist pro-animal politics: the ethical relationship with 
the animal the novel explores is one which necessitates a drive away from 
discourse and from the ideology to which Adams refers, and towards the 
body. 
Part three of the novel details the narrator's thoroughgoing attempt to 
identify with animals, who 'have no need for speech', by denying the most 
basic elements of her encu1turation: 'I no longer have a name. I tried for all 
those years to be civilised but I'm not and I'm through pretending'.l1 In this 
10 'In Search of Demeter: the Lost, Silent Mother in Surfacing' in van Spankeren and Garden 
Castro (eds.), pp. 183-204, (p. 184). See also Rigney, pp. 54-55. The fullest reading in terms of 
psychoanalytic feminism's search for the pre-oedipal mother is Sally Robinson, "'The Anti-
Logos Weapon": Multiplicity in Women's Texts', Contemporary Literature, 29 (1988), 105-24. 
11 Margaret Atwood, Surfacing (1974) in The Margaret Atwood Omnibus, pp. 410, 400. On being 
named as an essential part of becoming a subject, or becoming human see Butler, Excitable 
Speech pp. 28 ff. On a matter of grammar, here and throughout the current thesis I often use 
personal rather than impersonal pronouns to refer to animals. This is intended to reflect the 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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sense, the animal is in a position analogous to the maternal body for 
psychoanalytic feminism: it is that which is before (or beyond) discourse. An 
image recurrently presented by the narrator of her mother surrounded by 
jays is perhaps the most telling and poignant example of this configuration. 
These birds are always just beyond the extension of the mother's reach. And 
the mother herself is always hazily described, eluding the grasp of the 
narrator's memory. But before I come to a reading of this vital image in the 
final section, which will serve my Butlerian pro-animal politics, I want to 
track the path of the narrator's developing animal ethics in these particular 
terms of the interplay between discourse and the animal (or maternal) body. 
The key moment in sparking this development is the narrator's 
encounter with a dead heron, shot by hunters: 'I turned around and it was 
hanging upside down by a thin blue nylon rope tied round its feet and 
looped over a tree branch, its wings fallen open. It looked at me with its 
mashed eye' (p. 356). The transfixing quality of this look signals a compelling 
agency of the animal, even beyond death, in its ability to interpellate the 
narrator into some form of relationship with it. The visual power of this 
identification, despite its undoubted genesis in the physicality of the 
mutilated animal, is almost a cognitive after-effect of the narrator's primary, 
visceral reaction: 'it was behind me, I smelled it before I saw it; then I heard 
the flies. The smell was like decaying fish' (p. 356). It is, first and foremost, 
the narrator's body that reacts with disgust to the presence of the animal's 
corpse. 
arguments I am making about the need to reconsider the way animals are considered other to 
the human constructed in and by language. 
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The gap between the narrator's bodily reaction and a more cultural or 
discursive one is most clearly marked by her companion David's response to 
the dead heron. Immediately, he captures it for his decidedly modernist art-
film, Random Samples. This film's discourse is motivated by a Jackson Pollock-
like aesthetics of chance, which David believes gives his work an 'organic' 
relationship with its physical subject matter, 'like a painter throwing paint at 
a canvas' (p. 328). Such a relationship fails to materialise, however: the film 
instead goes the way of all 'fleshy' modernism by stifling into a passive 
specularised object the physical body which it aims to capture in 
representation. That this stifling effect extends from the animal body to the 
human female is evident later when photographs, just like 'windows opening 
into a place [the narrator] could no longer reach', fail to capture completely 
her mother's communion with the birds; and when David wants to film his 
girlfriend Anna to juxtapose 'a naked lady with "big tits and a big ass'" with 
the dead heron (pp. 350, 371).J2 
At this juncture it is worth pausing at length to note that the complex 
interplay of visuality and physicality in this section of the novel fascinatingly 
reworks the relationship between humanity and animality as portrayed in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. For the repression of smell (and with it carnality) in 
favour of the development of sight and the aesthetic is at the basis of Freud's 
theory of the emergence of humanity in Civilisation and its Discontents.13 (And 
if David enacts his allegiance to this Freudian heritage in the production of 
12 Adams offers an extended critique of the interrelationships between women and animals 
due to their simultaneous passive positioning by the (male) gaze in Neither Man, chapter two. 
13 Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by 
James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1953-1974), XXI: The Future of an Illusion; Civilisation and 
Its Discontents; and other works (1961). 
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his film, then his modernist formal method seems quite appropriate.} 
However, as Cary Wolfe has noted in a sophisticated discussion of these 
matters, there is a fundamental aporia at the heart of Freud's humanist 
schema: 
the human being who only becomes human through an act of 
'organic repression' has to already know, before it is human, that the 
organic needs to be repressed, and so the Freudian 'human' is caught 
in a chain of infinite supplementarity, as Derrida would put it, which 
can never come to rest at an origin that would constitute a break with 
animality.14 
Wolfe helpfully reconfigures this deconstruction of Freud's humanism in 
post-Darwinian terms, and in doing so leads us back towards our reading of 
Atwood. 'The subject of humanism', Wolfe writes, 
is constituted by a temporal and evolutionary stratification or 
asynchronicity in which supposedly 'atavistic' or 'primitive' 
determinations inherited from our evolutionary past-our 
boundedness to circadian rhythms, say, or the various physiological 
chinks and frailties that foreground the body as profoundly other and 
physically determined by a fundamentally a-human universe of 
interactions-coexist uneasily in a second-order relation of relations, 
which the phantasmatic 'human' surfs or manages with varying 
degrees of success. (pp. 118-19) 
Wolfe's recognition that a deconstruction of the solid opposition 
between human and animal as set up by Freud can concomitantly be found in 
the philosophical implications of human biology is important for our reading 
14 Wolfe, 'Faux Post-Humanism', p. 118. These matters are also discussed in Akira Mizuta 
Lippit, Electric Animal: Towards a Rhetoric of Wildlife (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000), pp. 121-27. 
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of Surfacing. It leads him to argue that even if theory has recognised the forms 
of power that are implied by vision (and here he notes a critical lineage from 
Sartre to Foucault to Haraway), then this power is also 'ineluctably tied to the 
specifically human'. Indeed, if the transcendence of the human is purchased 
'only at the expense of repressing the other senses-and more broadly the 
material and the bodily as such with which they are associated-then the 
only way to recast the figure of vision (and therefore the human) is to 
resituate it as only one sense among many in a more general-and not 
exclusively human-bodily sensorium' (p. 119). 
Such a resituating is precisely what Atwood attempts when Surfacing'S 
narrator encounters the dead heron. Not only is the power of the gaze 
temporarily shifted (even if in a heavily circumscribed way) from the human 
to the (dead) animal with its affecting 'mashed eye'; but also the status of 
vision itself is undermined by a visceral reaction (the narrator's disgust).15 
And it's worth remarking here that although it is almost a critical cliche to 
note a critique of the logic of the gaze in Atwood's work, there has rarely 
been sustained inquiry into what exactly can be said to escape the gaze. Here, 
at least, it is smell that profoundly acts on the body of the narrator and 
prepares her for an ethical relationship with the animal; and smell is also the 
physical remainder inassimilable into David's representation of the dead 
animal in the discourse of his 'art'. As he replies-discounting the 
15 This problematic of the animal gaze is central to Derrida's most recent work on what he 
calls 'the question of the animal'. He goes as far as to suggest, in an uncharacteristically 
sweeping gesture, that the absence of 'the experience of the seeing animal, of the animal that 
looks' is a 'calculated forgetting' that is constitutive of Philosophy itself; and, more generally 
still, that absence marks 'an immense disavowal whose logic traverses the whole history of 
humanity', 'The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow)" trans. by David Wills, 
Critica/lnquiry, 28 (2002), 369-418 (pp. 383, 380). 
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importance of the smell, and hence its bodiliness-when his cameraman Joe 
complains that it "'really stinks"': '''that won't show in the movie [ ... J you 
can stand it for five minutes, it looks so great'" (p. 356). 
However, if the dead heron, in its irreducible physical materiality, 
suggests that the starting point for understanding the narrator's ethical 
relationship with the animal is the shared level of the body-the argument of 
current pro-animal feminism-then Atwood quickly sheds doubt on this 
straightforward possibility. Reading the position of the heron in the 
psychoanalytic schema of subject development which I have outlined 
(mother/animal=body : father=discourse) we see that while the bird is (as 
body) aligned with the mother, it is also, paradoxically, aligned with the 
father. Herons form a recurrent motif in Surfacing, and the striking visual 
imagery that represents them demands close attention. Describing a plane 
flying above her as 'an X in the sky', the narrator is reminded of an earlier 
vision of a heron 'flying above us the first evening [ ... J, legs and neck 
stretched, wings outspread, a bluegrey cross, and the other heron or was it 
the same one, hanging wrecked from the tree' (p. 375). Her almost 
compulsive remembering of the dead bird, which repeats the original 
traumatic encounter and underscores its ethically foundational status, here 
indicates the heron's structural parallelism with the narrator's lost father. 
By linking the heron to the 'X' Atwood evokes the narrator's search for 
the father that repeatedly takes the form of a search for an X marked on a 
map. Read at first as her father's signifiers for the location of indigenous 
cave-paintings that he had been researching, the signification of these XS 
becomes remarkably unstable. The X also indicates later the location of the 
father himself, and the number of significations proliferates further to 
suggest possible sites for paintings. The narrator furthermore acknowledges 
the equally unstable origin of the pictures signified by these XS when she 
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finds her father's hand-drawn reproductions. She first thinks they are 
hallucinogenic self-portraits, and then realises they are 'not originals, only 
copies' that trace the indigenous paintings. Hence they offer a symbolic way 
to find him by 'vindicating' the legacy of his research. Finally, they are read 
as his I guide' to help her understand the pantheistic power of the 
environment (pp. 347, 365, 370, 383). If X marks the spot at which the narrator 
presumes she will complete the search for the father, it would appear that 
such a search is doomed to ever-displaced failure. 16 Significantly, the search 
for the father is always also a search for a logic and language that can 
completely represent the physical world with no remainder: the logic of 
enlightenment rationalism that he explicitly values (p. 290), or indeed the 
artistic discourse of Random Samples. Stumbling with uncanny accuracy on a 
key insight of the post-structuralist critique of such discourses, the narrator 
finds during one of her early forays in search of her father, not that there is 
'no sign' of him, but there are 'too many signs' (p. 300). 
As we try to come to ethical terms with the animal by reading the dead 
heron image according to the psychoanalytic schema, it appears that the 
heron is positioned as that physicality which is irreconcilably beyond 
discourse (that is, aligned with the mother). Yet in being marked, like the lost 
father, by the signifier of the X, it is important that the heron also comes to 
indicate that this function will always itself be a figuration. The heron cannot 
actually be embodied in the narrator's written text; it can only symbolise that 
embodiment beyond discourse. Such an inability to escape the symbolic 
16 Here, Atwood's novel diverges slightly from the Lacanian schema, as for him it is the 
attempt to reach the mother, rather than the father, which necessitates the subject'S entry into 
the differential logic of language. 
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structure of language, of course, is the crucial position with respect to bodily 
materiality in the post-structuralist logic of the sign, as it has been aptly 
described by Judith Butler: 
The linguistic categories that are understood to 'denote' the 
materiality of the body are themselves troubled by a referent that is 
never fully or permanently resolved or contained by any given 
signified. Indeed, that referent persists only as a kind of absence or 
loss, that which language does not capture, but [ ... J which impels 
language repeatedly to attempt that capture, that circumscription-
and to fail. [ ... J To posit a materiality outside of language is still to 
posit that materiality, and the materiality so posited will retain that 
positing as its constitutive condition. (p. 67) 
How then to discern an ethical response to the animal from the novel's 
portrayal of this murdered heron, marking as it does this complex 
interrelation of discourse and the body? Perhaps the clearest explanatory way 
to do this is to follow Atwood's narrator, as in a short space of time she 
passes through a series of key stages in her adoption of an ethical 
consciousness about animals. By watching her thinking proceed from stage to 
stage, we can see more clearly the underlying logic that propels her beliefs,17 
By analysing in the first instance the complexities and ambiguities of the 
narrator's response to the heron, the ethical relation to the animal offered by 
the text as a whole will become clear. 
17 Also, this approach responds to an important fact about the novel that is implicit in the 
many readings of it as quest narrative, whether feminist, spiritual, psychological or otherwise: 
Surfacing is an essentially developmental novel in the sense that comments made by the 
narrator have to be judged by their chronological position, for she frequently contradicts 
herself, progressively uncovering 'truths' which she had repressed but then assimilates into 
the logic of her actions. 
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Vital to the narrator's response is the way she apportions blame for the 
heron's death. Wondering why the heron had been strung up 'like a lynch 
victim', she equates it to other 'trophies' that are displayed by hunters to 
'prove they could do it'. She recognises that since the wild heron cannot be 
'tamed or cooked or trained to talk, the only relation they could have to [it] 
was to destroy it', Reading the heron thus as, once again, a specularised 
object, she decides that 'it must have been the Americans' who killed it (p. 
357). This is a national group whose ability to unite animal display with the 
economic colonisation of Canada is noted early in the novel, as a gas station 
is advertised by a stuffed moose dressed in human clothes 'waving an 
American flag' (p. 270). Perhaps the narrator's most perceptive comment on 
this' American' commodification of nature is to recognise that the killing and 
display of the heron has a primarily sacrificial function; it provides the 
hunters with an object onto which they can project the unwanted parts of 
themselves. To use a term that is apposite for its etymology in the important 
place of the animal in such human procedures, the heron serves as a 
scapegoat. 
Interestingly, given my earlier reading of the logic of specularisation 
and the failure of representation vis-a.-vis the female and animal body, the 
narrator's perception of the sacrificial function of the heron appears in the 
context of the simultaneous objectification of woman and animal by David. 
He makes a sexualised joke that Canada's national emblem should be the 
'split beaver' and the narrator responds with a naivety which is anything but 
insignificant: she reads his pun literally, just as she earlier queries the old 
axiom that 'there's more than one way to skin a cat'. IIIWhy should it be 
split?" I said. It was like skinning the cat, I didn't get it'. This 
defamiliarisation helps reveal the function of David's metaphor. In his jocund 
collocation of woman and animal the bodiliness of female genitalia and 
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animality itself are both repressed, even symbolically butchered, in a 
misogynistic and speciesist configuration of the self. The narrator's mental 
response to his joke returns her to the scene of the heron's sacrifice: 'a part of 
the body, a dead animal. I wondered what part of them the heron was, that 
they needed so much to kill it' (pp. 358-59). 
Seen in this light, the narrator's sympathetic ethical response to the 
animal adumbrates Adams's pro-animal feminism, particularly in relation to 
her theory of the 'absent referent', which has been cogently described by 
Cary Wolfe and Jonathan Elmer: 
In speciesist, sexist society, both women and animals are subject to a 
twofold process of objectification through dismemberment (real or 
figurative) and renaming, a process that foregrounds edible or 
sexually charged body parts and makes what Adams calls an 'absent 
referent' of the subjectivity and ontogeny of the Other. Thus, for 
example, dead cows are 'meat,' baby ones 'veal,' [ ... ] and so on. The 
sexual absenting of women operates by the same sort of renaming of 
women as animals (chick, beaver, playboy bunny).18 
The narrator's ignorance of metaphor (split beaver/skinned cat) suggests a 
'respect for the literal' that Adams sees as vital to a pro-animal literature or 
criticism that would rescue the absent referent from this ideological 
renaming.t9 Indeed, I read this dismantling precisely as an attempted denial 
of the I sacrifice' inherent in the symbolic logic of metaphor itself, in which the 
vehicle (the 'real' animal) is eliminated by the metaphoric substitute. This 
18 'Subject to Sacrifice: Psychoanalysis, Ideology and the Discourse of Species in Jonathan 
Demme's Silence of the Lambs', Boundary 2, 22.3 (1995), 141-70 (p. 151). See Adams, Sexual 
Politics, chapter two. 
19 Sexual Politics, p. 104. Adams fleetingly refers to Surfacing in similar terms on pp. 183 and 
185. 
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process of dismantling continues as the narrator suddenly becomes aware of 
the act of killing involved in fishing. With the 'thud of metal on fish bone, 
skull, neckless headbody' comes the realisation that 'the fish is whole, I 
couldn't do it anymore, I had no right to'. The description of the fish as 
'whole,' and particularly as a 'neckless headbody' clearly resonates with 
Adams's animal-body politics, which refuses the phallogocentric separation 
of mind and body. The use of this description certainly prefaces the 
narrator's 'rescue' of some frogs that she had used to bait the fish while the 
others admire the 'murder[ed] cadaver'. It also leads to her recognition of the 
sacrificial logic that validates this use of the frogs just as it does their use in 
high school vivisection (p. 360). 
This reading is complicated, however, if we revisit for a moment a 
But1erian reading of linguistic reference to the body. For Butler, language 
operates 'by means of the displacement of the referent, the multiplication of 
signifiers at the site of the lost referent'-as we saw with the Xs marking the 
absence of the narrator's father. 'Indeed, signification requires this loss of the 
referent, and only works as signification to the extent that the referent 
remains irrecoverable' (p. 209, my emphasis). Wolfe and Elmer extend this 
psychoanalytic reading of the formation of the human subject in language 
and link it explicitly to the logic of sacrifice as it is inscribed in the inherently 
symbolic function of language. In doing so they make a vital point about the 
pro-animal feminist schema that posits the animal or female body as the lost 
referent of phallogocentrism. 'There is a powerful psychoanalytic account of 
[the] accession to culture,' they note; and in it 
what intervenes between child and mother, what effects the 
'primordial repression' -of mother, [ ... ] of 'nature' and 'the 
animal' -and erects thereby a regime of symbolic substitution and 
sacrifice, is in fact language itself, or rather symbolicity tout court. (pp. 
162-63) 
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This observation suggests that the living animal-whether it be heron, cat, 
beaver or fish - is not the absent, hidden reality behind speciesist ideological 
practice, as Adams claims. For, as Butler notes, the bodily referent is always 
beyond language. The animal-body is better considered (in Butler's terms) as 
the 'constitutive outside' of the discourse of speciesism. 
Indeed, to recapitulate my point made in section one, Butler's reading of 
the binary 'sexing' of the human being locates the gay or lesbian body as the 
constitutive outside of 'compulsory heterosexuality' (p. 18). Extrapolating 
from this, the critic who attends to this gendering of the human while 
attuned to the complementary functioning in it of speciesism-a discursive 
formation which repudiates the animal as sexism does the feminine and 
heterosexism does homosexuality-will go on to read the animal-body as the 
constitutive outside of what we might call, following Butler, 'compulsory 
humanity'. It is compulsory that we 'become' human, and this very becoming 
is a function of our renunciation of the animal. This reading allows a 
recognition of what I would call, with Wolfe and Elmer, the essentially 
sacrificial structure of language itself; or, again in Butler's terms, a 
recognition that 'every discourse operates through exclusion'. (As I will 
explain in more detail in the following chapter, when we look in particular at 
the pro-animal literary-critical methodology that Adams advocates, if the 
recognition that the animal body is always-already outside language renders 
problematic the concept of the animal as 'absent referent', then it suggests a 
redundancy in the use of 'literal language' to restore it.) 
In light of this Butlerian analysis of the animal politics of Surfacing, I 
want to explore more fully the implications of the narrator's putative denial 
of the metaphoric logic that sacrifices animals. The futility of such a denial 
quickly becomes clear. It is signalled by her insistence that such a 'sacrifice' 
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certainly jumps the species barrier, for humans do not only sacrifice the 
animal: 'anything we could do to the animals we could do to each other: we 
practiced on them first'. The narrator insists that 'the Americans'-for whom 
the only 'things worthy of life were human, their own kind of human'-are 
most responsible for the sacrificial repudiation of the animal in their killing of 
the heron. And if for the narrator 'guilt glitters on them like tinfoil', then 
perhaps the xenophobic rhetoric by which she apportions all blame for any 
abuses of power to 'the Americans' points to another sacrifice, another 
discursive exclusion (pp. 360, 366). But this time the sacrifice is in the human 
sphere. That her readiness to condemn entails its own form of exclusion is 
evident only when the hunters are revealed not as Americans but as a group 
of Canadians sporting New York Mets merchandise because they 'always 
root for the underdog'. Clearly, the scapegoating of I Americans' had simply 
served to relieve the narrator of responsibility or complicity in her own-and 
importantly the animals'-fate. For throughout the book we find the narrator 
searching for ways to justify any use of animals-from her pretence that fish 
might forgive her in advance if she prays for them to be caught or her belief 
that 'killing certain things is all right, food and enemies, fish and mosquitoes' 
(p. 312), to her remarks about indigenous Americans' strategies of atonement 
(p. 365). Since these strategies do not expiate her profound but 
unacknowledged guilt at using animals as a resource, she projects that guilt 
onto 'the Americans'. Envisioned as oppressors, they bear the weight of the 
guilt that she tries to repress. In this she mirrors the hunters who also project 
an unwelcome part of themselves onto the sacrificial heron. In their case, it 
was the animality that must be purged as they perform their masculinity and 
humanity. 
Atwood herself has shed some light on this complex configuration of 
victimisation and responsibility, guilt and sacrificial substitution in the 
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context of both animal and national politics. In response to a series of 
questions around the notion of guilt in Surfacing, she has said in an interview 
that what she was 'really into in that book was the great Canadian victim 
complex'.20 And in Survival, her survey of Canadian literature, Atwood 
argues that Canadian writers, from 'wild animal story' authors Seton and 
Roberts onwards, had been better able to write 'from the point of view of the 
animal' because of their perception of Canada's perpetual oppressive 
colonisation (whether by Britain or America). As she asks, faux-nai"ve: 'if 
animals in literature are always symbols, and if Canadian animal stories 
present animals as victims, what trait in our national psyche do these animal 
victims symbolise?' (p. 75). 1his perspective is clearly at play in Surfacing, in 
which the narrator identifies with the 'innocent' animals who 'get 
slaughtered because they exist' (p. 365). 
1his understanding of Canadian animal literature in terms of the 'victim 
complex' gives notice of a postcolonial analysis of national psychology, but in 
doing so suggests how postcolonial thinking can easily short-circuit pro-
animal politics. In the fiction of Graeme Gibson, Atwood finds a critique, 
which prefigures one found in Surfacing, of 'the need to see yourself as a 
victimised animal' (p. 81, her emphasis). For her, this is a cultural weakness 
or pathology that needs to be transcended because it short-circuits what she 
sees as a necessary progression in the national-cultural psychology of the 
Canadian from identifying with the victimised animal (exemplified by Seton 
and Roberts) through self-knowledge and self-definition (such as her own or 
Gibson's cultural analysis) to healthy self-respect. The problem with 
Atwood's otherwise valuable description of the progression from colonial to 
20 Conversations, p. 13. 
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postcolonial consciousness-aside from its slightly harsh impatience with a 
'victim complex' that might betoken the very real psychological effects of 
cultural disenfranchisement-is that such progression occurs in direct 
proportion to a concomitant disavowal of the animal's right to be an object of 
cultural concern.21 Atwood's assertion that animals are always symbols-that 
they can only bear anthropomorphic meaning such as providing the vehicle 
for cathartic explorations of Canada's national identity in victimisation-has 
an important corollary. She makes it logically impossible to render the 
victimisation of animals in literature. In doing so, she herself replicates the 
speciesist sacrificial logic that I have thus far used her novel to put to the test. 
Of course, Survival appeared in 1972; I would suggest that in the 
intervening decades Gibson has been replaced by another of Atwood's 
contemporaries, Timothy Findley, as the Canadian writer most committed to 
exploring the dynamics of human identification with animals. In a series of 
novels since The Wars, which won Canada's most prestigious literary prize 
(the Governor General's Award) in 1977, Findley describes the processes of 
social othering and repeatedly marks them with cross-species identifications. 
He examines a set of different social formations from the perspective of those 
21 Cary Wolfe makes a similar point about the implications of/for the animal of Homi 
Bhabha's deconstructive reconfiguration of postcolonial identity in terms of colonial mimicry 
and the destabilising 'time-lag' that it insinuates in Eurocentric constructions of what it means 
to be human: 'once we have rewritten the figure of the human in Bhabha's terms, it is still 
necessary to understand that if the colonised opens up a 'time-lag' in relation to the 
coloniser's modernity, then the non-human other is even slower than that, as it were, in relation 
to both those forms of the human'. If, for Bhabha, the importance of colonial mimicry is that 
it creates the possibility for the colonised of 'active agency of translation-the moment of 
making a name for oneself', then his work' elides, under the figure of the human, the right not 
to be colonised with the ability to engage in cultural translation'. ('Faux Post-Humanism', p. 
148). The irony of Bhabha's postcolonialism is that precisely because the animal cannot speak, 
to paraphrase Gayatri Spivak, its colonisation is secure. 
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human others the reality of whose lives is excluded by the hegemonic norm. 
One could summarily describe these scenarios as subjections: of Canadian 
adolescence to military/colonial masculinity (Robert Ross in The Wars); of 
empathy with others to instrumentalist patriarchy (Mrs. Noyes, Ham and 
Emma in Not Wanted on the Voyage); of a child's mental illness to the demands 
of middle-class social mobility (Lily in The Piano Man's Daughter); and of a 
son's need for parents' love to their need for sexual freedom in a post-nuclear 
family (Will in Spadework). But rather than representing human otherness in 
terms of a sort of colonisation of animals' victimhood (qua Gibson), Findley 
does three things. He represents cross-species identification as a result of, and 
spiritual cure for, his characters' being treated as outsiders: for example Lily's 
fascination with entomology in The Piano-Man's Daughter or Will's with a 
pack of crows in Spadework. Or, he situates the victimisation of animals as a 
conditional part of the process of social othering itself as with Emma's rape by 
Dr. Noyes using a murdered unicorn's hom in Not Wanted on the Voyage. Most 
significantly, the fight against abuses of animals goes hand in hand with 
resistance to other forms of dominance: in The Wars, the way Robert Ross 
rebels against the calamitous and callous military strategy of the British 
generals is to abscond with a troop of horses that he refuses to see ordered to 
an inevitable death. The importance of Findley's differences here from 
Gibson, or the Atwood of Survival, is that by them he explicitly ties his larger 
renunciation of social oppression to a proper concern for animals' lives 
themselves, rather than making the latter a screen for the former. Such 
concern is actually abrogated by Atwood's postcolonialism.22 
22 The Wars (London: Faber, 2001), Not Wanted on the Voyage (London: Arena, 1986), The Piano 
Man's Daughter (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1995), Spadework (London: Faber, 2002). 
Scholtmeijer touches on Atwood's ideas about the animal victim with surprising brevity in 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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Perhaps an explanatory path through the differences can be found by 
returning to Surfacing and following the stages of its narrator's own reaction 
to the discovery of her shared nationality with the hunters. Her response is to 
remove from her xenophobia whatever basis Gustifiable or not) it had in the 
substantive realities of North American geo-politics. 
But they'd killed the heron anyway. It doesn't matter what country 
they're from, my head said, they're still Americans [ ... ]. They spread 
themselves like a virus, they get into the brain and take over [ ... ]. If 
you look like them and talk like them and think like them then you 
are them, I was saying, you speak their language, a language is 
everything you do. (p. 367) 
Here, the narrator de-essentialises nationality, representing it as a matter of 
linguistic or cultural mindset instead of one of geographical or genealogical 
origin. Consequently, she is able tentatively to maintain the othering of 
Americans that shores up her own victimised, and hence guiltless, position. 
Yet the dispersal from within stable national boundaries of abusive power-
or as she calls it, 'evil' -as a virally proliferating cultural construction only 
provides the narrator with the resultant problem of pinpointing its original 
causes. 'But how did [the Americans] evolve, where did the first one come 
from?' she asks (p. 367). Remembering her post-war childhood she becomes 
increasingly aware of the ubiquity of scapegoating, and its failure to purify 
the world of oppression: 'if only he could be destroyed everyone would be 
saved, safe [but] Hitler was gone, and the thing remained' (p. 367). In the face 
of this collapse of the logic of sacrificial substitution, the narrator confronts 
Animal Victims, pp. 84-85. She also ignores Findley's challenge to them in her analysis of Not 
Wanted on the Voyage (pp. 244-49), which differs from my approach by judging the novel in 
terms of its animal politicS rather than inquiring into how those politics intersect with broader 
cultural concerns. 
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again the dead heron, 'still there, hanging in the hot sunlight like something 
in a butcher's window, desecrated, unredeemed. It smelled worse' (p. 367). 
Re-experiencing this bodily identification with the animal, only this time 
without scapegoats to blame for its death, the narrator reaches perhaps the 
key stage in the development of the animal politics of Surfacing. She feels' a 
sickening complicity, sticky as glue, blood on my hands'. 'The trouble some 
people have being German,' she thinks, 'I have being human' (p. 368). 
Inspired by this acceptance of guilt-which I might venture is a common 
feeling, even if not expressed in these terms, amongst animal advocates-she 
relives her liberation of animals from her brother's childhood vivisection 
'laboratory', only to find there a further complicity. Her fear of his angry 
reaction had allowed many others to die (p. 369). Through this series of 
realisations the scapegoating of 'the Americans' as an means to assuage her 
guilt appears as just another exercise of exclusive power, an exercise which 
the narrator characterises as constitutive of 'being human'. In an attempt to 
void herself of this power the narrator compulsively clings to her Rousseau-
like innocent childhood visions of the 'peaceable kingdom': 'I didn't want 
there to be wars and death, I wanted them not to exist; only rabbits with their 
coloured egg houses, sun and moon orderly above the flat earth, summer 
always, I wanted everyone to be happy' (p. 369). As Atwood describes the 
narrator: 
she wishes not to be human, because being human inevitably 
involves being guilty, and if you define yourself as innocent, you 
can't accept that [ ... ] you refuse to accept power. You refuse to admit 
that you have it, then you refuse to exercise it, because the exercise of 
power is defined as evil. (Conversations, pp. 13, 14-15) 
If this all seems to invoke Butler's argument that power 'orchestrates, 
delimits and sustains [ ... ] the human' then it is because Atwood's belief, 
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borne out in the text, is that sacrificial substitution-Butler's 'constitutive 
exclusion' -is just such a human inevitability. 
This conclusion is nowhere more obvious than in the text's playing out 
of Atwood's assertion that 'what the heroine does at the end of Surfacing 
results from taking a hypothesis and pushing it as far as it goes: what 
happens when you identify with the animals?' (Conversations, pp. 43-44). I 
want to claim that the result of Atwood's animal politics in Surfacing is 
indeed a BUtlerian one, and to do so I return to the narrator's bodily 
identification with the dead heron and 'neckless headbody' of the fish. As I 
argued earlier, this identification aligns the animal body with the lost 
maternal one; this alignment is entirely consonant with pro-animal 
feminism's 'identifying with the animals' on the level of the body. Atwood 
makes the connection clear after comparing the 'unredeemed' heron and all 
animals to Christ - that ultimate sacrificial 'lamb'. Strung up in the shape of 
an X, the heron is an 'unsacred crucifix'. 
Whether it died willingly, consented, whether Christ died willingly, 
anything that suffers and dies instead of us is Christ [ ... ]. The animals 
die that we might live [ ... ]. And we eat them, out of cans or 
otherwise; we are eaters of death, dead Christ flesh resurrecting 
inside us, granting us life. (p. 375) 
This passage obviously collapses two Christian notions, the sacrament and 
the crucifixion, to recognise the physically and spiritually redemptive 
function of meat for human beings, as well as the sacrificial substitution of 
animals that a carnivorous diet involves. There is also an intimate connection 
between the sacrificial logic at work here and the denial of the body in 
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enlightenment humanism. Indeed, this connection has recently been marked 
by Derrida in his extension of his already quoted description of western 
cultural logic to carno-phallogocentrism.23 Unlike meat-eaters, however, the 
narrator in her guilt goes 'unredeemed' like the heron. Her oft-commented 
upon dive into the lake, which immediately follows, offers this redemption 
and in doing so marks her most explicit configuration of animal body and 
maternal body as the sacrificed others of humanity. 
The 'spiritual' or 'baptismal' nature of this dive and its vital place in the 
textual construction of the narrator's identity has been repeatedly noted by 
critics, yet its function in the novel's animal politics has not. Marking her 
imagined equivalence to the victimised animal, the dive explicitly parallels 
the narrator's earlier release of the frogs which she had been using as fishing 
bait: she dives 'letting out air like a frog', evoking the way that they had 
'slipped into the water' (pp. 376, 360). And it is precisely via this state of 
identification that the narrator is able to confront the trauma of her own 
determined non-acceptance of the maternal body, her abortion-the function 
of the dive as it is usually read. Indeed, she remembers the aborted foetus 
itself in terms of animal abuse, 'in a bottle curled up, like a cat pickled' (p. 
378). The foetus was the bodily part of her that she rejected, precisely the 
heron's function for the hunters. However, she is not able to maintain the 
distance insinuated by the sacrificial logic that underpinned the hunters' 
killing of the bird: 'it was filled with death, it was touching me' (p. 377). This 
confrontation with abjected maternity and animality-for the narrator's lover 
23 "'Eating Well", or the Calculation of the Subject', trans. by Peter Conner and Avital Ronnel, 
in Points: lnteroiews 1974-1994, by Jacques Derrida, ed. by Elizabeth Weber, trans. by Peggy 
Kamuf and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 255-87 (pp. 280-81). 
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the foetus 'wasn't a person, only an animal' -marks the start of the narrator's 
thorough merging with the victimised animal. As such, it prefigures the 
rejection of her humanity undertaken in the third part of the novel: 
I realised it wasn't the men I hated, it was the Americans, the human 
beings, men and women both. [ ... ] I wanted there to be a machine 
that could make them vanish, a button I could press that would 
evaporate them without disturbing anything else, that way there 
would be more room for animals, they would be rescued. (p. 387) 
This is perhaps the key passage for my Butlerian reading of the novel's 
animal politics, not least because the passage unselfconsciously reveals that 
attempts to rid the world of abusive power can so easily slide into a terrorism 
that replicates that power's very logic. This passage is important also because 
the narrator's attempt to purify herself of the power inherent to her 
humanity, an attempt to create for herself a non-human world, is explicitly a 
refusal of sacrificial or substitutive logic. With Butler as well as Wolfe and 
Elmer, I earlier identified this logic as characteristic of language itself, of 
'symbolicity tout court'. The narrator's renunciation of substitution is also a 
renunciation of language. 
The narrator makes it quite clear that language is a problem, for 
'language divides us into fragments,' while I she wants to be whole' like I the 
animals [who] have no need for speech' (pp. 381, 410). Furthermore, she 
indicates that the symbolicity inherent in language is itself the problem in the 
ethics by which she understands fishing: 'if we dived for them and used our 
own teeth to catch them, fighting on their own grounds, that would be fair, 
but hooks were substitutes' (p. 365). The narrator thus attempts to fashion a 
level playing field for human and animal, an ethical field devoid of power, by 
refusing humanity access to anything but its own natural tekhne. In a passage 
that suggests that the novel's logic drives towards concerns that are strictly 
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environmentalist, rather than pro-animal, the narrator rejects the setting up 
of any distinctions or borders such as her father's fenced garden. The 
narrator's attempt to forge herself into a symbiotic part of a holistic natural 
environment in disavowal of these most literal of human cultural barriers is 
another indication that the symbolic logic of language is a problem.24 Such 
demarcations, like those between subject and object, or sign and referent are 
essential to the logic of language and so to renounce them is to renounce 
language itself. 
Of course the very possibility of such a denial of the gap between word 
and absent referent is exactly what is at issue in my Butlerian critique of 
Adams's pro-animal criticism. And as I have argued, identification with the 
animal on the level of the body-such as the narrator's attempt to suffuse 
herself in animality by abrogating symbolic-sacrificial substitution-is 
eventually seen by Atwood to fail. It fails precisely because it necessarily 
entails a rejection of human community. At the novel's close the narrator 
must return to some sort of place in human society: 'withdrawing is no 
longer possible and the alternative is death' (p. 418). Indeed, Atwood 
predates Butler in recognising that any abrogation of language in celebration 
of the body will in the end always be just that, an abrogation. Atwood makes 
this most explicit when detailing the narrator's futile attempt to divest herself 
of all the trappings of human productivity. In a gesture that ironically adds to 
the proliferating signification of XS earlier in the novel, the narrator attempts 
24 See p. 409. Atwood advocates an environmentalist position in her non-fictional statements 
such as Suroival. There, her explicit concern to question 'the great Canadian victim complex' 
insists that the type of identification with individually victimised animals that promotes pro-
animal thought in Surfacing is unhealthy in contemporary human society. She concedes 
however, that one should be 'humane to animals or protect the wolf' (p. 81). 
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to 'sacrifice' her possessions by symbolically scratching a cross onto a 
suitcase and 'x-ing it out' (p. 406). 
Julia Kristeva has most succinctly captured the impossibility at the heart 
of the narrator's aporetic project here to cancel out the stain of discourse 
symbolically: 'purification is something only the Logos is capable of'.25 
Agreeing with this point, Butler suggests in her psychoanalytic reading of the 
substitutive logic of language that there must remain a gap between word 
and referent. 'Were the referent to be recovered this would lead to psychosis, 
and the failure of language', and of subjectivity itself, she writes (p. 209). And 
if that state of psychosis which means exclusion from human linguistic 
community must be avoided, so too must the narrator 'surface' from her 
immersion in animality in order to attempt what Atwood calls the 'supposed 
ideal' of becoming a 'whole human being' (Conversations, p. 16). This 
surfacing happens at the moment of the narrator's re-entry into language, the 
recognition that 'the name of the father' must also mean the absence of the 
father himself, and the simultaneous acknowledgement of the otherness of 
the animal: 
I say father 
He turns towards me and it's not my father. [ ... ] I'm not 
frightened, it's too dangerous for me to be frightened of it; it gazes at 
me for a time with its yellow eyes, wolf's eyes, depthless but lambent 
as the eyes of animals seen at night in the car's headlights. Reflectors, 
it tells me it has nothing to tell me, only the fact of itself. (p. 414) 
This is an extremely ambivalent description of the father-wolf's eyes: first, 
they are depthless (that is, both 'unfathomably deep' and 'shallow and 
25 Powers of Horror (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 27. 
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superficial', OED); moreover, if the wolf allows for no more than basic 
phenomenological knowing, with 'nothing to tell [ ... ] but the fact of itself', 
then the symbolism with which its eyes are described suggests that such 
knowing will destroy it.26 1his ambivalence indicates that the wolf's 
'otherness' must ultimately be recognised as an aspect of the self, as it is 
when the narrator finds that the wolf/father's footprints are in fact her own 
(p.416). 
Yet this assimilation is of a particular kind. The narrator's re-entry into 
language itself entails another form of surfacing: 
From the lake a fish jumps 
An Idea of a fish jumps 
A fish jumps, carved wooden fish with dots painted on the 
sides, no, antlered fish thing drawn in red on cliffs tone, protecting 
spirit. It hangs in the air suspended, flesh turned to icon. 
I watch it for an hour or so; then it drops and softens, the circles 
widen, it becomes ordinary fish again. (p. 415) 
We see here the narrator's re-acceptance of linguistic substitution (after her 
'submersion' into the animal world) and her perception of the animal's 
inevitable elevation in the process of human linguistic cognition from real to 
symbolic meaning. Indeed, the highly literary representation of this 
progression by a textual change from free-form poetry to punctuated prose 
seems almost to presume its inevitability. Only after this progression is made, 
and it is granted that to know the animal is necessarily to know symbolic 
representations of it, can the fish 'become ordinary' again. However, if we are 
26 This passage is reminiscent of the narrator's most thoroughgoing moment of identification 
with the animals, hoping to escape the search party for her when they arrive on the island: 
she has 'rabbit's choices: freeze, take the chance they won't see you; then bolt' (p. 412). 
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to read this ordinariness as a state of autonomous being, then that autonomy 
must also bear some of the ambivalence that applied to the wolf. 
What are we left with then, in surveying the animal politics of Surfacing? 
Clearly, there is recognition that humanity cannot 'identify with the animals'. 
Our construction in language requires the sacrificial substitution of both the 
animal and the (maternal) body. Yet, as both Atwood and Butler show, a 
simple renunciation of this construction-identifying with the animals and 
accepting the integrity of the body, the position of pro-animal feminism-is 
clearly impossible. At the end of the novel, Atwood offers us a character who 
must perforce abandon the position of victim in order to function in human 
society (p. 418); but in doing so she must renounce her bodily connection 
with animals, and admit the absence of the maternal. To put it succinctly, 
Surfacing suggests that pro-animal politics is 'humanly' impossible. 
At this point it is worth briefly picking out some parallels with two 
other novels that offer correctives to this conclusion of Atwood's text: the 
first is Catherine Bush's Minus Time, the second Milan Kundera's The 
Unbearable Lightness of BeingP Bush's novel includes some fascinating echoes 
of Surfacing; so much so that it can be considered a 1990s response to it. Set in 
Toronto and North Ontario, it switches between first and third person 
narration to relate the life of a Canadian woman in her early twenties, Helen 
Urie, who develops a commitment to animal rights while trying to come to 
terms with the lack of a maternal presence in her life. The major difference 
from Surfacing in terms of these texts' mother-daughter relationships, 
however, is that in Minus Time questions about the absent mother do not 
27 Minus Time (London: Serpent's Tail, 1995); The Unbearable Lightness of Being, trans. by 
Michael Henry Heim (London: Faber, 1985). 
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centre on maternity and the body per se, but on how the structural shift in 
women's employment from home to workplace during the sixties affects 
their daughters' late twentieth-century femininity. In terms of the 
relationship between that femininity and animal politics, though, Bush offers 
a more profound reconfiguration of Surfacing'S logic. The novel recounts 
Helen's ambivalent reaction both to the absence from home that her mother's 
job requires and to the celebrity that it entails (Helen'S mother is the first 
woman Canadian astronaut). The ambivalence lies in the fact that her 
mother's achievements both compel and overshadow Helen's own 
progression out of adolescence while her prolonged absence (by 
undermining childhood security) renders unstable the foundation for that 
progression. 
In light of this, Helen's commitment to animal rights risks being 
presented, quite conventionally, as an act of rebellion that is a part of her 
liminal status as an adolescent; 'just a phase', as they say, that she will leave 
behind as she emerges from the maternal shadow. However, Helen in fact 
desperately tries to hide the connection to her famous mother and refuses to 
use the publicity of her mother's space-trip to bolster that of a pro-animal 
rally organised by her animal activist group ('United Species'). 'I'm doing this 
because I believe in it', she thinks, 'This has nothing to do with my mother' (pp. 
237-38, Bush's emphasis). Doing so, Helen insists that pro-animal politics is 
kept separate from daughter-mother identification and consequently on the 
irreducibility of belief in animal rights to a question about adolescent 
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identity. Such a reduction is what happens in Surfacing, when all is said and 
done.28 
Turning now to The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the final chapter of that 
novel thoughtfully explores the relationship of a woman called Teresa with 
her dying dog Karenin. Teresa (also not unlike Surfacing's narrator) feels that 
her identity and her relationships with men are in crisiS.29 Teresa's bonds 
with Karenin offer a means to comment on her relationship with her 
philandering husband Tomas; they also suggest people's need in a post-
Christian age to position themselves psychologically as victims of the control 
of others. Thus, Teresa empathises with Karenin and other animals by 
identifying with their absolute weakness before human acts of power. In this, 
Kundera is rather like Atwood. His modulation of this story, though, is to 
suggest that although the future happiness of Teresa and Tomas requires her 
28 The idea that pro-animal commitment is the province of adolescent naivety is a cultural 
cliche widespread enough not to require documentation here. A recent literary example 
though is Zadie Smith's White Teeth (London: Penguin, 2000), in which a character called 
Joshua Chalfen's attachment to a group of animal rights activists is satirised as the 
consequence first of a crush on the group's leader, and second of rebellion against his 
bourgeois parents, but not of concern for animals. These facts combine with the group's 
manipulative co-opting of Joshua because his father is a vivisector to demean their ethical 
concerns about Marcus Chalfen's genetic experimentation on animals and resignify them as 
examples of the fundamentalism (another pro-animal cliche) that the text elsewhere 
condemns. The result is that animals are the first casualty of what the text portrays as a 
properly adult awareness of pluralism. T. Coraghessan Boyle similarly represents animal 
activism as a ridiculous pursuit serving an adolescent's hidden sexual agenda that is 
ultimately foiled by the manipulativeness of the object of desire in 'Carnal Knowledge', in 
Without a Hero (London: Granta, 1995), pp. 123-44. 
29 The place of animal ethics in this novel requires a much longer discussion than I could 
attempt here. It would need to attend both to the complex structural importance of animal 
ethics in the novel's broader philosophical logic (they appear only in the final chapter yet 
seem essential to the final understanding of the main protagonists) and to the unexpected 
provenance of profound pro-animal thinking in a novel from Eastern-Europe. Sadly without 
mentioning Kundera, Simons (pp. 10-11) describes the perception in post-communist 
countries' literary circles that pro-animal thought is frankly absurd given the human horrors 
that abound. 
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to divest herself of such victim-thinking the need to empathise with animals 
remains in fact a valid one given the existential rootlessness of contemporary 
human life (p. 290). Indeed, for Kundera, neither Teresa's recognition that her 
passivity is itself a possessive and selfish form of control over Tomas nor, in 
tum, her desire to renounce it, compromises her ethical sympathy with 
animals (p. 302). In fact the chapter is filled with statements like the following 
about animal ethics which stand unquestioned in the authoritative narrative 
discourse of the text; some are so powerful that they have often found their 
way into the literature of animal rights groups.30 
True human goodness, in all its purity and freedom, can come to the 
fore only when its recipient has no power. Mankind's true moral test, 
its fundamental test (which lies deeply buried from view), consists of 
its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: animals. And in this 
respect mankind has suffered a fundamental debacle, a debacle so 
fundamental that all others stem from it. (p. 281) 
Sadly, Kundera does not really develop in the novel this radical 
proposition, which I would regard as entirely consonant with my discussion 
of the discursive construction of the human in section one (to the extent that 
animals have most consistently been the other against which humanity has 
defined itself).31 Nonetheless, in terms of human-animal relations, the novel's 
30 For example, Vegan Outreach: http://www.veganoutreach.orglwhyvegan! compassion.html; 
Northwest Animal Rights Network: http://www.narn.orglquotes.shtml; International Vegetarian 
Union: http://www.ivu.orglpeople/ quotes/goodevil.html. 
31 Derrida has claimed that an ethics based on animals' passivity-epitomised by what is 
perhaps the ur-text of animal rights thinking, Jeremy Bentham's claim in The Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (1789) that 'The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, 
Can they suffer?'-is the fundamental challenge to the metaphysics of presence that subtends 
western philosophy. See 'The Animal', p. 396. Bentham is quoted by Peter Singer in his edited 
volume In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 5. 
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main difference from the apparent logic of Surfacing (in which pro-animal 
politics were incompatible with a psychologically healthy humanity) lies in 
the fact that Teresa's renunciation of victim mentality is a result of her 
recognition that both Karenin's love for her and the love it occasions in 
return, unlike her experiences of parental or conjugal love, are entirely selJIess 
gifts to the other (pp. 289-90). 
Despite the correctives that Bush and Kundera's novels offer in terms of 
the animal politics we have found in the novel, there is something insistent in 
Surfacing, not a voice or an event but an image, which points to the possibility 
of an ethical relation to the animal similar to the one suggested by Kundera. It 
is the image of the narrator's mother and her gift of food to the birds. I want 
in my brief final section to suggest, albeit tentatively, that this image implies a 
pro-animal ethics of otherness, that seems to exceed Atwood's own 
pronouncements. 
III. Surfacing and the Ethics of Animal Otherness 
If the legacy of the narrator's father is that the 'real' animal, the bodily 
animal, is possessed of an otherness that can never itself be shared by 
humanity, only subsumed into the self-identity of human understanding, 
then the mother, the only person in the narrator's life who 'prohibited 
cruelty', offers something very different, a gift 'simple as a hand' (pp. 369, 
383). The hand in question is the mother's own as it is repeatedly 
remembered by the narrator, always 'stretched out' towards the jays that she 
often feeds (pp. 301, 324, 350, 411). In the distance between human and 
animal marked by the mother's perpetual reaching, the birds maintain their 
difference from her, despite her desire to close this gap; indeed, one of the 
few biographical facts we hear about the mother is her injurious attempt to 
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fly as a child (p. 362). It is clear, though, that the impossibility of complete 
identification with the birds does not imply a steadfast divide. We might also 
explicitly contrast the hand's continual reaching towards the animal other with 
the notion of capturing it. Such a capturing is permissible in the ethics that 
results from the narrator's refusal of 'substitutes' and human productivity: 
'perhaps I can catch a bird or a fish with my hands, that will be fair' (p. 410). 
The difference between the narrator and her mother here marks the 
difference between an ethics that tries to reach beyond the fundamentally 
exclusionary logic of any identity formation-a logic that is constitutive of 
'the human' -and one that imagines the figure of humanity can be divested 
of such exclusions and returned to equity with nature. As was suggested by 
my earlier allusion to Atwood's political statements, this is perhaps the 
difference between pro-animal ethics on the one hand and strictly 
environmental ethics on the other. 
The narrator's logic is flawed, of course, in thinking of the 'catching' 
hand as not being tainted by human technicity. In ignorance of now 
developing ethological knowledge of tool-use amongst the great apes, the 
hand has conventionally been considered as the locus of an essentially 
human technical capacity of which such substitutes are only an extension. 
This is what Stanley Cavell has called 'the fantasy of the apposable thumb'. 
As such, the hand stands as a key figure for the human-animal divide. 
However, a more conceptually nuanced idea of the hand's human-ness has 
recently been subject to deconstruction, by Derrida and others.32 Derrida's 
32 See Derrida, 'Geschlecht II, Heidegger's Hand', in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. by 
John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 161-195 (pp. 168-176); see also 
Cary Wolfe, 'In the Shadow of Wittgenstein's Lion: Language, Ethics and the Question of the 
Animal', in ZoontoJogies: The Question of the Animal, ed. by Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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discussion is in fact very pertinent here because it revolves around 'the 
opposition of the gift and the grip' (p. 176)-two functions of the hand that 
separate the narrator and her mother. Derrida explains a philosophical idea 
of the human hand that 'belongs to the essence of the gift, of a giving that 
would give, if this is possible, without taking hold of anything' (p. 173, his 
emphasis); this idea has been opposed to the notion of simple 'grasping' that 
has been thought available to the animal, at least in the Heideggerian 
discourse he is critiquing. This definition of hands as giving comes very close 
to describing those of the narrator's mother in Surfacing. Yet, for Derrida, the 
idea of the 'giving' hand cannot correctly be used to demarcate human from 
animal: 'nothing is less assured than the distinction between giving and 
taking' (p. 176). Similarly, the mother's giving hands simultaneously reach 
towards the birds while suggesting her difference from them. 
Surfacing'S contrast between seeking (or being tantalised by) animals 
and capturing them also brings into view the link between the animal ethics I 
am sketching here and Butler's political project. That project follows from her 
assertion of the constitutive nature of exclusion in any social field. 
Developing this assertion, I have argued that the exclusion of the animal, as a 
figure of the 'inhuman', is constitutive of the human community. Yet for 
Butler, exclusions of this kind are inevitable: every social formation-whether 
it is sexuality, nationality or race-has its others. Her political project, 
therefore, is to try to redefine those socially excluded positions as 'a set of 
future possibilities for inclusion', rather than dreaming of a community empty 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 1-58 (pp. 20-23); Cavell is quoted by Wolfe on p. 21; 
on Derrida, and for a reading of the hand motif in contemporary animal-based art, see Steve 
Baker, 'Sloughing the Human', in Wolfe (ed), pp. 147-164 (pp. 149-157). 
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of all human power relations. 'The ideal of radical inc1usivity is impossible', 
Butler states, but that very impossibility demands that a socius defined by 
political and ethical hospitality should extend welcome to those excluded 
beings-as animals certainly are by the current constitution of society-
whose lives form the 'not-yet-assimilable horizon of community' (p. 193). 
Figuring the animal other, the ever-elusive jays are just such a horizon, I 
would argue. In terms of the animal politics of Sutfacing, then, the 'gift' of the 
mother exceeds that of the father. His gift characterises the text's most 
apparent trajectory as I have described it: that human subjectivity, always-
already in language, necessitates the otherness of the animal. The maternal 
gift is essential because it insists that such an otherness is neither a reason for 
fear, nor indeed a validation for cruelty. Rather, in the words of Steve Baker's 
pertinent invocation of Luce lrigaray, animals' difference is 'a space for 
wonder'. It propels our always-human attempts to reach beyond our 
humanity and towards the animal,33 
33 An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Catherine Porter (London: Athlone, 1993), p. 73, qtd. 
in Baker, 'Review Essay', p. 84. Professor Catherine Rainwater made editorial comments in 
response to an early draft of this chapter. 
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FROM REPRESENTATION TO IMAGINATION: 
GETTING CLOSE TO ANIMALS WITH ALICE WALKER'S 
THE TEMPLE OF My FAMILIAR 
Introduction 
There is a surprise and something of an irony embedded in the fact that of 
those few African-American women who emerged as 'important new voices' 
on the American literary scene in the late 1960s and 1970s-Maya Angelou, 
Toni Morrison, Gloria Naylor and Alice Walker-it is in Walker that 
academic critical interest has proportionately most waned during the past 
decade. It is not just that this has occurred despite the exponential growth of 
her popularity outside the academy. In fact, the abruptness of the critical tum 
away from Walker's work is brought into relief by a comparison with 
Morrison in particular, who during the nineties has reached almost canonical 
status, particularly on the strength of her novel Beloved. By comparison, The 
Temple of My Familiar, which Walker published two years after Morrison's 
novel, and the largely hostile critical reaction to it mark the start of a recoiling 
from Walker's work as an object of critical concern. This is surprising at first 
given that, like Beloved, Temple is a novel that merges historical fact with 
creative rewriting to develop its abiding concerns with personal and cultural 
memory in African-American life, with racial and gender power relations, 
and with the effects of colonisation on meaning in general. Moreover, The 
Temple of My Familiar nails its postmodern colours to the formal mast much 
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more brazenly than does Beloved-from its juxtaposition of multiple genres, 
forms and literary styles to its incorporation of intertextual reference, 
pastiche, irony and kitsch. The lack of critical interest in the novel is all the 
more ironic, however, given that Walker's shared concerns with Morrison 
are housed by her novel's narration of its characters' consciousness-raising 
searches for personal-political identity. For this would seem to make it ideal 
critical territory in the decade whose defining critical drive was identity 
politics. Another side of the irony is that although all this takes place in the 
context of the novel's reimagining of human relations with nature and the 
animal world, the other emergent critical field of the last decade for which 
this should signal its interest, ecocriticism, has not embraced it either.1 
It is not my intention here to develop explanations for the shift in 
critical interest away from Walker's work in general or from this novel in 
particular. However, I do want to suggest that if the novel has fallen between 
two critical stools-its concern with holistic ecology, ecospirituality and 
animal ethics putting off those interested in representations of race or 
gender; its extended focus on racial memory, feminist consciousness and 
personal identity-politics deterring green critics-then that very fact suggests 
its importance for my project. For I want to claim that (in political terms at 
least) the real value of The Temple of My Familiar only appears not just when 
we consider its race, gender or ecological politics, but rather when its 
1 To date, on my count, only six articles and a chapter in the two full books on Walker have 
been dedicated to the novel, with a few more comparing it to Beloved. This is a bigger tally 
than is reported in Adam Sol's 'Questions of Mastery in Alice Walker's The Temple of My 
Familiar', Critique, 43 (2002), 393-404 (p. 399). While most of the novel's academic critics pay 
some attention to its representations of nature, only one reads it from within an ecocritical (in 
fact, ecofeminist) framework: Amanda Greenwood, /liThe Animals Can Remember": 
Representations of the Non-Human Other in Alice Walker's The Temple of My Familiar', 
Worldviews, 4 (2000), 164-78. 
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recodings of gender, race and postcolonialism are seen as supporting a more 
general reconfiguration of human-animal relations. So, when one character in 
the novel says that I Africa itself became-was made-in the world 
imagination, an uninhabited region, except for its population of wild and 
exotic animals. On the maps of Africa of five hundred years ago [ ... ] 
Europeans placed elephants where there were towns', we should hear in that 
assertion not just an indictment of the conventional racist figuration of Africa 
as absence, mute and void of civilisation.2 We should hear also the quieter 
recognition that this recoding of Africa as empty of humans, and thus ready 
for geo-political possession, allowed the institutional practice of speciesism 
that manifests itself in a violent commodification of the animal body, by 
hunting and the ivory trade for example. 
Listening for such confluences of cultural politics and animal politics in 
the novel, and more specifically listening for the suggestion in them of the 
difficulty with which otherness of a cultural or animal kind can be 
represented at all, allows us to discern the importance of Walker's novel for 
both pro-animal discourse and a wider cultural criticism alike. I will explain 
these matters in more detail below via a lengthy discussion of how The 
Temple of My Familiar and its representation of animals might intervene in 
debates about the social construction of race and gender. For now, though, it 
will suffice to say that the difficulty of representing animals' difference from 
humans is presented in the text as first and foremost a problem of language 
and of animals' exteriority to it. 
2 Alice Walker, The Temple of My Familiar (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 168-69. 
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Now, it is generally taken for granted that it is only in imaginative or 
literary creations that nonhuman animals can speak. Yet even in classic 
fictional examples of talking animals such as Aesop's Fables or The Jungle Book 
it is easily understood that animals are simply voicing human ideas and 
concerns and are certainly in no sense speaking for themselves. Despite 
research on chimpanzees' use of sign language, and even if we allow that 
animals can communicate to us some elemental needs or wishes, it is usually 
agreed that real communication between humans and animals, such as on 
the level that occurs when one human speaks to another, is impossible. That 
is to say, humans' use of language separates them from other animals. Or, 
more precisely, with their lack of language animals must always be thought 
of as at a distance from humans in a way that humans are not separated from 
one another. 
Of course, we saw in chapter one that confidence in the irrevocability of 
this separation lies at the heart of the animal politics of Surfacing. However, 
the strength with which this conviction has been held right across the history 
of ideas has been demonstrated very clearly recently by Akira Mizuta Lippit. 
In a comprehensive survey of notions of 'the animal' in the history of 
western philosophy, he describes the latter's overwhelming conclusion that 
although a human being 'can project anthropomorphic characteristics onto 
the animal or experience emotions (such as pathos or sympathy) in response 
to its being, an impenetrable screen-language-divides the loci of human 
and animal being'. 3 
3 Lippit, p. 179. He focuses on Descartes, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Burke, Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Heidegger. However, he does not address the implications for 
animals of the challenge to this secure human ownership of language in the philosophy of 
language of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida. 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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Now, in Atwood's novel, animals in the main are spoken about; that is 
to say their presence never goes further than being a mediated one. They are 
reported as objects of the narrator's attention rather than taking part, in 
anything more than the briefest way, as subjects of the narrative. This 
certainly does not stop animals being of paramount importance to the 
meaning of the text; but they remain passive in terms of the development of 
the narrative, which has a fundamentally human trajectory-even if that 
trajectory does concern humans' ethical relationships with their animal 
others. Here, we might think of the dead heron or the enigmatic and elusive 
jays as exemplary instances. 
In The Temple of My Familiar, however, while it is true that Walker 
shares some of Atwood's reticence in giving over her narrative to the 
portrayal of animals' consciousness-and with it a certain anthropomorphic 
subjective presence-it is the case that she attempts to negotiate a way past 
Atwood's insistence on animals' absolute otherness to linguistic 
representational strategies. Walker does this by way of a complex approach 
to the idea of representation itself. The novel's implication is that although 
humans' ability to represent animals linguistically necessarily creates a 
tantalising distance between the species, it correspondingly creates the 
possibility of representing them politically, concomitantly offering the scope 
to traduce that distance. These ideas are summarised, in words to which I 
will return, by Lissie in The Temple of My Familiar: 'Our language [the 
animals] will never speak; not from lack of intelligence, but from the different 
Cary Wolfe gives an exemplary account of this alternate line of thought in 'Wittgenstein's 
Lion'. 
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construction of their speaking apparatus. In the world of man, someone must 
speak for them' (p. 226). 
In this chapter, then, I will examine the basis and many implications of 
the progression from animals being simply 'spoken about' to being 'spoken 
for' in and by Walker's novel. In particular, I want to suggest that this 
'speaking for' marks a development from Atwood's novel in terms of the 
animal politics of contemporary fiction. That is because it suggests a subtle 
but crucial reconfiguration of the supposedly abyssal limit between humans 
and all other species caused by the single fact of our linguistic being. By 
conceding that such a difference is indeed a fundamental part of human-
animal relations, Walker goes along with Atwood: but if for the latter 
language irrevocably polarises humans and other species, The Temple of My 
Familiar insists that through imaginative fiction that distance can be spanned. 
I. Rewriting Genesis, Rereading Gender and Race: 
Questioning the (Linguistic) Representation of Animals 
The narrator of Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness of Being pithily captures 
the idea that subtends a pro-animal revision of the foundation myth of 
Judeo-Christian culture. 
The very beginning of Genesis tells us that God created man in order 
to give him dominion over the fish and fowl and all creatures. Of 
course, Genesis was written by a man, not a horse. There is no 
certainty that God actually did grant man dominion over other 
creatures. What seems more likely, in fact, is that man invented God 
to sanctify the dominion that he has usurped for himself over the 
cow and the horse. (p. 277) 
There could hardly be a clearer critique of Genesis as an ideological use of 
discursive power. Walker certainly agrees with the critique; but to begin to 
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understand how she reformulates this basic recognition of ideology in terms 
of representation and its relationship with the animal body, we should tum 
to another writer (and an enthusiastic reviewer of The Temple of My Familiar), 
Ursula Le Guin, and her important contemporary fable 'She Unnames 
Them'.4 Rewriting the moment when Adam names the beasts, which Le Guin 
sees as the primary point at which human language imposes itself on 
animals' bodies, her story has Eve retracting that imposition and giving the 
animals back their namelessness. Of the animals, Le Guin writes, 'most of 
them accepted namelessness with the perfect indifference with which they 
had so long accepted and ignored their names' (p. 194). Realising that she 
cannot 'in all conscience, make an exception' of herself, Eve joins the now 
nameless animals and hands her own name over to a distracted, insouciant 
Adam, saying 'I'm going now with the- [ ... ] with them, you know' (p. 196). 
Now, it is true that Eve's gift of namelessness to the animals is a human gift, 
after all it takes a human to imagine animals as nameless. Yet Eve's 
disavowal of Adam's discursive power encourages the recognition that 
animals do exist beyond the ways in which we think about them; and this 
necessitates the attempt to imagine what such an existence might be like. As 
she leaves Adam behind with his power of naming animals, Eve realises the 
seriousness and difficulty of relating to her fellow creatures without them. 
'My words must be as slow, as new, as single, as tentative, as the steps I took 
going down the path away from the house, between the dark-branched, tall 
dancers motionless against the winter shining' (p. 196). 
41n Buffalo Gals and Other Animal Presences (London and New York: Plume, 1988), pp. 194-96. 
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Here, Le Guin's Eve practises a theory of language subtly different from 
straight linguistic constructionism. While she is aware that to name the world 
is inevitably to alter it by possession, she does grant language the capability 
not to impose itself on the world. It is certainly clear that language does not 
call it into being. Rather, human language can respond to the physical reality 
of the world if it is used with enough care and imagination. As is suggested 
by the way Eve's words are assimilated to her steps, this will require at the 
very least dismantling the strict opposition between humans' language and 
their own bodily presence in that world. 
I will return to the importance of such a careful and imaginative 
response to animals later in my discussion of The Temple of My Familiar, but 
for now two aspects of Le Guin's brief rewriting of Genesis can introduce the 
terms of Walker's much more thoroughgoing one. First is its collocation of 
women and animals as subjects of the patriarchal power to name. Second is 
its recourse to the form of the fable which, in a quintessentially postmodem 
way, works parodically from within the fictional, narrative terms of Genesis-
as-myth to deconstruct its ideological moves. Importantly, however, because 
Le Guin's form is the result of a belief that, as myth, Genesis is necessarily 
imaginative, its derivative parody is paradoxically all the more insistent on a 
creative rethinking of our relationship to animals. 
Walker pushes this formal method to its limit, engaging in a profoundly 
anti-realistic and creative sort of myth-writing, in which Genesis is rewritten 
through the narrative of one of the book's main protagonists, Lissie, shifting 
sections of the novel into the genre of fantasy or fantastic literature. 
Rosemary Jackson has described the motivation that often lies behind a 
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writer's choice to step outside of conventional reality: 'the fantastic traces the 
unseen and unsaid of culture: that which has been silenced, made invisible, 
covered over and made "absent"'.5 Thus, the genre of fantasy is particularly 
appealing to the writer who sees the hugely influential human-created 
narratives by which our world is understood as suppressing other more 
politically desirable ones. For Walker, the story of Genesis is just such a 
narrative, and so this ability to speak the unspoken is perhaps the clearest 
reason why the fantastic mode is employed to 'speak for animals' . 
Since this chapter includes much discussion about 'the representation of 
animals', it will serve well at the outset to analyse a section of The Temple of 
My Familiar that stages-in relation to animals-the two-sided concept of 
representation as I will be using it here. I will use 'representation' in the twin 
senses of (a) signification: the presentation of phenomena by means of words 
or images that act as symbols for the things they represent. For example, the 
word 'dog', or an image of a dog, represents a particular species of furry 
animal, or individual of that species; and (b) advocacy: someone's acting as a 
proxy for another, in the sense that lawyers represent their clients. 
The scene that stages the concept of representation involves two of the 
novel's central characters: Suwelo, a middle-aged African-American 
professor of history is listening to the words of Lissie, a remarkable old 
woman of the same ethnicity whom Suwelo comes to view as a wise mentor 
and guide. Lissie describes one of her' dream memories' which detail what 
she says are past lives (p. 99); these lives have taken place from prehistory to 
recent centuries and in them her race, gender and even species are not fixed. 
5 Quoted in Bonnie Braendlin, I Alice Walker's The Temple of My Familiar as Pastiche', American 
Literature, 68 (1996), 47-67, p. 54. 
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She has been variously white, male and in one instance a lion. These past 
lives can be seen as Walker's rewritings of the stories and creation-myths, 
particularly the book of Genesis, through which Judea-Christian culture 
came to understand its own origins. Lissie describes a particularly distant 
past life as a white boy approaching adulthood and living with his mother 
and the other women in a sexually segregated black tribe. Importantly, Lissie 
notes that in this lifetime humans and animals formed part of the same 
community: 
In the days of which I am speaking, people met other animals in 
much the same way people today meet each other. You were sharing 
the same neighbourhood after alL You used the same water, you ate 
the same foods, you sometimes found yourself peering out of the 
same cave waiting for a downpour to stop. (p. 393) 
Furthermore, the women of the tribe were accompanied by 'familiars': 
companion animals of a special kind-reminiscent of the oft-described 
witch's familiar and contrasted specifically with contemporary 'pets' (p. 138). 
They live entirely independently from, yet enjoy a relationship of reciprocal 
physical and emotional care with, their human companions. Lissie's mother 
in this past life had an adult lion named Husa as her familiar, yet animals in 
this life constituted no aggression or danger to humans, as Lissie explains: 
'this perhaps sounds strange to you, Suwelo. About the lions, I mean. But it is 
true. This was long ago, before the animals had any reason to fear us and 
none whatever to try to eat us' (p. 393). 
Clearly, then, there is a sense of togetherness of humans and animals. 
This seems impossible today, when most people think, Lissie claims (with a 
hint to the novel's interlinking of concern about animals and about 
contemporary neo-colonialism), that a lion is 'some thing that cares about 
tasting their foul flesh if they get out of the car in Africa' (p. 394). Eventually, 
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however, this togetherness comes to an end when Lissie-a boy in this past 
life-is expected to find a mate. The girl he meets has her own familiar, a 
serpent named Ba. Immediately after their sexual coupling, the boy comes to 
recognise his racial difference, the whiteness (apparently the result of what 
we would now term a genetic mutation) which his mother had always 
hidden from him by the application of pigmented ointment (p. 398). 
Empathising with her partner's thorough trauma by this recognition of racial 
lack, the boy's mate seeks to comfort him, displaying once again the human-
animal relatedness that obtained in this past life: 
She was crying as much as I was, and beating her breasts. For we had 
learned mourning from the giant apes, who taught us to feel grief 
anywhere around us, and to reflect it back to the sufferer, and to act 
it out. But now this behaviour made me sick. I picked up a stick and 
chased her away. (p. 398) 
As his mate's familiar defends her, the boy kills Ba in a final act of violence 
caused by the repression of his grief. 'In my rage I struck it, a brutal blow, 
with my club, so hard a blow that I broke its neck, and it fell without a sound 
to the ground'. Finally, the boy's mate retrieves Ba's broken body and 
abandons him (p. 399). 
This memory, as recounted by Lissie, can be seen as a feminist anti-
racist re-enacting of the story of the Fall. Through a feminist reading, Eve's 
temptation of Adam under the malicious influence of the serpent becomes 
the story of humanity'S (primarily Man's) loss of sexual innocence, of the 
moment that the difference between the sexes is first perceived, and 
patriarchy instituted. In Lissie's story this becomes the boy's unwarranted 
aggression towards the girl, borne out of the repressed pain of his racial 
difference or imperfection. Oppression by gender and race, Walker suggests, 
marks this most powerful biblical myth of human origins. 
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Linking this assertion to the question of animals, in her rewriting 
Walker has realigned the strict opposition of human and animal that marks 
the story of the Fall. She positions the animal inside a triangular relationship 
that is not conditioned by species: woman-familiar-man, in contrast to the 
positioning of the serpent of Genesis. There, the serpent is necessarily external 
to a specifically human community-it acts on Adam and Eve as a malicious 
agent. This is because it is only by being thus separate that the figure of the 
animal can bear the burden of the traumatic rent in this community that is 
sexual (and, for Walker, racial) difference. How then do we read the murder 
of the familiar-serpent Ba? With it, Walker suggests a continuum between the 
rhetorical violence in the humanism of Genesis-the exclusion of the animal 
in order to suture the wound of difference and underwrite the human 
community-and a more literal violence against animals. Such violence is in 
tum authorised by the assertion of humans' essential difference from 
animals. 
This confluence of racism and speciesism has been remarked upon 
slightly differently by Cary Wolfe in his discussion of Ernest Hemingway's 
The Garden of Eden, a text posthumously published just three years before 
Temple and which casts an intertextual shadow over this part of it. Wolfe 
exposes Hemingway to a theoretical reading that both reveals a concern with 
the ethical problema tics of animal otherness which in that author can only 
come as something of a shock and which chimes consistently with my 
reading of Walker here. Wolfe concludes that in The Garden of Eden the 'ur-
mechanism of whiteness's own self-naturalization as a racially unmarked 
category-its fundamental operation of recoding the always unstable and 
fluid distinction between white and nonwhite as the more stable and 
identifiable distinction between human and animal' is exposed as a racist 
sham by the childhood attachment of the novel's protagonist to an African 
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elephant. As Wolfe reports it, this sympathetic identification, which is subject 
to various traumatic repressions in the Hemingway text, bears an uncanny 
resemblance to that with the animal familiar in Walker's novel. Wolfe points 
out that such identifications mark a problem for racist discourse because, 
'after all, the use of "animality" as a crucial supplement to the discourse of 
racism is only effective so long as the distinction between human and non-
human is assumed to be unproblematically coterminous with the distinction 
between subject and object'.6 
Compelling though it is in itself, the rehearsal of Lissie's past life does 
not end here with the boy's racially based aggression towards his mate and 
her familiar and the exile from his community that it causes. Rather, Walker 
proceeds from questions of race to ask her most pertinent questions about 
the representation of animals. Alone, the boy enjoys an all too brief period of 
care by his mother's familiar Husa during which the lion gives him the skin 
of one of the already lame animals he has killed. As Lissie relates, she (that is 
the boy) uses it as clothing: 
With a stone I battered it into a shape that I could drape around 
myself. I found a staff to support me in my walks and represent 'my 
people'. 
Husa left. 
And now I gradually made a discouraging discovery. The skin that 
Husa gave me [ ... ] frightened all the animals with whom I came into 
contact [ ... ]. They ran from me as if from the plague. And I was 
totally alone for many years. (p. 400 my emphasis) 
6 'Fathers, Lovers, and Friend Killers: Rearticulating Gender and Race via Species in 
Hemingway', Boundary 2, 29.1 (2002), 223-57 (pp. 255-56). 
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Thus the post-Iapsarian boy of Lissie's past, exiled from his human 
community by the murder of the serpent Ba, ends up exiled from the 
animals, just like Adam and Eve. This is a quiet but important shift in the 
conventional perspective on the consequences of humans' shame at the 
nakedness signifying their exile from God. Also, Walker explicitly indicates 
the psycho-social context of this exile: the boy's desire as a result of his 
loneliness to assume power over a fictional tribe. He does this by 
'representing' -that is, symbolising by means of a staff-'his' people. It is 
precisely this tropic ability to represent, to make one thing stand for another, 
which is the very essence of human language, in which a linguistic sign (the 
word we use) stands for the thing it represents. From this vantage point, we 
can see Walker's preliminary suggestion that the very notion of 
representation-language-marks the moment at which human community 
with animals has been lost. As my analysis of her rewriting of the Genesis 
story shows, however, this profound opposition of human to animal is not 
fixed or essential, as is presumed by the view that sees language as the 
specific mark of the human. Instead, it derives from the power of white male 
patriarchy over women and animals, a power figured in the unexpectedly 
white boy's murder of his mate's familiar.7 
7 Derrida offers a different reading of nakedness and naming in Genesis from the point of 
view of the animal that is consonant with Walkers. He deconstructs the Biblical moment of 
naming which would posit Adam as having precedence over animals to remind us that the 
animals come before Man and watch over his creation. This is part of Derrida's more general 
reconfiguring of the power of the gaze in his essay to explore both the philosophical denial 
and the constitutive importance for 'the human' of the animal gaze. He goes as far as to claim 
not only that humans can be close to animals but that their very being is constituted by that 
relationship of contiguity: 'I am inasmuch as I am alongside [aupres] the animal', 'The Animal', 
pp. 379-87 (p. 379). 
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At this juncture, it is worth pausing at length to reinterpret these 
developments in Walker's text by way of some explicitly theoretical 
discussion. nus will let us do two things: attend to some of the broader 
(human) socio-cultural implications of Walker's animal politics as outlined 
here, expounded as they are in the context of race and gender; and in doing 
so let us mark the point at which Walker's understanding of animals moves 
away from Atwood's. To do this, I will discuss the work of literary critic and 
theorist Margaret Homans. It is of particular salience to my discussion firstly 
because she has offered perhaps the most sophisticated (if flawed) discussion 
of Walker's novel in terms of its economy of language, cultural markings 
(such as race and gender), and the body. What makes a detailed analysis of 
Homans's reading of Walker essential for my larger purposes in this thesis, 
though, is that Carol Adams's idea that the animal is the 'absent referent' of 
meat-eating culture is an extrapolation from Homans's suggestion that 
women are the absent referent of patriarchal culture. Adams's idea has been 
perhaps the most influential methodological concept in cultural criticism 
from a pro-animal perspective.s 
S See Adams, Sexual Politics, pp. 4~2. The term absent referent is derived from Homans's 
Bearing the Word: Language and Female Experience in Nineteenth-Century Women's Writing 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). For its influence see, in addition to Wolfe and 
Elmer (quoted in chapter two), see: Josephine Donovan, 'Ecofeminist Literary Criticism: 
Reading the Orange', Hypatia, 11 (1996), 161-84; Erica Fudge, Animal (London: Reaktion, 
2002), pp. 36-37; Schoitmeijer, Animal Victims, pp. 148-49; Stephanie Wardrop, 'They Don't 
Have a Name for It Yet: Patriarchy, Gender and Meat-Eating in Jonathan Demme's The 
Silence of the Lambs', LIT, 5 (1994),95-105. 
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So, the ensuing critical reading of Homans's work on Walker has 
several functions. It allows for a detailed critique of the theoretical 
underpinnings of Adams's pro-animalliterary-critical method that demands 
a 'multilayered evocation of the literal', in order that fiction and/or criticism 
reveal the real animals behind figurative representations of them.9 Also, my 
reading of Homans brings to the foreground two particularly important 
strains of animal politics in The Temple of My Familiar: the recognition that 
any culture is hegemonic ally founded upon its constitutive exclusion of 
others; and, in the light of this fact, the reconfiguration of liberal politics that 
is required to avoid purchasing the dismissal of racism, sexism or 
heterosexism at the expense of a renewed speciesism. 
Homans uses her reading of the Genesis scene that I have been 
discussing to interpret Walker's position in what was in the late 1980s and 
into the 1990s probably the key debate in race and gender theory: whether or 
not these are cultural constructions, and the conceptual availability of a pre-
discursive body that might be thought to lie behind them. She suggests that 
in Walker's rewriting of the Fall, there is a 'difficult tension between 
figuration and the body [that] comes neither from racial division alone, nor 
from sexual division alone, but from racial division as it is complicated by 
sexual division'.l0 For Homans, the materialism-constructionism debate is 
best carried out in terms of the spectrum of the literal and figurative aspects 
of language; the body is collocated with the literal, and cultural construction 
9 See the section of Sexual Politics entitled 'Writing the Literal; Writing Vegetarianism', pp. 
104-05 (p. 104). 
10 Margaret Homans, "'Racial Composition": Metaphor and the Body in the Writing of Race', 
in Female Subjects in Black and White: Race~ Psychoanalysis Feminism, ed. by Elizabeth Abel, 
Barbara Christian and Helene Moglen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 77-
101 (p. 94). 
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is aligned with figuration. In the work of Walker and other African-American 
women writers such as Maya Angelou and Toni Morrison who have 
rewritten the Fall story, Homans writes, 
the use or representation of a relatively literal language corresponds 
to and puts into practice a belief in the embodiedness of race and of 
gender (a belief that race and gender are experienced in the body), 
whereas the view that race is figurative coincides with and is 
performed as a celebration of language as figuration. (p. 79, my 
emphasis) 
However, this apparently stable binary understanding of the meaning of the 
racially marked or gendered body in terms of the presence or absence of 
language (figuration) is troubled by a fundamental ambivalence. This 
ambivalence is indicative of a constitutive exclusion from debates about 
social construction - the exclusion of animals and pro-animal meaning - so I 
will take the time here to explain it. 
It is signalled by a continual, almost metronomic, recurrence in the 
phraseology Homans uses to characterise the representation of embodiment. 
The modifier 'relatively', which I have italicised in the quotation above, is 
repeated by Homans ten times in reference to the use of literal language by 
Walker and other writers; indeed, it marks every use of the phrase 'literal 
language' in that context.ll This compulsive repetition betrays Homans's 
recognition that a completely literal language is in fact logically impossible 
11See pages 79 (3), 85, 88 (2), 92, 95, 95 and 98. The example I describe here is, because of its 
significant repetitiveness, the most telling example of Homans's before the fact annulment of 
the project of Walker, Morrison and Angelou to write the literal body into their work. More 
mundane examples abound: for example at one point, Homans writes (in relation to Walker) 
'language risks betraying the things it refers to because of the inevitable gap between word 
and referent' (p. 87). 
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within the figurative structure of signification. The prevaricating use of this 
modifier, then, in Homans's description of the authors' supposed attempt to 
develop a purely bodily understanding of race and gender consigns that 
attempt to the realms of impossibility almost before it is described. 
Despite arguing throughout her essay that the language of Walker, 
Morrison and Angelou characteristically fits onto a spectrum between binary 
poles (literal/figurative) and that these poles must remain separate-'each 
concludes by representing the necessity of choice: figuration or the authentic 
body, but not at the same time' (p. 93)-Homans summarises their work 
otherwise. She writes that 
in each scene, the fall is the moment at once of embodiment (entrance 
into history) and of the failure of embodiment adequately to 
represent a prior condition of wholeness. As narratives of the 
embodiment, stories of the fall explain why the literal is always 
accompanied by its opposite: figuration names the gap that 
embodiment seeks to fill but fails to close. (p. 94) 
Again the vocabulary is telling: for Walker et aI, 'embodiment' is the moment 
of 'entry into history' (surely a contested discursive field); we find that this 
'embodiment' cannot 'represent' a prior condition of wholeness (presumably, 
were embodiment literal, the opposite of figuration, it could not 'represent' 
anything). Furthermore the very fictionalisations of embodiment that 
Homans bases her essay upon are 'narratives of embodiment': their 
fictionality only highlights the impossibility of discussing embodiment 
outside of figuration, or narrative. Finally, Homans explicitly admits that 
these authors' 'narratives of embodiment' prove the fact that the 'literal is 
always accompanied by [ ... ] figuration', surely evidence itself that any 
discussion of these works in terms of markedly different meanings which 
they supposedly apply to (and elicit from) these supposed opposites, literal 
and figurative, is firstly misguided and secondly pointless. 
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The binary terms in which Homans discusses these writers in particular 
and the debate about the social construction of race and gender in general are 
now beginning to look extremely limiting, indeed misleading. And this 
limitation cannot but be felt in any theory that develops from it, such as 
Adams's pro-animal criticism focused on the literal,12 That Homans should 
continue to formulate her discussion of the possibility of assigning positive 
cultural meaning to the body in binary terms of literalisation and figuration, 
despite her awareness that those terms are conceptually flawed by the logic 
of language, suggests that those terms support a deeper need within that 
discussion itself. That need, I will argue, is that a debate which has now 
accepted the discursive, cultural condition of bodily knowledge and 
meaning-be it of race or gender-should not be allowed (as it easily could 
be) to promote a questioning of the centrality of the one common 
denominator on which feminists and anti-racists can rely in their demand for 
equality: the common species of all human subjects. While racism and sexism 
are revealed as ideological formations by constructionist thought, its own 
humanism remains intact. 
In fact, despite her recognition that 'Lissie's remembered lives [ ... ] 
constitute a world history of interracial (or interspecies) conflict' Homans 
does not pursue a reading of The Temple of My Familiar attentive to the 
complexities of its representation of animals. However, when her discussion 
of Walker's work does alight on this topic, the moment carries 
12 I should note that Adams's later work on race questions is more consonant with my 
argument here, suggesting that animal advocacy can be a 'progressive, anti-racist possibility'. 
Often explicitly referring to Walker's journalism, she insists on the need to recognise, in 
speaking lor animals, the interconnected yet different abuses in our culture of (among other 
groups) women, animals and the environment, people of colour or who are gay or lesbian, 
Neither Man, pp. 71-84. 
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disproportionate importance for my reading of The Temple of My Familiar. 
Homans describes a harrowing anecdote in Walker's Living by the Word in 
which Walker-compelled by a fear of snakes, a fear that she herself 
abhors-kills a companion being, a 'snake person' in her garden. This clearly 
prefigures the novel's own revision of the Fall in which the girl's familiar is 
killed by Lissie's dream memory self. As Homans decodes this anecdote, 
though: 
By having the snake 'be' a person, Walker rhetorically enacts an 
Edenic unity between animal and human. Her murder of the snake in 
the garden [ ... ] is an act at once of physical and of rhetorical violence, 
for it reveals that the snake is only metaphorically a person. Is falls 
into its component parts, exposing as fallen metaphor what Walker 
tries to present as the literal designation of identity. (p. 92) 
Since what Walker 'enacts' is a prelapsarian 'Edenic unity between animal 
and human' it is clear that Homans herself regards the essential difference 
between these two categories of being as a linguistic one: humans are 
different from animals as a consequence of the 'fall' that renders them 
fundamentally linguistic beings. 
The fall is certainly not a fortunate one for non-human beings, 
however, who obviously are defined by their negativity in Homans's binary 
schema: ontologically, they are fundamentally non-linguistic beings. Walker, 
it is claimed, uses rhetoric to re-enact this prelapsarian status by having the 
snake 'metaphorically [be] a person' (personhood, for Homans, is a 
necessarily human preserve). The snake's 'murder' reveals that it can only 
ever attain the status of person 'metaphorically'. Walker's metaphorical act is 
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to ascribe the concept of 'humanity' (personhood), to what we must presume 
is the literal (Le. aconceptual) animal.13 Therefore, just as elsewhere Homans 
criticises black male post-structuralists such as Henry Louis Gates Jr. who, by 
theorising race as metaphorical, substitute 'in the undesirable position of the 
referent or ground from which language differentiates itself, female for black' 
(p. 78), she herself substitutes the animal in that undesirable locale in place of 
both black and female. That is, the animal fills the gap that is left by 
Homans's recovery of the black/female body from the domain of the non-
linguistic. Given the acceptance of discursive constructionist thinking, 
however, such a domain is necessarily unintelligible, that of the pure body 
beyond language. It is a domain which is necessarily abject from all cultural 
understanding. Walker's attributed attempt to 'personify' the snake, then, is 
circumscribed by a profound pathos in that it can never really achieve its 
object. 
Now, the idea that humans are separated from animals by language 
was the first conclusion that I drew in my reading of the Fall scene in Temple 
of My Familiar just as it is (in the main) Atwood's position in Surfacing as I 
described it. Left as it stands, however, this idea remains deeply problematic. 
In the first place, as is familiar from work such as Judith Butler's, the use of 
language figuratively to position a specific cultural formation as the domain 
of the non-figurative is illogical and pernicious; as is Homans's delineation of 
the meaning of the concept 'animal' as the literal body, as non-meaning. This 
is an exclusionary move that relies on and reinforces the preconceived 
13 It is surprising that Homans does not parenthesise the word 'murder' here, since the logic 
of her point presumes that 'murder', as the rules of semantics dictate, should not be used of 
non-human beings. I would suggest, though, that this is a particularly piquant example of the 
way language can be anthropocentric. 
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understanding that ontology can be rigidly demarcated in terms of the 
possession or lack of language; and as such it is a fundamental humanism 
consonant with the philosophical heritage as I described it at the outset.I4 
What Homans's reading fails to remark, however, is that as a self-
reflexive representation of the fall into representation, Walker's novelistic 
recasting of the lapsarian story is able (by focusing in the story on the 
violence against woman and animal) to bring to the surface the work of 
patriarchal power and racial denial inherent in that fall. The supposedly 
ontological difference between human and animal, woman and man, black 
and white is reconfigured in The Temple of My Familiar as an effect of a 
particular working of both physical and discursive power. 
This argument that the notion of unbridgeable human-animal 
difference is discursively constructed opens out, as I read it, on to a slightly 
more complex but nonetheless vital point. It is not simply that humans are 
separated from animals by the violence inherent in linguistic representation; 
rather, the very concept of an irreducible difference between humans and 
animals is always-already ideological. I should be clear that Walker does not 
disavow the obvious facts of psychology, physiology or ecology to claim that 
there are no differences between humans and animals. Quite to the contrary, 
my reading suggests that the notion of commuting the multiple differences in 
order to code the human-animal relation as a single and essential difference 
in kind-especially in terms of one symptom such as language use-begs the 
question of the power relations involved. IS The inscription of that difference 
14 See Bodies, chapter seven. To see these issues played out in terms of poststructuralism and 
psychoanalysis, see Wolfe, 'Fathers', pp. 246-49. 
IS Compare on this point Derrida: 'I am trying to explain how drawing an oppositional limit 
itself blurs the differences, the differance and the differences, not only between man and 
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in humans' dominant form of communication (language) is necessarily an 
exercise of human ideological power. This power is enacted in the murder of 
the serpent Ba. Violence against animals is implicit in the concept of linguistic 
representation as such while it remains conceived as that which marks their 
unbridgeable separation from the human community.16 
Thus we do not see in The Temple of My Familiar, a use of literal 
language to write the body into our cultural consciousness, as is 
ambivalently suggested by Homans. Neither is literal language used, as 
Adams would ask of the pro-animal writer, to bring into cultural view the 
bodily presence of the real animal. Rather, Walker accepts the irrevocable 
circumscription of materiality by discourse in human life (what more could 
we expect from the writer of a book called Living by the Word?). But-and this 
is where Walker both exceeds Homans's reading and differs from the 
Atwood of Surfacing-she sees that circumscription as an opportunity to 
unpick the essentialism of a humanism, itself of course discursively 
constructed, that would see language itself as an abyssal limit between 
humans and animals. Walker wittily makes this point by narrating the 
novel's only explicit description of a human being's actual accession into the 
field of language as an acknowledgement of representation propelled by a 
desire to understand the animal other. Fanny (Suwelo's estranged wife) 
learns to speak as a child when she progresses from a fixation on her 
animal, but among animal societies-there are an infinite number of animal societies and 
within human society itself, so many differences'. Matthew Calarco quotes this among many 
other instances of this point in Derrida's work, 'Deconstruction Is Not Vegetarianism: 
Humanism, Subjectivity and Animal Ethics', Continental Philosophy Review (forthcoming, 
2(03). 
16 This point is an extension of arguments about the inherence in representation of 
misogynistic violence, see Susanne Kappeler, The Pornography of Representation (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1986). 
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transitional object, a red bird made of cloth, feathers and rubber that she 
repeatedly stuffs in her mouth with quite some childish violence. It is only 
when she understands that this object represents the beautiful real birds that 
Fanny sees outside and hears spoken of by her relatives that she says her first 
word: 'bird' (p. 175). In fact, since it turns out that the bird is also the 
familiar-animal of Fanny's grandmother Celie, her embracing of the animal 
in language also roots her in her ancestral family. As such, this moment is the 
positive correlative of Lissie's traumatic dream narrative. 
So, Walker's concern is to complicate the claim that as beings bound by 
the representational logic of language, humans are always-already separate 
from animals. She does so in order to open up the possibility that by 
advocacy (that other sense of representation) people like Lissie might bridge 
that essential difference. Now, as Lippit shows, the claim that language 
essentially separates humans and animals has the validation of the western 
philosophical tradition; it is to counter such a hefty weight of agreement that 
Walker deconstructs the Ur-text of Judeo-Christian myth, Genesis. It could 
be argued that this approach results in a monolithic critique tied to the 
structural level of patriarchy, one that is blind to the complexities of different 
historical situations. As I will suggest below, however, Walker does indeed 
attend to such complexities. More importantly, however, it is only by first 
engaging her critique at the broadest level that the notion of essential 
human-animal difference can be dislodged from its cultural centrality. 
Therefore, we must bear this reason in mind while analysing Walker's 
researches at the margins of western history, beyond the Judeo-Christian 
tradition that for her has divorced humans and animals under the influence 
of racist patriarchy. There, Walker explores the forms of representational 
advocacy that her rewriting of Genesis suggests are possible. 
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II. Alternative Histories, Unheard Voices: Speaking for Animals 
In Temple, Lissie writes a letter to 5uwelo shortly before her death. In it, in 
contradistinction to the rewriting of Genesis, she describes an alternative, 
non-Judeo-Christian story of the relationship between women of colour and 
animals. It is a story of people whose lives have gone unrecorded in 
conventional western history. Of central importance here is the figure of the 
witch, which Lissie has also been in a previous incarnation. Lissie writes that 
the witches of medieval Europe were women (often women of colour) who 
had an especially close relationship with animals. Following from the 
argument of the previous section, being human and language-using, women 
might be thought to be separate from animals. Yet in the history Lissie 
outlines, although they cannot communicate fully, women in the Middle-
Ages were not as divorced from the community of animals as men. 
Woman [ ... ] kept alive some feeling for the other animals, though she 
was reduced to caring and feeding one small house cat. [ ... ]We never 
forgot it should be possible to communicate with anything that had 
big enough eyes! So there we were, the dark women, muttering 
familiarly to every mouse or cow or goat about the place. (pp. 225-
26) 
Lissie suggests that one reason why the notion of the 'witch' as we 
currently understand it appeared in the medieval period under the influence 
of the Spanish Inquisition was to meet the need to subdue this relationship 
with animals: 'the inquisitors, set in place to control us, declared consorting 
with animals a crime, punishable by being burned at the stake!' (p. 226). 
Here, the inquisitors' law that criminalises 'consorting with animals' and 
calls its perpetrators 'witches' in effect invents a legal category called 'witch' 
which can be used to describe such women. By being too close to animals 
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some women called into question the inquisitors' belief that to be human is 
to be different from animals. 
Moreover, as Lissie continues, this legal foreclosure of human-animal 
communication is reinforced by other cultural methods: 
The inquisitors claimed we were fucked and suckled by bulls and 
goats and all manner of malformed animal creatures. For good 
measure, they gave their devil- the black thing that represented the 
people they most despised and wished to be separate from-sharp 
cloven hoofs and pointed horns, a tail. They made it seem not only 
natural, but also righteous to kill [ ... ] any animal or dark creature 
that one saw. (p. 226) 
Lissie suggests that through these derogatory images or representations of 
women and animals, and ultimately through the force of written law, the 
cultural constructions of the white male inquisitors leave no space for 
alternative realities, such as that of women who maintained a close 
relationship to animals. Furthermore, as long as conventional written history 
consistently fails to recognise this, theirs is literally a silent story. An 
epigraph to the letter Lissie is writing makes clear these initial and 
subsequent erasures: 'They burned us so thoroughly we did not even leave 
smoke' (p. 221). 
It is with this erasure of history, however, that we reach an important 
point in Walker's understanding of the representation of animals. First, in 
order to make these points about witches and animals, she relies on the 
recognition that both the law and history are powerful means by which the 
people who write them silence others. She shares the viewpoint of Erica 
Fudge that if 'our only access to animals in the past is through documents 
written by humans, then we are never looking at animals, only ever at the 
representation of the animals by humans', Walker develops this into the 
recognition of the power that such representations (in my first sense) have to 
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hide from view the animals (or witches) they represent. As Fudge notes, the 
fact that 'representation is always-already inevitable' means that 'the real 
animal can disappear' from our understanding.17 In this sense, human 
representations fail both animals and the 'witches' who have a close 
relationship with them. The preliminary conclusion to be drawn here is that 
language, now specifically understood as language controlled by the 
interests of the inquisitors (or representation as 'speaking about') separates 
humans and animals. With the figure of the witch in the story of Lissie's past 
lives, however, Walker offers some recuperation from this state of affairs. 
Concluding her letter on the subject of language and the distance it 
creates between humans and animals, Lissie extends the statement quoted in 
my introduction by returning to the witch: 
The animals can remember [ ... J. But our language they will never 
speak; not from lack of intelligence, but from the different 
construction of their speaking apparatus. In the world of man, 
someone must speak for them. And that is why, in a nutshell, 
Suwelo, goddesses and witches exist. (p. 226) 
Having traced the creation of the witch in the suppression of women's 
relationships with companion animals by the legal discourse of the Middle 
Ages, Lissie now claims for the witch a special ability: the representation (in 
my second sense of 'speaking for') of animals. Just as I have suggested that 
fantastic literature aims for the political power to speak the unspoken, so 
Walker's imaginative creation Lissie reclaims the figure of the witch from its 
former designation of evilness or inhumanity and sees it as a place in which 
17 Erica Fudge, I A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals', in Rothfels (ed.), pp. 
3-18 (pp. 6, 7). 
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animals can be spoken for. The power of both the witch and the goddess, 
which Lissie also claims to be (p. 409), is that being supernatural they are not 
quite human and not quite animal. At the borders of humanity, both goddess 
and witch provide creative and imaginative ways to reappraise our cultural 
ideas of being human. And if, as Lissie's description of the Inquisition 
suggests, such ideas have to an extent been formed by criminalising close 
communication with animals as witchcraft, the witch perhaps provides an 
ideal figure to effect a particularly feminist, anti-racist setting for the political 
representation of animals. 
It is necessary now to pause to look critically at what sort of 'speaking 
for animals' is offered here. Walker's use of the figure of the witch does do 
some important work by making clear an alternative perspective on human 
relationships with animals. As I have suggested, this alternative provides 
Walker with a way to query the opposition of humans and animals on the 
basis of language possession that is central to the western tradition. It does, 
however, raise a worrying question. We might wonder, as does Amanda 
Greenwood, whether Walker reinscribes the politically reactionary idea that 
to be female or black is to be bound to the bodily realm and hence to be more 
like animals in the derogatory sense of being unworthy of fully human 
ethical treatment (p. 166). This of course is a key paradox that must be 
negotiated by any pro-animal thinking that takes feminism as its starting 
point.IS Indeed, Marian Scholtmeijer suggests just such a problematic reading 
18 Beth A. Dixon uses this argument as the key pOint in her somewhat niggardly denial of the 
suggestion, so central to the pro-animal feminism of Adams and others, that animals and 
women suffer analogous masculinist oppressions, 'The Feminist Connection between Women 
and Animals', Environmental Ethics, 18 (1996), 181-91. See also the extensive debate on the 
subject 'Should Feminists be Vegetarians?' between Katherine Paxton George and Carol 
Adams and others in the pages of Signs, 19 (1994), 405-34 and 21 (1995),221-41. 
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of the novel, stating that through Lissie's descriptions of an elemental 
connection between black women and animals, Lthe inner animal, in Miss 
Lissie, and in all women, surfaces, to explain and render powerful that 
correspondence between women and animals'. Greenwood, as might most 
pro-animal feminists I think, adroitly side-steps the problems of such a claim 
by focussing on animals' increased status, rather than on the demeaning of 
women. She asserts that while Walker does perceive an alignment of black 
people or women and animals, the text is celebratory of it rather than 
condemnatory (pp. 166-67).19 
My argument sorts the competing ideas more discriminately than this. I 
would repeat that for Walker the very notion of humans' absolute difference 
from animals is itself a rhetorical trope that is marked by our power over 
them. This essentially post-structuralist point underlies what I regard as the 
novel's concerted critique of liberal-humanist forms of feminism or anti-
racism as I described them in the earlier analysis of Homans's project. The 
effect of her recuperation of the female, black (or black female) body into 
cultural meaning was the forging of a necessarily all-human community by 
distinguishing the inevitable discursive marking of the human body from the 
essential materiality of animality. This in tum casts the latter concept into the 
realm of cultural negativity. Such a failure to attend to othering per se, and 
the concomitant othering of non-human species in such a language-centred 
ontology, is the inevitable corollary of liberal forms of community that are 
predicated on sameness of whatever kind (gender, race, species) rather than 
the embracing of difference. This is precisely the difficulty with otherwise 
19 For Scholtmeijer's comments see 'The Power of Otherness: Animals in Women's Fiction' in 
Animals and Women, ed. by Adams and Donovan, pp. 231-62 (p. 251). 
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'on the bottom steps of an enormous white stone building in a different city 
and a different century[ ... ] the colour of cheap false teeth' (p. 140). This 
debased image of Capitol Hill suggests the inadequacy of American 
representative democracy to accommodate Lissie's cultural alterity as 
symbolised by the familiar. More significantly, though, Lissie's traumatic 
uprooting in the dream from indigenous homeland and abandonment with 
the white others at Capitol Hill warns that the price of accession to modem 
metropolitan forms of political enfranchisement as they stand is the 
foundational repression, indeed loss, of a human relationship with the 
animal other. Of course, the positive side of this is that Lissie's acts of 
repression do not succeed: just as the familiar escapes in the dream, so does 
Lissie reveal her subaltern histories to Suwelo in the narrative proper; and by 
doing so she speaks for animals. 
So for Walker the point is not simply to celebrate or condemn women's 
theoretical closeness to animals. Rather, it is to examine the ideological 
conditions by which a genuine affinity might be made possible - that is, one 
that is based on a positive revaluation of all forms of otherness (not just 
animals') and so cannot be part of a strategy to demean blacks or women as 
'animals'. Walker therefore writes Lissie's dream memories in order to 
release the hold of the argument that there is an 'essential difference' 
between humans and other species and to effect just such a possible affinity. 
For, if 'the human' itself is a discursive category marked by ideological 
power, any essence it might have been said to have is riven by its differential 
relationship with its non-human others. This important aspect of Lissie's 
place in the structure of the novel is missed by both Greenwood and 
Scholtmeijer. They fail to see the radicalism of Walker's text by 
understanding Lissie as a paragon of virtue, someone who unproblematically 
voices the text's message or can be wholly integrated into it. In my reading, 
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however, it is fundamental that Lissie's story itself always remains open to 
critique, when read, as it will be below, in conjunction with the worldviews 
of the novel's other characters. Lissie's feminist and afro-centric reclamation 
of history is part of what I see as Walker's larger commitment to pluralism 
based on the imaginative understanding of others, both human and animal. 
III. Imaginative Understanding: Getting Close to Animals 
Can one speak of the animal? Can one 
approach the animal? 
Jacques Derrida21 
Before explaining the details and implications of Walker's commitment to 
pluralism in the novel, I will begin with an example of it, in which no one 
character has a singular claim to morally authoritative status, although 
ethical choices are certainly made. It is borne out in the story of Fanny, her 
mother Olivia, her grandmother Mama Celie and her lesbian partner Mama 
Shug. These latter characters are described to an extent as moral exemplars in 
the novel, a description that refigures Walker's development of them in The 
Color Purple; Mama Shug institutes a religion founded on, among other 
things, compassion for animals.22 Yet it eventually becomes clear that Mama 
21 'The Animal', p. 390. 
22 See pp. 317-19. I will not explore the intertextual possibilities suggested by Walker's 
inclusion of these characters, but we should be wary of the realist conclusion that Mama Celie 
and Mama Shug are the same people as the characters in The Color Purple (London: The 
Women's Press, 1983) since the textual forms in which we meet them are so different. 
Nonetheless, it is worth remembering in our current context the moment in the earlier novel 
when Celie finds herself equated to an animal as a counter in a patriarchal economy, passed 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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Celie, having herself been battered by her ex-husband, had for a long time 
repeated the pattern of this abuse by beating the family dog. Her compassion 
for animals only comes about when Mama Shug, having 'liberated' the dog 
from his subservient acceptance of this and made him bite back, laughs at 
Mama Celie's reversal of fortunes, embarrassing her (p. 344). Celie's 
compassion, then, is not a 'truth' inherent in her womanhood as Scholtmeijer 
would appear to argue. Rather, it is the consequence of a specific action 
arrived at by way of the complex negotiation of empathy and mockery in 
Mama Shug's response to the factors of Celie's emotional history. Thinking 
further in terms of the novel's disavowal of moral exemplarity in anyone 
person, we can read this scene as a corollary of Lissie's profound prejudice 
against 'man's ''best friend", the "pet" familiar, the fake familiar, his dog' 
(pAD3). Because she thinks of dogs as agents of male power, Lissie's 
prejudice is less a direct result of her identification with cats throughout the 
novel than of her anti-patriarchal thinking. Yet in its mistaking of human (or 
masculine) abuses of dogs' power for the essence of the dog itself, such 
thinking suggests that even Lissie's radically politicised animal advocacy 
conceals its own excluded other. 
More importantly, though, the novel also reveals that although Mama 
Shug and Mama Celie may appear exemplary in their actions towards others, 
their very over-competence as parents to both Olivia and her daughter Fanny 
itself creates a problem. Olivia comes to feel supplanted as a mother and 
eventually leaves the home, the gap left by her departure creating a deep 
sense of loss in Fanny. Fanny's attempts to recover from this abandonment 
from her 'Pa' to Mr. _: when Mr. _ asks about a dowry ('That cow still coming?') Pa's 
answer (speaking of Celie) is 'her cow' (p. 12). 
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form a large part of the novel. Thus, while Mama Celie and Mama Shug 
complicate Lissie's animal advocacy, they also exhibit the capacity of even 
the most virtuous personal philosophies to overpower and silence other 
people. Compassion, Walker seems to say, is the hard-won result of an 
always ongoing, genuinely engaged thought, rather than easy moral 
judgements: 'the awareness of having faults [ ... ] opens us to courage and 
compassion', she has written.23 This acceptance of flaw leads directly to 
Walker's celebration of the creativity of imagination which always, she 
believes, maintains openness to others' realities, be they human or animal. 
I have argued that in the character of Lissie, Walker uses the creative 
power of the human imagination, especially as it occurs in story-telling, to re-
envision the human-animal relationship. The existential distance that the fact 
of language is conventionally said to insinuate between humans and animals 
was shown to be socially constructed and power-laden; it can thus be 
traduced. And as Lissie shows, the force which brings humans close to 
animals is the creative imagination. Here, Walker foreshadows a point made 
in J. M. Coetzee's novella The Lives of Animals. His main character, a novelist 
called Elizabeth Costello, discusses the supposed boundary between humans 
and animals suggesting that the imagination can bring the two close: 
There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination. If you want 
proof, consider the following. Some years ago I wrote a book called 
The House on Eccles Street. To write that book I had to think my way 
into the existence of Marion Bloom [ ... ]. The point is Marion Bloom 
nt?'oer existed. Marion Bloom was a figment of James Joyce's 
imagination. If I can think my way into the existence of a being who 
23 Anything We Love can be Saved: A Writer's Activism (London: The Women's Press, 1997), p. 
xxiii. 
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has never existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat 
or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom I share the 
substrate of life.24 
Walker herself has taken this point about imaginative empathy further, 
arguing that the very purpose of fictional writing is to use the imagination in 
this way, and that the absence of life is not even a barrier to it: 
[The] writer's pen is a microphone held up to the mouths of 
ancestors and even stones of long ago. [Once] given permission by 
the writer [ ... ] horses, dogs, rivers, and, yes, chickens can step 
forward and expound on their lives. The magic of this is not so much 
in the power of the microphone as in the ability of the nonhuman 
object or animal to be and the human animal to perceive its being.25 
In these examples, Walker and Coetzee equate the imaginative writer to 
the witch or goddess as exemplified by Lissie: he or she can get close to 
animals. I would argue, however, that the important aspect of this 
assessment is imagination and the ability to be creative in understanding 
others-and here we are reminded of Ursula Le Guin's Eve and the sort of 
creativity demanded of her that foregoes the use of entrenched patterns of 
thought-rather than writing per se. Indeed, perhaps surprisingly in a written 
work, Walker's novel explicitly denigrates writing, as we saw in Lissie's 
narrative when the force of written law was used to criminalise witches and 
24 The Lives of Animals, ed. and intro. by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), p. 35, Coetzee's emphasis. The character's argument here sidesteps the ethical 
dilemmas noted by Fudge above that surround the linguistic representation of 'real', that is 
living, animals. She posits that from the point of view of the creative understanding 
delineated here the 'realness' of its object is of no importance to the ethical or 'sympathetic' 
imagination; indeed real animal and fictional creation are equivalent. 
25 Living by the Word: Selected Writings 1973-1987 (London: The Women's Press, 1988), p. 170, 
Walker's emphasiS. 
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silence those women's correspondence with animals. So the written word 
holds the power of representation (in my first sense) to silence others. 
Therefore, Walker's speaking for animals through the celebration of 
imaginative understanding (representation in my second sense) emerges in 
this novel paradoxically in proportion to the denigration of writing. 
This occurs most obviously through Lissie's past lives which are 
imaginative, though not strictly 'imaginary', since she claims that she 
remembers them (p. 80). The key impact of her merging of fictive and real is 
its ability creatively to reflect another one: the merging of material fact with 
discourse that occurs in any process of representation. Doing so, the dream 
memories can flag the ideology present in the representation of the supposed 
facts of species difference. However, it is important to remember that Lissie's 
report of these past lives never attempts to achieve the status of objective, 
verifiable fact. Indeed, Lissie's past lives are explicitly contrasted to official 
history, always appearing in the form of the oral narratives that she tells to 
Suwelo, himself (significantly) a professor of American history. These force 
him to recognise, for instance, that the authoritative discourse of history, and 
hence the written facts on which his knowledge is based, often ignores the 
stories of women, indigenous Americans, other people of colour and 
animals-groups who do not fit the authoritative description of the past. 
This distrust of the written word is dramatised explicitly in the text, in 
which written documents of the past have a very tenuous status. For 
example, one character reads the diary of her nineteenth-century ancestor, 
Eleandra Burnham, and in it learns about the history of British Imperialism. 
Even before the diary has been completely read, it crumbles in its reader's 
hands having been eaten by moths (pp. 258-59). The diary tells of Eleandra's 
trip to the British Museum, in which a captured indigenous African is 
housed as an exhibit. This exercise of colonial power reminds Eleandra of 
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animals: 'animals in zoos were afraid of me simply as [yet] another human 
being come to stare at them, but this was different somehow' (p. 250). 
This issue marks one aspect of the novel in which Walker moves 
beyond the rather unhistoricised approach to the question of human-animal 
difference discussed in this chapter. She extends the understanding of the 
important place of animals and zoos in nineteenth-century British 
colonialism-extensively documented by Harriet Ritv026 _to the perspective 
of contemporary neo-colonial capitalism. As the novel opens, Zede, a 
Guatemalan woman, crafts head-dresses from peacock feathers. Hers, the 
most beautiful, are made from found feathers retrieved by Zede's daughter, 
not those plucked from the live peacocks whose 'mournful cry' is distressing 
to her (p. 11). When, years later and living in 1970s San Francisco, the 
daughter herself makes head-dresses for rich American rock stars, her own 
child is also able to 'find' feathers by stealing them from the sweatshop 
where she works as a cleaner. By paralleling the two generations, Walker 
implies that the plight of peacocks and of sweatshop workers, of animals and 
oppressed peoples, must be understood in the context of each another. 
As an aside, I would note that because this approach attends to the 
negotiation of postcolonial and animal politics that contextualises many of 
the representations of animals in the novel it indicates the lack of 
perceptiveness in Scholtmeijer's unilateral claim that the novel has a 
'vegetarian message' P Such an appeal to moral authority cannot 
accommodate the apparently contradictory fact that eating meat is a vital 
26 See The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in The Victorian Age (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987). 
27 'Power of Otherness', pp. 249-50. 
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part of Lissie's identity as an African-American and that self-adornment with 
feathers plays a crucial role in maintaining the cultural identity of displaced 
South American peoples in the novel (pp. 263-65, 227). Similarly, it hides the 
text's complex recognition of the socio-political as well as economic factors 
involved in food choice, and not just of ones based on animal ethics. Lissie 
suggests that during her childhood the distaste for vegetarian 'rabbit food' in 
her black community has its roots in their intemalisation of the values of 
previous generations of slave-owners who had punished the eating of such 
prized foodstuffs (p. 69). It is true that in other places the novel offers a more 
damning verdict on the dietary deficiencies that whole communities of 
African-Americans suffer in later years through their ideological prejudice 
against healthy eating. This prejudice is itself a result of a fetishisation of fast-
food commodities (p. 196). Nevertheless the motivation for this verdict 
remains an attack on the structural racism it implies rather than on the ethics 
of meat eating per se. 
But returning to the problem of writing, the disintegration of Eleandra 
Burnham's diary is mirrored elsewhere in the novel. Fittingly enough, the 
letter in which Lissie narrates her alternative history of witches is written in 
special invisible ink, which disappears after being read only once (p. 225). 
Clearly, in both of these instances the all-powerful status of documentary 
history is being problematised. Furthermore, Lissie recalls a confrontation 
with a white woman professor after a lecture at which she, Lissie, had been 
describing a past life as a slave of the middle passage. Although she knew 
that 'the professional way to present [her] experience was as if it had been 
merely told to [her]" she accidentally presented it in terms of actual 
memories. Recalling the professor's correcting of her, Lissie tells Suwelo that: 
[some] people don't understand that it is [ ... ] the nature of the mind 
to recall everything that was ever known. Or that was the nature, I 
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should say, until man started to put things down on paper. The 
professor went on to say that she couldn't even imagine what it must 
have been like on the slave ship. (p. 80) 
For Lissie, written history itself, the period when 'man started to put things 
down on paper', hinders the imaginative understanding of others. In this 
instance, Lissie is discussing Africans of the Diaspora, yet the point equally 
applies to the animals of her dream memories. Indeed, because of its 
structural position in the novel, this white professor's inability to imagine the 
conditions of the middle passage can be equated to a failure of imagination 
that separates humans and animals. 
Now, if there was one commonplace amongst the hostile critical 
responses to The Temple of My Familiar, it was to debate what was seen as the 
extreme relativism advocated in Walker's novel, exemplified here in its 
dramatisation of the power of unverified oral history. The dismissal of such 
relativism by historically aware critics often accompanies a tendency to look 
rather sniffily at the novel, its characters, and their outre embracing of 
holistic ecological spirituality. Such critics often dismiss the text (and its 
sometimes high-flown spiritualist rhetoric) as evidencing a naIve faith in new 
age faddism. 28 To indict the novel for the charge of relativism-that there is 
not one historical 'truth' and all interpretations of reality are equally truthful 
28 The issue of relativism is reSignedly reported by a generally more affirmative critic, Maria 
Lauret, as the point at which her defence of the novel in terms of Jungian psychoanalysis 
collapses in Alice Walker (Hound mills: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 129-30; for the more ambivalent 
Adam Sol, the task for future Walker critics should be a negotiation of what he sees as a 
contradiction between the novel's 'trite post-hippie feminism' and its 'muddling of history 
and realism' with its ambitious attempt to 'break down hegemonic viewpoints and 
mythologies' (p. 399). Defending the novel, Braendlin argues that the high-flown rhetoric is 
only one sound in the disjunctive clash of discourses from which Walker creates a 
postmodem polyvalent text (pp. 48-51). This latter point fits well with my argument here. 
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or valid, so genuine inquiry is impossible-would, however, miss Walker's 
point. First, she does not deny that there are empirical facts. Indeed, whole 
sections of the novel are a response to the specific material impact of 
capitalism and colonialism on parts of Africa and South America. Rather, the 
main focus of the relativist charge, Lissie's 'dream memories' -which merge 
some of the status of the real with some of the imaginary-are Walker's way 
of releasing the potential in notions of the unconscious. These render 
permeable the oppositions between reality itself, our factual knowledge 
about it, and our subjective imaginary responses to it; such permeability is 
necessary for the creation of new forms of knowledge. 
In addition to all of this, the continuing (if reducing) scepticism of 
Suwelo, the novel's modernist historian (and to a lesser extent of Lissie's 
husband Hal) balances Lissie's revisionist dream memories. So rather than 
shying from the factual altogether, Walker draws attention to the way in 
which a selection of (in themselves perfectly valid) historical facts can cohere 
via a particular unified perspective into what might be called a regime of 
truth. As such, this partial and selective approach, which characterises any 
history, nonetheless utilises for its own ends the power inherent in the 
absolute authority of the truth. To cast this in terms of my earlier argument 
about the human-animal relation, we might say that the (problematic) truth 
at which we arrive by viewing humans and animals in terms of language-use 
is that there is a single oppositional limit between them. The problem is that 
the factuality of such a unilateral opposition is itself underwritten by the 
powerful status of truth. Walker's response is to abjure the absolute authority 
inherent in that power. Relativism, on the contrary, smuggles this power of 
authority in through the back door by simply sharing it across the variety of 
different interpretations of empirical reality. 
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I would argue that it is precisely through Walker's holding back from 
the authoritative power of truth that genuine inquiry becomes all the more 
possible. A good example of this is Walker's strategic marshalling of Lissie's 
claim that the witches of Europe were often women of colour (,daughters of 
the Moors', p. 222). Walker quite possibly gleaned this from the many afro-
centric alternative histories that proliferated in the early eighties, though it is 
not a position that is at all consonant with most historians' reports.29 What is 
important, I think, is that Lissie's claim retains the value of highlighting the 
racist and sexist arena in which the argument of human-animal difference 
appeared and is maintained. Yet it is equally important that its mode of 
presentation also ensures that Lissie's claim remains open to doubt on a 
purely factual level by her interlocutor Suwelo (p. 222), as well as by its 
readers. 
Just as I have indicated Walker's concern with the written word and the 
representations it offers, so too are photographic images problematised. 
Living in the house of his recently deceased uncle before his first meeting 
with Lissie, Suwelo notices that there are many faded patches on the wall 
where once there were photographs. Eventually he discovers that these 
correspond to photographs of Lissie that she had hidden. However, when 
she gives him them, what he sees are 'thirteen pictures of thirteen entirely 
different women' (p. 107), as it transpires that this photography has 
magically been able visually to capture Lissie's various past lives. 
29 For the authoritative historical view at the time of Temple's publication, see Brian Levack's 
The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe (London: Longman, 1987) a more recent voluminous 
cultural-intellectual history is Stuart Clark's Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in 
Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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I will conclude with this example which is vital to Walker's 
understanding of representation, in my first sense of using words or images 
to stand for the phenomena they represent. First, the fact that Lissie's past 
lives shine through in these magical and unusual pictures calls attention by 
contrast to the way that photographs, being mere static images, reduce and 
simplify the complexity of life. Beyond any photograph, these pictures 
suggest, there is always a varied life history that cannot be captured. Just as 
Walker suggests that written history excludes the lives of people (or animals) 
not considered important, even photographs-what we might think of as the 
most 'realistic' of representations-by their very nature exclude much. 
Furthermore, Lissie's hiding of the photographs from Suwelo until she 
knows he will be accepting of her unconventional life story marks a series of 
connections that it has been the purpose of this chapter to outline. It links 
Walker's disaffection with claims to absolute truth in written or 
photographic representation, her valorisation of imagination and creativity 
rather than 'facts', and her concern to speak for animals. Lissie later tells 
Suwelo that, just as she had hidden the photographs, she has always had to 
hide her past lives. Particularly harrowing for her is the fact that even though 
her empathetic husband knew about many of her past lives, she had 
repressed the memory of her being a white boy cared for by a lion because of 
her husband's intense fear of white people and cats. She can only divulge it 
when she meets Suwelo, by whom she thinks this life stands a chance not of 
being believed but 'of simply being imagined, fantasised' (p. 402). 
Importantly, Suwelo's imaginative ability to understand others is 
always only partial in the novel, part of an ongoing learning process that the 
novel describes. lIe is not complacently offered as an exemplar of the 
imaginative understanding the novel promotes. Rather, we view Suwelo 
moving from a position of self-centred authority at the novel's opening to 
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one of humble, outward-looking ignorance at its end. Such a commitment to 
ignorance promotes the ongoing learning about others and their worldviews 
that Walker sees as the precondition of closeness to animals. Until Suwelo 
paradoxically learns this ignorance, and with it openness to others, the 
closeness to animals which is figured in Lissie's past lives remains hidden, 
silent, impossible. Therefore, it is not only the failure of photographic or 
written representations that stops the closeness to animals described in 
Lissie's memories being heard. Human separateness from animals is equally 
reinforced by the added failure of people to imagine the possibility of such 
closeness. This is Walker's abiding concern in The Temple of My Familiar. The 
creative power of the human imagination-exemplified most obviously by 
Lissie's oral history - enables humans to bridge the gap caused by the 
insistence that language use separates them from animals. It is only by 
abjuring authoritative claims to the truth, by being open to the realities of 
others and by 'imagining' or 'fantasising' the very possibility that people can 
get close to animals. 
Now, while The Temple of My Familiar attends to the material abuses of 
animals on a grand scale, and to differences in human-animal relations across 
different historical contexts, there is one avenue open to the literary 
representation of animals that it does not explore. It is the coming together of 
an experimentation with textual form that can tap literature's full potential to 
affect our thinking about animals with detailed exploration of the specificities 
of animal politics in a particular historical situation. This is perhaps not 
surprising given the text's ambitions in debunking grand narratives, to say 
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nothing of the fact that Temple is a mass-market novel by a best-selling 
literary author. In the next chapter, however, I will explore a text which does 
offer this: Deborah Levy's Diary of a Steak. It is a profoundly reader-
unfriendly avant-garde text about what has come to be known as 'the mad 
cow crisis', its impact on our relationships with animals, and on the ways we 
represent them. 
CHAPTER THREE 
(MIS-)READING THE AVANT-GARDE ANIMAL: 
BSE, HYSTERIA, AND THE ANIMAL POLITICS OF 
DEBORAH LEVY'S DIARY OF A STEAK 
Prolegomena: A Story of BSE 
On 20 March 1996 Stephen Dorrell, the then Secretary of State for Health, 
announced to parliament that he had been advised of the likelihood of a link 
between Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and new variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD). This contradicted his government's 
repeated denials of such a link over the preceding decade. Now, he was 
admitting that a disease that had caused people, many of them young, to 
become anxious, depressed then withdrawn, to lose their memory and sense 
of balance, all of their physical functions, and finally their life was indeed the 
human form of ESE. This was the disease which had caused cows to become 
irritable, foam at the mouth, to lose their balance, stagger and collapse. The 
pictures shown over and over again on television of deranged cows 
stumbling and thudding into the ground in a muddy farmyard could no 
longer be viewed by meat-eating Britons secure in the knowledge that the 
species barrier protected them from a similar fate. Instead, in the aftermath of 
Dorrell's announcement, the pathos (and for some, the humour) of those 
images took on a more frightening aspect and that earlier impervious security 
gave way to the fear of contagion. For the implication of the BSE-veJD link 
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was that the eating of meat cut from cattle to be eaten any time in the 
preceding ten years, an act apparently so innocuous before the 
announcement was made, could have belated life-shattering effects. The 
'Roast Beef of Old England' once had life-affirming power, both literally and 
as a national symbol. It was suddenly resignified as a bringer of illness and 
death: a disturbing and abject reversal. 
20 March 1996 was the day that 'mad cow disease' stopped being solely 
a problem of animal health, and became the 'mad cow crisis', perhaps the 
most important political and social event of 1990s Britain. Beyond the terrible 
immediate fact of the deaths of humans from cases of vCJD (127) and of cows 
diagnosed with BSE (179,901), its ramifications were and are widespread. 
Epidemiologists still cannot calculate accurately the number of people who 
continue to incubate vCJD. The response to export controls imposed by the 
European Commission on the British meat industry repeatedly exposed the 
Conservative Party's schism over the issue of UK-European relations. This 
was a rift which (along with the handling of the BSE epidemic itself) must be 
seen as a huge factor in the Labour Party's general election win in 1997. BSE's 
cost to the UK treasury was to have reached £3.7 billion by the end of the 
2001/2 financial year, a cost largely borne for the removal from the food chain 
of all cows over thirty months old. To date the cull of animals in the wake of 
BSE has required the slaughter and disposal of 5,784,006 animals.1 
Such a figure as this last may still have the power to shock. Yet as one 
draws a breath at the sheer scale of death involved here, it is easy to overlook 
1 Statistics pertaining to BSE are found on the Department of Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs website the (http://www.defra.gov.uk!animalh/bse/index.html) and for vCJD from the 
Department of Health website (http://www.doh.gov.uk!cjd/stats/apr03.htm). 
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the complicated interplay of empathy and disavowal involved in such a 
response. For expressions of dismay at BSE's mass slaughter, or indeed at the 
modem-day hecatombs that blighted the countryside during 2002's Foot and 
Mouth outbreak, may give evidence of a real sense of loss at the demise of 
these beasts. Yet at the same time the mourning of these animals acts as a 
screen for a more profound loss to the psyche of the meat-eating public: that 
of a quasi-pastoral ideal in which meat is produced without the visible reality 
of death by farmers whose intimate relationship with their living herd 
counteracts the meat consumer's alienation from the animal that is 
slaughtered. Indeed, despite appearances, it is not strictly the death of the 
animal in the aftermath of BSE or Foot and Mouth that is mourned, but also 
its waste as a commodity.2 There is a salient difference between the demise of 
the animals condemned during these epidemics and the six thousand cows 
that are killed each day in Britain's meat industry. Although the latter 
disappear into an efficient market where gastronomic and economic 
consumption are combined, the deaths of the former remain visible, 
languishing with no use value and hence no economic destination. The 
condemned animals' burning, whether in pyres or incinerators, bears witness 
to the hard facts of an industry where death is essential to production and 
consumption. The decision was made to eradicate Foot and Mouth because it 
reduces milk yields and animal growth (that is, profit); the decision to cull 
cattle over thirty months was made primarily to retain public confidence in 
2 By analysing Britons' ethical response to the nameless mass of animals, I want to maintain a 
different (more materialist) perspective from that of Erica Fudge, who suggests that both the 
public outcry for the reprieve of 'Pheonix', a calf who miraculously survived a cull, and that 
outcry's stimulus in the calf's movement from nameless object to subject are evidence of the 
profound ambivalence in a 'nation of animal lovers' that eats dead animals (Animal, pp. 38-
43). 
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British beef after BSE, rather than to meet the explicit requirements of human 
or animal health. 
I. BSE Narratives 
The reason that I have begun this chapter with a foray into some of the 
meanings of BSE is that in surveying the cultural aftermath of the crisis it is 
fascinating to note this surprising irony: BSE has spawned a great number 
and variety of narratives, but virtually no literary response. Newspapers and 
television documentary, news, and discussion programmes have attempted 
to manage the ongoing story for the public.3 As Richard Kerridge has noted 
in his analysis of these, two particular narratives emerged: one of a return to 
normality as BSE itself was gradually eradicated; the other of a crisis ever 
harder to control as blood transfusions and growth hormones were 
implicated and information about possible longer incubation periods forced 
reconsiderations of the eventual number of veJD cases.4 Accompanying 
these, however, were two highly politicised narratives. First, the nationalist 
Euro-phobia which turned the international politics of BSE into a 'Beef War' 
tapped into Britain's camivoristic image repertoire of beefeaters and Jo1m 
Bull to promote a flagging industry by making the eating of beef a matter of 
national pride. Harriet Ritvo writes: 
3For an interesting analysis of the media coverage of the BSE crisis in the UK and USA, see ]. 
Gregory Payne, Daniel Dornbusch and Veronica Demko, 'Media Coverage of the Mad Cow 
Issue' in The Mad Cow Crisis ed. by Scott C. Ratzan (London: University College London 
Press, 1998) pp. 131~5. 
4 Richard Kerridge, 'BSE Stories', Keywords, 2 (1999), n.p .. 
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Although the government proclaimed its policy was based on 
'scientific advice', it was more transparently founded on patriotism, 
which had the advantage of immediate public appeal. From this 
perspective, the interests of the nation, its citizens and its cattle 
industry were happily indistinguishable from those of the animals 
themselves [despite] the similarity between BSE-induced culling and 
ordinary slaughtering from the bovine point of view. 5 
She continues: 'Beef, and the cattle that produce it, holds a special place in 
British national mythology. Before John Bull was a canine he was a bovine' 
(p. 120). The second accompanying narrative, that of the reaction to BSE as 
'mass hysteria', tried to reassure the public by characterising the response to 
Dorrell's announcement (a tum away from beef consumption) as irrational 
panic.6 In her otherwise insightful analysis of contemporary mass panics, 
Elaine Showalter has followed this trend by suggesting (without evidence or 
argument) that 'the furore over Mad Cow Disease in 1996 owed some of its 
intensity to British fear and denial of anything mad',7 She mentions neither 
the complex manipulation of such a denial by politicians, marketers and 
press to promote the interests of the meat industry, which was surprisingly 
effective, nor the genuine life-preserving self-interest which might have been 
behind the original tum away from beef. 
Accompanying the journalistic response, books appeared such as 
Stephen Dealler's Lethal Legacy: BSE-the Search for Truth (1996) and Pulitzer 
Prize-winner Richard Rhodes's Deadly Feasts: Tracking the Secrets of a Terrifying 
5 Harriet Ritvo, 'Mad Cow Mysteries', American Scholar, 67 (1998), 113-22 (p. 119). 
6 See Ray Brookes, 'Newspapers and National Identity: the BSE/QO Crisis and the British 
Press', Media, Culture and Society, 21 (1999),247-63 (p. 257). 
7 Elaine Showalter, Hysfories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture (London: Picador, 1998), 
p.28. 
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New Plague (1997). As their titles suggest, both of these are essentially 
modem-day quest stories, dramas of search and revelation. Lethal Legacy 
yokes the recounting of events into his personal narrative of professional and 
scientific justification in the face of governmental refusal to take BSE 
seriously. Deadly Feasts combines the genres of medical history and airport 
novel. As the jacket blurb says, Rhodes's book' reads like a Michael Crichton 
thriller', a 'brilliant and gripping medical detective stOry'.8 
Finally, the most weighty narrative of BSE, in terms of sheer size as well 
as cultural capital, and the one that aims for authoritative status as regards 
both the facts and ethics of the case, was the report of the official public 
inquiry into the events leading up to Dorrell's announcement, which was 
chaired by Lord Phillips. The centrality of story-telling to the understanding 
of BSE is underscored by this report's reliance on a narrative-led style and 
metaphorical conceits. A glance at volume one, section six, 'The Final 
Months', which documents the inquiry's findings about the protection of 
human health during the crisis, reveals that it begins with the phrase 'we 
come to the last section of our narrative'. Also, as it narrates the approach to 
the 20 March announcement it contains sub-headings such as 'The Storm 
Clouds Gather', 'Rumbles of Thunder', and (inevitably) 'The Storm Breaks'.9 
The fact that what is essentially a bureaucratic report with a main readership 
of health professionals and parliamentarians should have such a reliance on 
narrative plotting at its most important moment only goes to insist that any 
8 Stephen Dealler, Lethal Legacy: BSE: the Search for Truth (London: Bloomsbury, 1996); 
Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts: Tracking the Secrets of a Terrifying New Plague (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1997). 
9 http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk!report/volumel/chapte68.htm#646149 (sic). 
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understanding of the politics of BSE-veJD should not be separated from the 
analysis of its formal representation. 
Taking all of this into account, I want to suggest here one consequence 
of the prevalence of these particular narrative types in our understanding of 
BSE. The animals at the source of the epidemic are in effect effaced from the 
general cultural response to it-an effacement that my opening narrative tries 
in part to redress. This is not to say that popular and official BSE narratives 
do not talk about cows. Rather, they follow the pattern that I documented in 
my opening paragraphs of appearing to be about cows, while all the while 
being about commodities. The ESE Inquiry Report is a good example. Second 
in its list of thirteen key conclusions is the following: 
A vital industry has been dealt a body blow, inflicting misery on tens 
of thousands for whom livestock farming is a way of life. They have 
seen over 170,000 of their animals dying or having to be destroyed, 
and the precautionary slaughter and destruction within the United 
Kingdom of very many more. to 
Here, the deaths of the cows are unsurprisingly secondary in importance to 
the survival of an industry facing a collapse that is the chief cause of the 
farmers' 'misery'. Such misery is in tum the main concern of the report's 
authors. The telling word 'precautionary' is the signal for the emotional 
dynamiC I discussed earlier, by which a professed sadness in response to 
animal death acts as a screen for the projection of a more profound, economic 
loss. One can see that the misery annotated in this passage would be out of 
place if conditions allowed the replacement of 'precautionary' with 
'productive' or some such. 
10 http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume1/execsum2.htm#669592. 
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However, the interesting point here is not that there is an ideology 
inherent to the meat industry, one that is repeated by the report, which 
masks the fact that meat is predicated on death. Indeed, an interesting recent 
development in the narratives of meat-eating in the wake of Foot and Mouth 
disease has been a major shift in this ideology away from masking the 
conditions of meat production and towards a persistent focus on the ideal of 
organic consumption: knowing where one's meat comes from, and 
purchasing accordingly. 
This is represented in a recent Channel 4 television film called It's a 
Cow's Life. Having in its own right a fascinating narrative form, this 
programme offers a modem adult morality tale by combining tongue-in-
cheek reworkings of both the Bildungsroman form and the scene of the 
farmyard stories prevalent in British primary schools, complete with 
patronising narrator. The film mirrors the pattern I have identified in meat 
narratives by once again carefully reconfiguring the story of a cow (named 
Lulu) into one about the demise of farming. Also, it sees no problem in 
confounding the viewer's narrative desire by using as its plot one specific 
animal's progression from birth to death, yet abjuring narrative tension by 
making explicit early on the absolutely inevitable cathartic closure in the 
slaughterhouse. The programme begins, in quite conventional Bildungsroman 
terms, by establishing its purported main character. It does so via the 
presentation of Lulu's owner's anthropomorphic treatment of her. Then, 
juxtaposed with self-consciously cute pictures of the frolicking calf, the 
narrator says: 
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It's funny how farmers humanise their animals, especially when you 
think about the reason why animals like Lulu exist. And although this 
is a story about Lulu the cow, it's also about the people who come 
into contact with her ... like you perhaps. She could end up on your 
table. Have a good look at her. With her silky skin and big eyes she's 
cute and pretty. But let's not forget why she's here .... ll 
At this point, the action is frozen so that Lulu, a wide-eyed epitome of the 
neotenous representation of animals, appears to fix the viewer in her gaze. As 
I argued in my earlier discussion of Atwood's Surfacing, the animal gaze has 
an uncanny power as an aesthetic signifier of (or incitement to) cross-species 
empathy. But the voice-over of the film swiftly overcodes any possibility of 
viewer identification with the cow in the space of this look with its 
explanation of exactly 'why she's here': 
She's hamburger. And sirloin steak and a roast beef dinner. She's 
sausages and tripe and steak and kidney pie, or perhaps pet food. 
She's the leather jacket on your back, the shoes on your feet. She 
could even be the soap in your sink. 
Thus, the sympathy evinced from the viewer when the narrative uses the 
Bildungsroman form to give the animal a clear individuality is subtly obscured 
by the self-deconstruction of that narrative. After all, it would seem to be 
impossible to unfold a story about the life of a being whose very ontology-
'why she's here' -is that it is always-already dead: 'she's hamburger'. 
Yet what makes such moments as these so interesting is not only that 
the programme's makers are willing to use such grotesque realism to reverse 
an almost universal trend in the ideology and urban geography of modem 
11 It's a Cow's Life. Dir. Brian Hill. Channel 4. 2002. 
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western meat-production by making very visible the facts of meat 
production. The programme indeed draws to a close with scenes from inside 
the slaughterhouse of Lulu's death and butchering that are so graphic that 
the programme, broadcast at 11 pm, carried a warning to viewers. This is the 
first such warning that I can remember in the history of television's recording 
of meat stories-such warnings did not accompany news footage of the 
aftermaths of BSE and Foot and Mouth-and it adds another layer of 
significance to the politics of representing animal death. It would appear that 
in the minds of the broadcasters, narrative conventions (as opposed to those 
of the news reporting) allow for the kind individuality that allows scenes of 
animals' death to produce compassion for them in the viewer. But what is 
most unusual in this film is that the explicitness and visibility of its 
representations of animal killing do not occur in the context of arguments for 
animal rights, the conventional place for anti-obfuscatory rhetoric about the 
meat industry. Rather, it is in the service of enlightened, or organic, 
consumption. And it is this type of consumption (the ideology of It's a Cow's 
Life suggests with forlorn hope) that might resurrect the pastoral ideal of 
small farming. The film's denouement tells us the moral of the tale. It begins 
with a parallelism that mirrors the earlier effect of narrative self-
deconstruction, ironically tying the fate of the cow to the inevitable closure of 
the text that gave her individuality: 
Well, that's the end of Lulu, and almost the end of our story. The next 
time you tuck into a juicy steak or a lovely hamburger you might 
spare a thought for Lulu, or one of the other six thousand cattle killed 
in this country every day. I'm not trying to put you off eating meat, 
but it's a good idea to know where your food comes from. [ ... ] And 
as for the farmers: they're still struggling, and getting into debt, and 
wondering how they'll survive. The end. 
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So, once again the key point of interest here, just as it was in the 
narratives of BSE, is not just that the most prevalent modes of narrative for 
telling the story of meat ideologically mask animal death. Rather, it is the way 
that nostalgic mourning for the demise of what is essentially an economic 
endeavour can only find its expression precisely and ironically via grief for 
the very animal deaths that are the raison d'etre of the industry. Moreover, 
such an overlaying of animal by industry closes off the possibility of 
mourning the animal itself. 
Of course, it is not surprising that narratives produced for consumption 
by a public that is largely meat-eating and so is fully invested in a productive 
meat industry should have this sort of focus. This is so especially when the 
passage from animal to human misery is the essence of the disaster of vCJD. 
Obviously, too, the narrative drive of scientific research into the nosology 
and epidemiology of both BSE and vCJD is to document a specifically human 
teleology. The extension of this, as the cultural narrative of BSE responds to 
the BSE Inquiry Report, is to find The London Review of Books turning to an 
eminent bacteriologist to review that document. Hugh Pennington's main 
conclusion was that the most important lesson of BSE is that we need more 
scientists in the Executive: 'gifted amateurs with non-science first-class 
Oxbridge degrees may be able to write brilliant position papers proving that 
black is white, but they should not be occupying the heart of government'.12 
Thus in one of Britain's premier cultural reviews, BSE becomes a drama 
about the recruitment policy of the civil service. However, a claim implicit in 
12 Hugh Pennington, 'The English Disease', review of The BSE Inquiry: Vo/s. I-XVI by Lord 
Phillips, June Bridgeman and Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, London Review of Books, 22.24 (2000), 
~(p.6). 
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the work of the present thesis is that it is one of the possibilities of literary 
narratives to complicate the predictably anthropocentric focus which guides 
the popular and scientific narratives I have been discussing here. 
As I mentioned earlier, there has been only a small number of very brief 
literary responses to BSE-vCJD.13 On the one hand, this is perhaps an 
understandable result of the oft-noted dilemma for the postmodem fabulist 
that the contemporary world offers such fantastic narratives that fiction can 
barely keep up. lhis is certainly the case with BSE, which 'is a story as rich in 
images, subsidiary plots and tragic outcomes as any novel'.14 On the other 
hand, however, the lack of a literary response remains surprising given the 
fact that if BSE were a novel, it would be a distinctly postmodem one. As 
Joan Leach notes, 'the BSE event offers no narrative closure, no ending by 
which the truth is recovered, boundaries stabilised, or uncertainties made 
certain'.IS Obviously, there is the human tragedy involved for sufferers of 
velD and the possibly national scale on which it was predicted to appear. 
There is also the arresting repertoire of the imagery of BSE, replete with 
staggering cows and infernal incinerators. Then, there is the challenge to 
narrative technique itself of representing the traumatic belatedness of a 
disease with such a complex chronology, a point remarked by Barbara Adam. 
13 After researching this particular topic since 1997 I have found this to be the case aside from 
BSE's appearance in the occasional poem, such as Vicki Raymond's 'Mad Cows Song', in 
Selected Poems (London: Carcanet, 1993), or Simon Armitage's film poem for the millennium 
Killing Time (Channel 4. 2000). This film, which has the same director in Brian Hill as It's a 
Cow's Life, not unsurprisingly introduces the anguish of farmers with the iconic falling cow 
image. The only extended literary response has come in the form of Jo Shapcott's cycle of 
'Mad Cow Poems', some published before and some after 1996, see Her Book: Poems 1988-
1998 (London: Faber, 2(00). 
14 Pennington. p. 3. 
IS Joan Leach, 'Madness, Metaphors and Miscommunication: the Rhetorical Life of Mad Cow 
Disease' in Ratzan (ed.), pp. 119-30 (p. 128). 
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As Kerridge applies her argument, 'the timescapes of the dominant forms of 
contemporary narrative, from thrillers to documentaries and news reports, 
cannot accommodate the timescape of BSE/CJD, with its unknown rates of 
infectivity and unknown incubation period' .16 The prevalence of other kinds 
of traumatic narrative in recent years, covering such diverse social 
phenomena as slavery and race, the Jewish Holocaust, and HN-AIDS, only 
serves to bring into relief their dearth in the case of BSE-vCJD. In fact, Leach 
suggests that 'the BSE story-line has much in common with other disease 
narratives such as AIDS' and describes BSE in terms Paula Treichler has used 
of AIDS as an 'epidemic of signification' (p. 125).17 There is, however, one 
literary story of BSE which responds to each of these exigencies of its 
representation, as well as counteracting the particular effacement of the 
animal that I have documented in other modes of BSE narrative. It is this 
work, Deborah Levy's Diary of a Steak, which will be the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter. 
I will begin with a description. Published in late 1997 and clearly responding 
to the aftermath of the BSE-veJD as a trans-species problem, Diary of a Steak 
is a fascinating addition to the emergent cultural narrative of 8SE firstly 
because of the potential of its avant-garde form. 1his text explodes from the 
16 Kerridge, n.p .. See Barbara Adam, Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible 
Hazards (London: Routledge, 1998). 
17 The comparison was in fact a staple of the middle-market papers' handling of BSE. The 
front-page headline of the Daily Mail on 22 March 1996 was 'COULD IT BE WORSE THAN AIDS?'. The 
Daily Express ran with 'IT COULD BECOME WORSE THAN AIDS'. See Brookes, p. 252. 
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confines of conventional literary forms and in doing so offers a markedly 
different figuration of the animal from any of the other books analysed in this 
thesis. Throughout this chapter I will be referring to Diary of a Steak in terms 
of genre by its sel£-designation, as a diary, or by other non-literature-specific 
terms such as book or text. This is because standard literary generic 
categories, such as the novel, seem unable to accommodate this extremely 
unusual piece of writing. Formally, it is largely made up of fractured 
stretches of prose, but it also resembles at times the text of a performance 
artwork, containing both transcribed conversations and declamatory 
statements that explicitly address a public audience. The meaning of the 
prose itself is extremely enigmatic, with plenty of unexplained extra-textual 
allusion. And throughout, language itself is broken down, losing coherence at 
all semantic levels: words often have letters missing; there is erratic grammar 
and frequent non-sequiturs; and the text itself is heteroglot, incorporating 
both a host of European languages and also, strangely, English words 
transliterated into ancient Greek. 
Responding to this heteroglossia, one good way of describing the text is 
in Bakhtinian terms, for in addition to the journal form it accommodates a 
range of other genres and modes of writing which are put into dialogic 
interaction, from medical and cultural history to psychoanalytic case study, 
news reportage and surrealist free-association poetry, from parliamentary 
speeches to popular celebrity magazines like Hello!, private letters and even 
bureaucratic documents like faxes. This all contributes to a remarkably 
pluralist, even anarchic, textual arena in which the reader has to make a 
meaning of the text as much from the clash of these discourses as from the 
insight of anyone of them. The resulting text is certainly a grotesque one, its 
language decomposed and difficult to make any sense of. It is filled with 
allusion to food, illness, the exigencies of time, and death (not surprising in a 
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text about BSE) as well as to sexuality and other bodily processes. The final 
entry of the diary, which comments on the cause of BSE's spread at once with 
punning humour and melancholy, suggests that BSE-veJD is in a way the 
most Bakhtinian of social phenomena: 'My momm y went to the incinerator. 
She was not allowed to suckle me. I'm a herbivore but I was made into a 
carnival'.18 In its sad indictment of a fact structural to the dairy industry (the 
forcible removal of calves from their mothers) this entry also introduces to 
the narrative of BSE a gender-based inflection that will be of central 
importance to my reading of the text. 
This entry is written by the eponymous steak, but the panoply of 
discursive modes that I have described is in fact called upon (in the space of 
forty nine pages) to relate two interwoven stories. Diary of a Steak takes the 
form of the highly unconventional journal of, ostensibly, two different 
diarists. It is a record of the last six days in the (shelf-) life of a steak culled 
from the body of a cow that has been slaughtered while incubating BSE, and 
it incorporates both individual memories of the cow's actual life and what we 
might call 'cultural memories' of her bovine grandparents. But it is also a 
diachronic memoir of the treatment of women by the various stages of 
psychotherapeutic medicine, ranging from Victorian 'moral management' 
through Darwinism and the birth of psychoanalysis, to anti-psychiatry and 
electro-convulsive therapy (ECI). These stages correspond to chapters in 
Elaine Showalter's book on that subject The Female Malady, which along with 
the Diary of a Steak's obvious allusion to Gogol's 'Diary of a Madman', is its 
18 Deborah Levy, Diary of a Steak (London: Bookworks, 1997), p. 49. All quotations from this 
will be transcribed exactly, including the unusual typography and misspellings that 
characterise the text; I will not mark these with 'sic'. The only alteration will be my own 
occasional ellipses. 
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most obvious intertext.19 The summary moment of this history, for Levy as 
well as for Showalter, is the explosion of hysteria across fin-de-sitkle Europe, 
which marks the high watermark of incidence of female psychiatric illness, as 
well as the foundation of psychoanalytic therapy as we know it today. 
The collocation of hysteria and the camivalesque will be of no surprise 
to some. The influential reading of the former in terms of the latter by Allan 
White and Peter Stallybrass was an important corrective to the utopian ideals 
of early feminist theorising about hysteria as well as of carnival's 
revolutionary potential in contemporary culture.20 After their work it seems 
impossible to argue that either carnival or hysteria is a space that effectively 
allows the other to challenge the patriarchallbourgeois hegemony that 
oppresses it. Such issues will of course be important to any reading of Diary 
of a Steak for its ability to give voice to the animal other and a pro-animal 
politics. 
It is primarily by marking out the connections between hysteric and BSE 
cow that Diary of a Steak makes its most interesting contribution to 
contemporary pro-animal thought, but the text also indicates other surprising 
links between animals and the history of female psychiatry, such as the fact 
that ECT technology grew out of research work by Ugo Cerletti in Rome's 
19 Nicolai Gogol, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972). The 
surrealistic tone of Diary is dearly descended from that of the thoughts of Gogol's paranoiac, 
revolving as the latter do around the imagined Machiavellian machinations of talking dogs. 
Another key intertext is Roland Barthes's essay 'Steak and Olips', which is quoted on pages 
eight and eighteen. See Mythologies trans. by Annette Lavers (New York: Noonday Press, 
1989), pp. 62~. 
20 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: 
Methuen, 1986). 
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pork slaughterhouses. Here is how the diarist relates the development of 
ECf: 
The distinguished gentlemen of Italy got involved with pork. The 
slaughterhouses of Rome became the electroconvulsive laboratory of 
Europe. Their learned project was nothing less than the re-
incarnation of the pig soul ... kill off the bad self and birth the good 
self ... electrify torment out of the system just as you cut crusts off 
bread; bad pig soul zapped with electricity, leaving pure peaceful 
harmonious piggery ... it caught on in the hospitals of Europe and 
pigs were allowed to get back to just being slaughtered. (pp. 42-43)21 
In addition to all of this, Diary of a Steak stages a veritable polyphony of 
voices, including unnamed politicians at the time of the BSE crisis as well as 
famous physicians and hysterical patients such as Jean-Martin Charcot, 
Joseph Breuer, and Sigmund Freud, Augustine, Anna 0., and Dora, among 
its characters. It is interesting to note in parenthesis that by thus fictionalising 
the actual scene of hysteria in the context of BSE, Diary of a Steak is 
simultaneously part of a thriving tradition in terms of the former and a 
forerunner in terms of the latter. For in contrast to the literary silence about 
BSE, the actual historical scene of hysteria has been an inspiration to the 
contemporary avant-garde.22 Yet as if such a Babel formed by the clamouring 
21 See also Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-
1980 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 206. 
22 This tradition is an interesting parallel to the rise in literary-critical work on nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century representations of hysterical illness. See Helene Cixous's play Portrait 
of Dora (1979). Showalter documents in Hystories more recent work such as that of the London 
based 'Dora film collective' in the late seventies; artist Mary Kelley's exhibition Interim (1984-
85); plays such as Dianne Hunter's Dr. Charcot's Hysteria Shows (1988), Augustine or Big 
Hysteria by Anna Furse (1991) and Kim Morrisey's Dora: A Case of Hysteria (1994). Charcot 
appears in Alasdair Gray's Poor Things (1992); and Pat Barker's 'factional' novel Regeneration 
(1992), like Diary, interpolates Showalter's The Female Malady. Most recently Sharon Kivland's 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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voices of the drama tis personae of hysteria and BSE were not disorienting 
enough, the guiding form in which it appears is the quotidian self-disclosure 
of something which one would think cannot signify (a steak!). 
In analysing the book, I especially want to flag the problem of how to 
categorise it since, as I will argue later, one of its chief concerns is to 
undermine the notions of conventional aesthetic authorship and 
interpretation. It is therefore very difficult to talk about the book as a novel, 
or other such literary genre. nus is something which one might feel 
compelled to do when confronted with a text that, despite its titular claim to 
be a non-artistic form of self-disclosure, is clearly confected by an author 
called Deborah Levy, a writer of several highly regarded works of fiction.23 
These are concerns to which I will return later; but it will suffice for the 
moment to recognise that some form of effacement of human authorship 
seems a repeated concern of the project of figuring the animal. It is a trope 
which will be recognised as much from my discussion of Walker's disavowal 
of written discourse as from that of Surfacing'S narrator and her flight from 
the symbolic function of language. Indeed, as will have become clear, I want 
to suggest that this book, Diary of a Steak, tackles the difficult task of telling 
the animals' story of BSE, and confronts (and thus exposes) the way in which 
that story has been subsumed beneath the dominant human-centred 
interpretive schema. In fact, in my reading of the text, the story of BSE proves 
an especially fertile ground for the contemporary figuration of the animal. 
revision of the Dora case as a postmodern detective novel, A Case of Hysteria (1999) is 
published by the same small publisher, Bookworks, as Diary of a Steak. 
23 Levy has written several plays published in a collection by Methuen and a number of 
novels, books of poetry and short stories published by Vintage. These, as well as her 
contributions to a number of avant-garde projects are detailed on her internet homepage 
http://www.deborahlevy.co.uk. 
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This is because BSE-vCJD marks a moment when the structurally related 
oppositions of human to animal, of language to body, and of culture to 
nature-oppositions that I return to again and agam' . th t th . m e presen eSlS-
simpJy will not hold. This is encapsulated in one harrowing extract from 
Diary of a Steak. \\ glv~~ 'N,rtd~ to a 6SE cow that bring into the open the fact 
of human responsibility for infecting cows with BSE and the devastation of 
the slaughter that we have visited on them. 
I lost my mind before they culled it. Loss is not in the equation. I 
gained mindlessness, memories of knives and psychic anguish in the 
English countryside. The mind gentlemen is closely related to the flesh ... 
the mind Is a body ... the mind falling falling falling. (p. 11) 
In the case of vCJD, humans became infected with a disease that began 
as BSE in the bodies of Britain's cows, but which only disseminated 
throughout those many bodies because of their complete industrialisation, or 
enculturation.24 The reason for the spread of BSE, as we know, is recognised 
to be the practice in animal husbandry of replacing grass with meat and 
bone-meal made of rendered cattle carcasses. This is a high-protein cattle 
feed which increases milk yields and is a process integral to the post-war 
industrialisation of farming. One could say that the animals infected with BSE 
have in a sense been turned into texts, their very bodies inscribed with a 
disease that is the most explicit manifestation of agriculture'S 
denaturalisation of the animal. Seen in this light, BSE repositions the animal 
24 I will use the term 'infected' here because it is the one most often used and easily 
understood in the epidemiology of BSE. In fact, the more accurate term is pOisoned, since BSE 
and vCJD are contracted by a process of ingestion over time of what are known as 'infective 
units', and the agent of the disease is not organic matter, a virus with which one is infected, 
but what is known as a prion-protein. See Pennington, 'The BSE Inquiry'. 
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body from the silent or asignifying realm of nature and into a circuit of 
cultural meaning.25 That human bodies should then be infected with the 
disease after working another essentially textual device, the conversion of the 
animal body into meat ready for culinary preparation, makes it even more 
difficult for such binaries as human/animal, languagelbody, and 
culture/nature to hold. Indeed, the format of the text itself works to 
defamiliarise meat and to realise its textuality. The book's dustcover bears a 
life-size image of a steak pictured against a silver background which 
resembles a meat display; inside is reproduced a price ticket bearing the 
legend: 'ENGLISH, 10lbs' (figures one and two). The process of purchasing 
this book is thus uncannily (or was for this vegetarian, at least) like a trip to 
the butcher shop. 
So, it is in the context of these implications of BSE and meat that Diary of 
a Steak emerges, for in such a confusion of human, animal body, and text, any 
complaint that giving words to an animal is anthropomorphic seems entirely 
beside the point. In fact, it would seem to require only a small leap of the 
imagination to suggest that we can read meat as I a poetics of spleen and 
kidney and tongue' (p. 11), or indeed that steaks can write diaries! And it is in 
this context of the breakdown of the boundary between body and text that I 
25 This is not of course to say that Nature is meaningless; however, in a standard post-
structuralist reading, Nature is replete with meaning as the binary opposite which constructs 
the meaning of Culture as its negative. Such a reading thus accepts the absence of positive 
Signification in Nature; it simply sees significance in that very absence. My point here is the 
more nuanced one that in the case of BSE the supposed opposition between silent natural 
body and semiotic cultural text is crossed, the BSE-infected cow is both body ~d text. 
Contrasting post-structuralist readings of the significance of nature can be found m Kate 
Soper, What is Nature?: Culture, Politics and the Non-Human (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), Cary 
Wolfe, 'Nature as Critical Concept: Kenneth Burke, The Frankfurt School and "Metabiology''', 
Cultural Critique, 18 (1991), 65-96, and Val Plumbwood, Feminism and The Mastery of Nature 
(London: Routledge, 1993). 
Figure 1: cover of Diary of a Steak 
Figure 2: Inside Cover of Diary of a Steak 
Chapter Three (Mis-)reading the A~ant-Garde Animal 121 
now tum to the key guiding concept in Diary of a Steak: hysteria. For such a 
boundary transgression is perhaps a key facet of this illness in which mental 
traumas manifest themselves on the physical body in the form of culturally 
recognisable symptoms. The hysterical body, like the steak, is at once body 
and text.26 
II. Mad Cows and Bovine Hysterics? Parallels of Women and Animals in 
Diary of a Steak 
I want to preface my explanation of the link between hysteria and BSE with a 
quotation that will perhaps give a sense of the interlinking of the two in 
Levy's text. Here the cow-steak is addressing a gathering of 'learned 
gentlemen' at Charcot's famous le~ons de mardi, his lectures on hysteria. These 
were a sensation, attended by Freud along with the doctors and students of 
the Salpetriere Hospital at which they took place as well as many others of 
the Parisian artistic cognoscenti. In Diary of a Steak, however, Charcot's 
Parisian lecture theatre is merged with a post-BSE Brussels committee room, 
and the aforementioned 'learned gentlemen' now comprise 'vets, journalists, 
leading personae of Europa, scholars, journalists poets, more vets' P The 
26 Lippit explores some congruencies of hysteria and animality. He suggests that 'in hysteria 
the animal world erupts onto the surface of human consciousness as a kind of primal scene' 
(pp. 103-04). Despite the mixed metaphors, his point is well taken here. But my difference 
from Lippit is that where his concern deliberately stops at the influence of the concept of 'the 
animal' in philosophy, mine is to look for the implications of thus influenced philosophy for 
animals themselves. 
27 The text's use of 'Europa' here, and throughout, alludes to the Classical Greek story of the 
princess of Tyre who was mounted by Zeus in the form of a bull: we can only wonder if this 
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narrated subject is the privileged psychoanalytic subject of the 'primal scene' 
of the cow'S own conception. She also touches on a possible cause of BSE, the 
feeding to cattle of scrapie-infected sheep, as well as humorously alluding to 
the BSE symptom of intense itching. In addition, though, her narration 
merges with that of someone who would appear to be one of Charcot's own 
patients. The cow's actions with the ammonia, charcoal and top-hat are 
actually paraphrased from a contemporary report of the le~ons, although 
these were exhibited by different women. Here as elsewhere I include a long 
stretch of the text; this is because its allusive and enigmatic quality, which is 
absolutely vital to its overall meaning, can only come across in this way. 
Gentlemen: Pank you for calling me to the lecture theatre today and 
in such a pretty nightie too. Do you think my nose is too big? I tell 
you what. We do have something in common after all. You eat sheep 
and I eat sheep. I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine. If you want 
milk just tee heee. Mother was an eating machine. Father never got to 
breathe on her neck. He copulated with a large leather mock-up of 
mother and his semen was transferred via a glass tube into her 
womb. I think I was a Friesian Hereford cross, with plentiful width. 
Mother showed me how to do it. Hysteria. I learnt all I know from 
her milk. She taught me everything. Perfected my falls. Rolled my 
eyes. [ ... ] They gave me a bottle of ammonia to smell, I said it was 
rose water. They gave me charcoal to eat, I told them it was chocolate. 
They gave me a top hat and I told them it was a baby and suckled it 
in front of the distinguished gentlemen farmers and independent 
experts on brain disease. (pp. 6--8)28 
is the text's punning indictment of the xenophobic desire in the aftermath of BSE for England 
Gohn Bull) to 'fuck the European Union'? 
28 For the original report of the le~ons, see Axel Munthe, The Story of San Michele, quoted in 
Showalter, The Female Malady, p. 148. 
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The merging of patient and cow as narrator here would seem analogically to 
equate hysteric and cow, effacing the differences between them, and 
reinforcing the oppressive ideological collocation of women and animals. As 
Mary Jacobus writes, I analogy is a means of denying difference; since it really 
works to superimpose likeness, difference becomes the blind spot of 
analogy'.29 The term I would want to use here, however, is that the text 
indicates parallels between hysteric and BSE cow. This term allows for the 
evocation of similarity between the two, as parallel lines run in the same 
direction; while insisting on a necessary difference between them, as the lines 
cannot come into actual contact. Thus, while it remains possible to recognise 
that there is an obvious political necessity not to equate women and animals 
(an age-old patriarchal gesture), this notion of a parallel between hysteric and 
BSE cow allows me to use insights gained from the feminist study of hysteria 
to understand the figuration of animals. 
Now, while I do not want to give here a thorough introduction to 
hysteria as a disease and critical category-a project as impossible as it is 
unnecessary in the wake of a number of magisterial publications30 - I do want 
to touch on the most pertinent concepts for my purposes that study of 
hysteria has provided. To put it in very schematic terms which I will 
complicate as I progress: there were two contrasting ways of reading hysteria 
29 Mary Jacobus, Reading Woman: Essays in Feminist Criticism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), p. 283. 
30 Hysteria now has enough currency as a critical concept to deserve a pocket-sized 
introductory guide: Julia Borossa, Hysteria (London: Icon Books, 2001). For an exhaustive 
historical survey of the disease in both the medical and cultural arenas, see Mark Micale, 
Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995). Showalter's Hystories is a more polemic study in the field of feminist studies. For the 
most thoroughgOing aesthetic study of hysteria, see Elizabeth Bronfen, The Knotted Subject: 
Hysteria and its Discontents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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during its development as a valuable concept in the field of feminist 
influenced literary-cultural criticism in the 1980s and 1990s. The first, largely 
inspired by readings (or misreadings) of Cixous and Irigaray, saw the disease 
as a language of the female body that is symbolically repressed in patriarchal 
culture. In the quotation above, in fact, the cow's discourse seems a classic 
example of hysteria as Cixousian ecriture feminine: 'Mother showed me how to 
do it. Hysteria. I learnt all I know from her milk'.31 Ironically, by viewing 
hysterical symptoms as a sort of proto-feminist avant-garde poetics of the 
body and the famous hysterics documented by Charcot, Breuer and Freud as 
its artists, this reading finds itself in a tradition with the famous claim of 
Aragon and Breton that hysteria was' the greatest poetic discovery of the end 
of the nineteenth-century' .32 In turn, literary works which represented such 
symptoms in either form or content were championed by feminist scholars.33 
The second reading of hysteria, best represented by the historicism-
inflected work of Showalter, viewed hysteria in a less celebratory light, 
stressing the fact that while hysteric symptoms are a way for the unconscious 
to voice its disaffection, hysteria is most certainly not only a female malady 
and is at its sad essence a debilitating illness. As Showalter polemically claims 
in her recent cultural survey of hysteria: 
31 See Cixous, 'The Laugh of the Medusa', trans. by Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, Signs, 1 
(1976),875-93: 'There is always within [a woman] at least a little of that good mother's milk. 
She writes in white ink' (p. 881). In this essay, sounding not unlike Lissie in The Temple of my 
Familiar, Cixous imagines a connection between ecriture feminine and animals: that women's 
writing cannot fail to become a 'chaosmos of the personal' is a fact 'known by the colonised 
peoples of yesterday, the workers, the nations, the species off whose backs the history of men 
has made its gold' (p. 888, my emphasis). 
32 Quoted in Micale, p. 194. 
33 For a manifestation of this in theory, see many of the essays in In Dora's Case: Freud, 
Hysteria, Feminism, ed. by Charles Bernheimer and Gaire Kahane (London: Virago, 1985); in 
literary criticism, see Jacobus. 
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some feminist critics have overread women's stories and under read 
doctors' studies. They have reduced the vast literature on hysteria to 
a few canonical case studies of the great hysterical stars, chiefly Dora 
and Anna O. They have disregarded the history of hysteria and 
treated it as a metaphor.34 
Thus dissent emerged over the political effectiveness of hysteria as a 
feminist-theoretical category while excitement waned at the radical potential 
of hysteria's voicing of the female body, particularly when it appears in 
literary texts. Celebrating hysteria as a 'feminine discourse' too quickly 
placed women in a powerless position of victimhood, with no culturally or 
politically productive voice. Nonetheless, one factor does remain constant 
through both these competing readings: the critical leverage gained by the 
fact that in hysteria body and culture meet. 'Hysteria is a mimetic disorder', 
Showalter writes, 'it mimics culturally permissible expressions of distress' (p. 
15). As a psychosomatic illness, hysteria formulates its symptoms by tapping 
into the image repertoire of the culture of its sufferer. The hysterically 
suffering body is therefore both body and text, just like the BSE-infected cow. 
Bearing these points in mind, it is possible to draw out the interest of 
hysteria as a critical category in trying to understand contemporary 
figurations of the animal by situating hysteria in the context of some ideas 
already discussed in this thesis. This can be done in particular by 
remembering my discussion of the search for the lost female (or maternal) 
body in Atwood's Surfacing. There, I suggested that in that text, the animal is 
in a position comparable to the female body for psychoanalytic feminism-it 
is beyond the reach of discourse. Hysteria, in the second generation feminist 
34 Showalter, Hystories, p. 93. 
Olapter Three (Mis-)reading the Avant-Garde Animal 126 
definition I have outlined, was perceived as a response to that otherness of 
the body, a way for the body to speak; in those terms, one could imagine it 
acting as a context for the voicing of the animal body.35 
In taking such a path, one would only follow the lead of Cixous and 
Clement, who align hysteric and animal in their creative reading of the 
analogous relations between, and equivalence of, sorceress and hysteric. In a 
passage that foreshadows Walker's tum to the witch-animal bond in The 
Temple of my Familiar, Cixous and Clement write of the sorceress-hysteric who 
I finds herself in the heart of the forest. It has become her kingdom; she has 
become like the animals' .36 The opening section of this work, conventionally 
attributed to Ch~ment, is in fact a veritable bestiary. She touches on the many 
animal phobias of Freud's hysteria patient Emmy von N. Also, an array of 
animals and animal imagery marks her discussion of the witches, shamans 
and carnival performers whose population of the abject realm of the 
patriarchal imaginary is Clement's object of study. 
Neither she nor Cixous, however, is willing here to follow through their 
political conclusions about women to the animals with whom their hysterics 
share the status of patriarchy's other. There is certainly debate between them 
35 Indeed, an interesting coincidence in terms of the authors studied in this thesis is that 
Atwood's The Edible Woman and Walker's Meridian have been read as 'hysterical' texts: 
Patricia Waugh in Feminine Fictions: Revisiting the Postmodern (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 
168-86 briefly notes the importance of animals in Atwood's text, recognising that Marian, its 
main protagonist's body expresses feminist protest through 'disordered perception, confusion 
of species, hysterical conversion' (p. 186). Waugh does not, however, follow up the potential 
for animal politicS of the hysteric's refusal to consume animals. I have attempted precisely 
this in 'Animal Form' chapter three, and in my analysis above of a related refusal in Surfacing: 
there, we see not a hysteric's neurotic abstinence but a fully psychotic one. See also Maria 
Lauret, Liberating Literature: Feminist Fiction in America (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 135-38. 
36 Helene Cixous and Catherine Oement, The Newly Born Woman, trans. by Betsy Wing 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 4. 
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as to the revolutionary power of hysteria as feminine discourse; Clement 
disagrees with Cixous's assertion that as part of its imaginary hysteria is a 
'force that works to dismantle [bourgeois patriarchal] structures' (p. 156). 
Clement argues that the very fact of the hysteric's position in the imaginary is 
a problem for her revolutionary force. The distinction between 'those who 
nicely fulfil their function of challenging with all possible violence' (that is, 
those whose protest is bodily) and 'those who will arrive at a symbolic 
inscription' (that is, those who engage in direct social action) 'seems 
essential', she writes (p. 156). Despite this productive dissent within their 
joint work, the ignorance of which played a key part in second generation 
feminism's unchecked' celebration' of hysteria, they agree that the interest of 
the hysteric for feminist politics is her challenging, marginal position. For it is 
the fact that the symbolic can only function via the exclusion of the imaginary 
that grants the other its particular force. We might imagine, then, that the 
animal would hold a similar force for Clement and Cixous. However, when 
they boil down their social analysis to its explicit Lacanian reduction, its post-
structuralist logic vanishes and it consists of a surprising ethological 
humanism. The imaginary realm is integral only to human subject-
development, not a logical consequence of socio-cultural formations, so the 
animal has no part in it. In response to Clement's assertion that while 'the 
chimpanzee looks behind the mirror to see who is there, another chimpanzee, 
itself, or nobody [ ... ] man identifies and constitutes himself with the mirror', 
Cixous's caveat is that 'the chimpanzee actually is the chimpanzee and we 
are the result of our relationship to the [mirror], (pp.137-38). The irony, of 
course, is that by being explicitly excluded from this schema to allow it to 
function, the chimpanzee becomes the imaginary of such symbolic definitions 
as the Lacanian reading of human subjectivity. 
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I want to offer a different reading, however, to one which has hysteria 
as a language of the animal-as-body. Instead, I want to follow through the 
implication of hysteria as an explicit textualisation of the body. With the case 
of hysteria, and in tum with that of Diary of a Steak's figuration of the animal, 
we are dealing with the body-as-text. Because of its textualisation of the animal 
body, this work offers a radicalisation of Atwood's position in Surfacing that 
identification with animals on the level of the body is impossible because 
humans are linguistic or cultural beings. Atwood's position is just that of 
Cixous and Oement, above, that the symbolic function of language acts as a 
bar that cannot be crossed between humans and animals (or mind and body). 
On the contrary, in Diary of a Steak's manipulation of hysteria, we confront 
the fact that such a bar is problematised because the animal (or body) itself is 
seen as a text provoking or requiring interpretation rather than as non-
signifying matter. Under those circumstances, as we shall see, making sense 
of the animal and hysteria means, to be sure, understanding the politics of 
their interpretation. But to return to BSE and Diary of a Steak, I will now 
analyse the ways in which hysteria and BSE find their way into this text. 
In the literary publishing climate of the mid 1990s, in which the emergent 
genre of I chick-lit' gained much market force, it was almost inevitable that 
someone would make a banal appropriation of the metaphorics of women, 
insanity, and BSE. Sure enough, Kathy Lette's comedic novel Mad Cows duly 
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appeared in 1996, its title expertly chosen to make best use of the cultural 
currency of the disease.37 Its content of course had nothing to do with real 
cows (or real insanity) and everything to do with zany women and their 
adventures in post-feminist consumer society. Comedy, albeit of a distinctly 
more surreal and ironic kind, also marks Diary of a Steak. However, it in the 
end offers a more serious corrective to Lette's ignorance of any gender 
political implications of BSE itself. One of the text's funniest moments is a 
particularly acerbic comment on the gender politics that accompanied 'mad 
cow disease'. The diary contains this fantastical piece of government 
propaganda: 
The minister is proud to tell the world's press that the newly 
furnished Farmer's Bar [ ... ] in Somerset has been guest visited by an 
internationally renowned stand up comic unemployed in Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, Zagreb. He donated his act free of charge to rally the depressed 
gentlemen farmers diu:y spells, high blood pressure, beating vegetables out of defeat 
and into defiance. 'How do you know when a woman really loves 
you? She rubs her head on your gatepost every morning!' 'What's the 
difference between BSE and PMT? At least you can incinerate BSE!!' 
(p.40) 
An efficient cutting down to size of the sexist comic's international prestige is 
achieved here by way of the satiric marginalia in small font, which mayor 
may not represent unconscious commentary emanating from the diarist 
herself. With this, the text goes further than a simple mocking of the 
gynophobia of such jokes. For in the shadow of its satire the jokes reveal that, 
as was suggested by the diarist's mournful complaint that her mother was 
not allowed to suckle her, such gynophobia crosses the species barrier. In 
37 Kathy Lette, Mad Cows (London: Picador, 1996). 
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tum, perhaps, we might remember that the animals who actually developed 
symptoms of BSE were all dairy cows, female beasts whose pregnancy is 
continuously enforced throughout their lives. With an irony that is implicit to 
Diary of a Steak, they are a literal manifestation of the classic diagnosis of the 
hysteric symptom: the wandering womb. 
I have already touched on the way that the word 'hysterical' became a 
key epithet in the political management of the public refusal of beef in the 
wake of Dorrell's announcement. Diary uses this fact as a launching pad for 
its much more thoroughgoing mutual implication of the two realms 
(hysterical illness and BSE and vCJD). This might at first seem only a 
theoretically ingenious parallel, but the symptomatology of hysteria (at least 
as it is recorded most famously by Freud and Breuer) and of vCJD are 
remarkably similar, including as they do uncontrollable emotional states, 
aphasia, memory loss and a variety of bodily dysfunctions. In fact, my (and 
Levy's) looking to hysteria for pro-animal meaning only repeats in reverse 
the work of Victorian anti-vivisection activists who condemned the 'no less 
disgusting experiments practised on the lunatics and hysterical patients in 
the Salpetriere'.38 Looking specifically to BSE, falling is the symptom that is 
virtually synonymous with the disease, just as the conventional feminine 
swoon is one of the most pervasive cultural signifiers of nineteenth-century 
hysteria.39 Two extracts from Diary bring this parallel, this similarity in 
difference, shockingly to life. The repeating, circular form of the first also 
tends to the traumatic force for its viewers of the image of the stumbling cow. 
38 Zoophilist 7 (1887), p. 110 quoted in Elaine Showalter, 'Hysteria Feminism and Gender' in 
Hysteria Beyond Freud, ed. by Sander Gilman, Roy Porter and Elaine Showalter (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), pp. 286-344, (p. 311). 
39 See Showalter, The Female Malady, p. 149. 
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Its small font again suggests that it is in some wayan unconscious discourse, 
as would be pertinent to represent the traumatic content of the image: 
my eyes roll in their pink sockets my knees give way my ankles tum I fall I move my head from side to 
side I try to stand yet again my eyes roll in their pink sockets my knees give way my ankles tum I fall I 
move my head from side to english country side. (p. 35) 
Another more submerged connection between BSE and hysteria is that the 
repetition of 'falling' in this second quotation recalls Anna O.'s repetition of 
'tormenting', which Breuer remarks as one of the key signifiers of her aphasic 
speech disorganisation40: 
The camera has been crucial to the study of my hysteria, just as the 
microscope was crucial to histology. I have become partial to the 
status the lens has given me and my falls ... falling falling falling 
keeling and shuffling on sawdust. .. I'm thinking of Marilyn bathing 
naked in rock pools before she took the pills ... (p. 8) 
This second quotation in fact is particularly densely packed with 
meaning for my interpretation of the text. For in addition to its introduction 
(via the invocation of Anna O.'s aphasia) of the theme of the hysteric's failed 
speech, it also introduces the fact that visibility is central to the understanding 
of hysteria. That is to say, hysteria in this text is explicitly a performance 
before an interpreting viewer. Elizabeth Bronfen has summarised the 
complex play of hysterical performance and medical interpretation at 
Charcot's Salpetriere: 
40 Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. 
and trans. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1953-1974), II; Joseph Breuer, and Sigmund 
Freud, Studies on Hysteria (1955), pp.24-25. 
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Doctors, insatiably seeking images of hysteria (be these live 
performances or photographic representations) and hysteric patients, 
complying with this spectacle, outmatching each other with the 
theatricality of their poses, came together to stage a scene where 
hysterical suffering could be invented and fabricated as an art form, 
both as a spectacle and as an image. (p. 190) 
The text's linking of hysteria and BSE in the context of visibility is cemented 
by the allusion to the iconic photographs of a bathing Marilyn Monroe. 
Ironically, these photographs were taken by Eve Arnold on the set of The 
Misfits (1961), a film in which Monroe's character rages against animal abuse. 
In a letter to me, Levy explained the genesis of this link from hysteria to 
animal via what Bronfen calls Monroe's hysterical 'performance of 
seduction': 'it was the image on TV news programmes of a deranged cow 
staggering, falling and rolling her eyes that made me feel she was the Marilyn 
Monroe of BSE rhetoric. A perverse combination of abjection and celebrity'. S. 
Paige Baty has argued of Monroe iconography that such 'mass-mediated 
hagiographic rememberings' serve as a method for American culture to come 
to terms with the trauma inflicted by the apparent suicide of such a glorified 
figure.41 It is clear that for Levy, however, the ubiquity of the falling cow 
image has a very different and certainly not palliative effect on the national 
psyche. 
A last important message to be read in the above quotation from Diary 
is that its series of implications about hysteria, failed speech and the visibility 
41 Levy, personal correspondence, 28 January 1999. On Monroe, see Bronfen, p. 330; Eve 
Arnold, Marilyn Monroe: An Appreciation (London: Pan Books, 1967), p. 79; and S. Paige Baty, 
American Monroe: The Making of a Body Politic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 
p. 157. Another possible reference point for the diarist here is a set of stills of a naked bathing 
Monroe from Something's Got To Give (1962), a film which was not completed because of her 
suicide. 
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of the hysterical performance are made by way of quotation from Showalter. 
As such, it is one clear example of the text's construction from a tissue of such 
quotations. For in The Female Malady, we learn that 'one of [Charcot's] 
admirers remarked that "the camera was as crucial to the study of hysteria as 
the microscope was to histology''' (p. 149). In fact there are more than thirty 
such quotations from Showalter placed throughout the book, indicating that 
this particularly direct form of intertextuality is a formal method vital to the 
text's meaning. For just as the text's notion of hysterical performance 
presumes, following Bronfen, a certain dialogism or at least mutual 
complicity in the patient-doctor relationship, the incorporation of 
Showalter's words ensures that Levy's avant-garde presentation of that 
performance comes into dialogue with Showalter's historicism. This will all 
become clear in my final section, in which I will explain how the two major 
themes I have mentioned (failure of speech and the performative nature of 
hysteria) hold the key to Diary of a Steak's original contribution to the 
figuration of the animal. 
III. Textualising the Animal 
The Failure of Speech 
The first entry in Diary of a Steak begins with the apparently affirming words 
that 'it's good to talk', although the affirmation is not a little undermined by 
the fact that the phrase is overcoded with idiotic sales-talk in the form of a 
British Telecom advertising campaign. As the week's worth of entries 
progresses, however, this axiom passes through various stages of corrupted 
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mutation. It appears as 'goo 0 alk', '0 alk', 'it's od to ta' (my personal 
favourite), and 'goo tal', until on Friday the entry reads: 
good to talk 
gd talk 
o a tlk.42 
By this time the original notion that 'it is good to talk' -which bearing in 
mind the rationalist prejudice of Western thought is as much an 
anthropocentric credo as it is a barely masked piece of canny marketing-has 
been radically undermined. Considering the notion of 'talk' more specifically 
than just as a synonym for language, this very textual destruction of talk (how 
would one pronounce' 0 a tIk'?) indicates a certain denigration of the value of 
the spoken word itself in favour of writing. Here, we can recognise 
something of a clash of ideologies between Diary of a Steak and Walker's The 
Temple of My Familiar, which endorses oral history over written discourse for 
its openness to pro-animal thought. Diary instead recapitulates the familiar 
deconstructive critique of the sovereign subject, a subject that is always, of 
course, human, and whose self-certainty is underwritten by speech's 
prevalence over writing in Western thought. For, if this critique is correct, 
then the self-present subject of oral history-for example Walker's Lissie-is 
a humanist subject through and through. So, although Walker's text does 
certainly exemplify the importance of issues of race in pro-animal politics-
something which the almost invariably colour-blind French feminist 
42 Levy, pp. 9,9,11, 19, 32. 
Chapter Three (Mis-)reading the Avant-Garde Animal 135 
theorising of hysteria cannot do-lissie's humanist subjectivity might not be 
the best conduit for representing the animal.43 
Diary's tum from speech to textuality is also a consequence of its 
representation of hysteria. Hysteria has a very ambivalent relationship to 
speech, and its patients certainly indicate an alternative to the self-present 
humanist subject. They live not in the here-and-now, but belatedly, riven by 
unconscious forces and mnemonically signify their traumata only obliquely 
with their symptoms, rather than by conscious recollection. Hysteria's 
ambivalent relation to speech rests in the fact that its symptoms are 
essentially the result of patients' silencing, of their inability to find a valid 
cultural voice. Diary of a Steak finds an ingenious way to imbue this fact with 
additional meaning by staging a meeting between the steak and Josef Breuer: 
Das ist frauelin ... ? - This is Miss? 
- Buttercup 
Ein beefsteak? 
Yes. 
Aha. 
I was born in East Grinstead. [ ••• ] 
Einen stuch1? - A chair 
I'd like a car. 
Voll Bitte - A car? You want me to 'fill her up'? 
At what time does the bank open? 
Voll bitte - Talk more about filling up this car ... 
In what direction is the catherdral? 
Haben Sie etwas zu vorzollen? - have you anything to declare? 
May I have the bill? 
Es war mir ein Vergnugen - It was nice meeting you 
May I have the bill please 
43 Sander Gilman's impressive work, in which hysteria is inextricably bound up with early 
twentieth-century figurations of blackness and Jewishness in the best counteraction to this: 
see his 'The Image of the Hysteric' in Gilman, Porter and Showalter (eds.), pp. 344452. For a 
reading of a narrative that reclaims hysteria as a vehicle for communal resistance to racist 
oppreSSion, see Emma Parker, 'A New Hystery: History and Hysteria in Toni Morrison's 
Beloved', Twentieth Century Literature, 47 (2001), 1-19. 
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Alles ist inbegriffen - all is included. 
Pank you very much 
Guttentag Buttercup - Good afternoon Buttercup. From now on I 
will call you Buttercup O. 
He called me Buttercup 0 (p. 34) 
Here, the scene of psychoanalysis is melded with the scene of the ignorant 
Brit abroad in continental Europe. The heteroglot result makes a telling 
comment not only on the deafness of the analyst to the hysterical voice. With 
Breuer's German tongue so uncomprehending or ignorant of the steak, it also 
manages a wicked joke at the expense of a certain kind of English 
xenophobia, one which resurfaced so tellingly during the BSE debacle. For 
although all of Europe banned British beef, it was as ever Germany that bore 
the brunt of the ire in the tabloid press.44 
Breuer's naming of the steak 'Buttercup 0' obviously reaffirms the 
parallel with Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim), whose case study is the first 
recorded in Breuer and Freud's Studies on Hysteria.45 Like another name taken 
by the diarist, Aberdeen Augustine (compare Aberdeen Angus), this is a 
delicious parody of both farmers' Adamic naming of their beasts and the 
psychoanalyst's power to possess his patient and her symptoms (at least in 
his text) through her renaming. The allusion to Anna O. also highlights the 
ambivalent relation of hysteria to speech: 
44 On 22 May 1996, under the headline 'CATTLE OF BRITAIN' and beside a picture of Winston 
Qmrchill The Sun reported that 'in a showdown on a scale rarely seen since the Battle of 
Britain, the beef fiasco has forced us to fight to save our traditions and freedoms'. It 
continued: 'in 1996, we must draw on that bulldog spirit again-and show one of Sir Winnie's 
famous V-signs to the boors of Berlin, the killjoys of Cologne and the mutts of Munich'. 
45 Standard Edition, II (1955). 
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invented the talking cure that is psychoanalysis ... 
mute. I was mute (p. 37)46 
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Muteness, the other of speech, characterises the hysteric as well as the 
animal. As Jacobus notes: 
It is an irony of the history of psychoanalysis that the patient credited 
with the invention of 'the talking cure' (Anna O.'s English phrase for 
the therapeutic technique which she evolved with Breuer) should 
have had as her major hysterical symptom the inability to talk. 
Afflicted by a I deep-going functional disorganisation of her speech,' 
Anna O. took refuge in a speaking dumbness. Initially at a loss for 
words, and eventually almost completely deprived of them, she 
successively 'lost her command of grammar and syntax'. 47 
Avant-garde writers from the Surrealists to Cixous, lrigaray and Kristeva 
have played with language in an attempt to capture at the level of the text 
this challenge to subjectivity and signification posed by Anna 0.' s aphasia. 
Levy's development of this tradition is to take its challenge for the fictional 
representation of postmodem human subjectivity into the realm of 
representing the animal. 
The diarist's self-introduction on the opening page aligns Buttercup 
with a roll-call of now famous hysterics: 
At times I will lose control of grammar and syntax. Call me Emmy, 
Dora, Bertha, Anna 0, Augustine, Buttercup. (p. 5) 
46 The diarist's name, 'Craisy Daisy', invokes the popular Romantic figure of Crazy Jane, 
originally created by Mathew 'Monk' Lewis. 
47 Jacobus, p. 205. She is quoting from Studies on Hysteria, p. 25. 
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This passage has several implications and contradictions for the 
understanding of work that tries to represent cows. Primarily, it inscribes on 
the very first page of the work the slippage from spoken to textual word. To 
introduce herself by way of the idiomatic phrase 'call me' implies 
communication, a moment of spoken address by the reader. And yet written 
on the first page of a work of fiction, that phrase cannot but seem explicitly 
intertextual, evoking Melville's-and his character Ahab's-attempt to 
capture in literature a very different (cetacean) kind of cow. Indeed, we can 
see that the diarist is a specifically textual sort of animal when we recognise 
her further self-expression, in this most personal of written forms, by way of 
a slight modification of Breuer's words about Anna 0., which are quoted by 
Jacobus above. 
Furthermore, that the diarist should imply an estranged reader who 
would need to 'call her' anything immediately makes a problem of the notion 
of self-reflexivity inherent to the diary's conventional mode of construction, 
which presumes that it will only be read by its writer. As a form, the diary 
might at first appear to avoid the narratological consequences of 
conventional autobiography. The diary is implicitly perspicacious as a form, 
because it has no apparent addressee (other than, as with the 'Dear Diary' 
approach, the diary itself). Also, unlike autobiography, it is structured only 
by the real condition of its writer's temporal existence, rather than by more 
aesthetic concerns. Yet, as a written document the diary must have an 
implied reader, even if only an unacknowledged part of the writer's own 
subjectivity. So, in a sense the diary is an ever-failing attempt to shore up the 
self-presence of the writing subject. The writer attempts to control their 
personal history through the very act of revisiting it in writing. Yet once the 
diary passes from process to product and is read, it can only reveal the self's 
ongoing construction in time. In Diary of a Steak, moreover, the writing 
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subject is not only split across a variety of selves (from Emmy to Buttercup), 
but it also explicitly emerges as the result of a dialogic performance with the 
text's implied reader. And this dialogism is spread into a larger cultural 
realm by the fact that the performance interpolates intertextual utterances. 
Such a dispersal of the first person in writing is of course a familiar 
lesson of post-structuralist readings of enunciation. Far from being a signifier 
of self-presence, as a general singular form in grammar the'!' can always be 
possessed by others. Recently, however, Derrida has noted the link between 
this sense of the'!' and the word animal: 
It happens that there exist, between the word I and the word animal, 
all sorts of significant connections. They are at the same time 
functional and referential, grammatical and semantic. Two general 
singulars to begin with: the I and the animal designate an 
indeterminate generality in the singular and by means of the definite 
article. The I is anybody at all; I am nobody at all and anybody at all 
must be able to say 1.48 
And in a surprisingly lyrical passage, Derrida goes on to suggest what might 
be at stake for the representation of animals in Levy's deconstruction of the 
bovine diarist's position of enunciation: it grants this represented animal a 
certain kind of freedom. He suggests that by using the general singular and 
effacing animal difference, philosophers' talk of humanity's difference from 
'the animal' enacts a kind of imprisonment. Derrida metaphorically connects 
that philosophical gesture to literal animal abuse ('a crime of the first order 
against the animals', he calls it on p. 416). 
48 Jacques Derrida, 'The Animal', p. 417. 
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Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast encampment 
of the animal, in this general singular, within the strict enclosure of 
the definite article ('the animal' and not 'animals'), as in a virgin 
forest, a zoo, a hunting or fishing ground, a paddock or an abattoir, a 
space of domestication, are all the living things that man does not 
recognise as his fellows, his neighbours, or his brothers. And that is 
so in spite of the infInite space that separates the lizard from the dog. 
(p.402) 
All of this is a far cry from the simple validation of self-expression, 'it's good 
to talk'. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, the other constituent factors of the 
Diary's deconstruction of speech-performativity and dialogic construction-
are essential components of Levy's representation of the hysteric-animal 
parallel. 
Teasing out the implications of 'talk' for human-animal ethical relations, 
Alec Irwin writes: 
Talk stops where human culture stops, and conversely, where there is 
no more talk, we have reached the limit beyond which culture's 
codes of rights and responsibilities (response-abilities) no longer 
apply.49 
Fascinatingly, this Kantian logic, in which there is no ethical community 
between (human) self and (animal) other without responsive spoken 
communication, echoes Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard's reading of hysteria, which 
though fascinating has been surprisingly uninfluential in the critical literature 
on the topic. In his catalogue essay for a 1980 exhibition entitled 'Photographs 
of the Salpetriere' Lyotard stages a Socratic dialogue between, it seems, two 
49 Alec Irwin, 'Talking to the Animals', in Talk Talk Talk: The Cultural Life of Everyday 
Conversation, ed. by S. I. Salamenski (London: Routledge, 2(01), pp. 145-62 (p. 145). 
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different philosopher-doctors. The first is an empiricist who wishes (like 
Charcot) to understand the bodily language of hysterics and to 'record them 
everywhich way'; the second is a sceptical postmodernist (such as Lyotard, 
although his voice also features outside the dialogue) who refuses to accept 
that such a scientific heuristic can accommodate the heterodox subjectivity of 
the hysteric. The dialogue's opening exchange introduces its remarkably 
Cartesian topic: 
- Do these women have souls? What do they want? 
- Ask them. 
- But to ask someone a question is to presuppose that he wants to 
help you to know something, that he wants to know with you, co-
operate in a dialogue, and therefore that he has a soul and wishes 
for the good.50 
It thus constructs the hysteric as precisely the same kind of epistemological 
object as Descartes's infamous 'automatic' or soulless animals. The problem 
of whether or not hysterics have souls comes down, in this dialogue, to 
whether, and in what way, they can respond to a question; to whether or not 
the bodily language of their symptoms can be part of a human dialogue. 
Adding credence to Levy's linking of the two realms, Lyotard's notion of 
response-ability in the hysteric becomes important to Derrida's own critique of 
thinking about the animal within the philosophical tradition. Philosophers 
from 'Aristotle to Lacan, and including Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and 
Levinas,' he writes, 
50 Reprinted as 'Speech Snapshot' in Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, 
trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 
pp.129-34. 
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all of them say the same thing: the animal is without language. Or 
more precisely unable to respond, to respond with a response that 
could be precisely and rigorously distinguished from a reaction, the 
animal is without the right and power to I respond' and hence 
without many of the things that would be the property of man. (p. 
400) 
Returning to Lyotard in this context, his Charcot-like philosopher-doctor 
defines his approach to hysteria with a methodological passage that now 
sheds light on the desire of philosophy (as glossed by Derrida) to know the 
non-human other: 
- That's it, it's a problem of communication, i.e. translation. No 
doubt they have a soul, but of a type different to ours, speak a 
language, but a bodily language [ ... ]. We have to establish what 
they want. We record them every which way, like extra terrestrial 
beings. We describe their gesticulations exactly. And, you'll see, we 
shall decipher their idiom, they'll end up by talking to us. They will 
want to know, like we do. They will enter our community. There 
will be no more hysterics. 
- You mean that this strange, foreign idiom will be absorbed, that a 
universal language will permit the circulation and exchange of all 
meanings, you'll have finished with obscenity? (pp. 130-31) 
The second philosopher's incredulous response to the first's empiricist 
interpretative method evidences a commitment to the hysteric's otherness. 
Doing so, it can stand as an epigraph to the next stage of my reading of Diary 
of a Steak. For I want to argue that such a commitment to the otherness of 
both hysteric and animal results from the text's method of representing both 
as particular kinds of performer, whose act seduces the desire of the viewer 
to interpret it. In the case of hysteria, the viewer of this performance is of 
course the examining doctor; in the case of the animal, it is the human who 
would wish to know the animal other. What is vital, though, and what links 
the two across the species barrier, is that the hysteric's performance is one 
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without (as far as we can know) conscious intention. Just so, the viewer's (or, 
here, reader's) agency is effaced when they are compelled to interpret the 
hysteric performance.51 
The interest of the scene of hysteria for the pro-animal critic, then, is 
that it describes a drama of power and resistance that is unconscious. This 
unconsciousness separates the hysteric's protest from conventional liberal 
political action which presumes a rational human subject. The parallel of 
hysteric and BSE-cow thus offers a space for animal protest, something that 
otherwise seems ridiculous in conventional terms. The task of the next 
section will be to explain just how a highly confected artistic text manages to 
promote a protesting agency that is predicated on the effacement of authorial 
power. To do so, however, first requires understanding that although 
feminist interpretations of hysteria presume that the hysteric enacts a bodily 
performance without conscious intention, the feminist political potential of 
the disease has nevertheless been understood in terms of strategic agency. 
51 The particularities of animals' representation (and presence) in various kinds of 
performance are explored by the contributors to a special issue titled 'On Animals' of 
Performance Research, 5.2 (2000); one of these is the major performance artist Rachel Rosenthal 
with her propagandistic pro-animal piece 'The Others' (pp. 92-107). 
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Performing Hysteric, Performing Animal 
Aberdeen Angus? 
I don't know who I am. 
I don't know who I am. 
What am I? 
Iamwhat? 
Who 
barking 
I can feel some erotic hysteria coming on 
It's coming 
my theatre of rib and shadows 
here it comes 
nearly these 
my hysteria (p. 28)52 
The words of the diarist here chime with those of Lyotard, who suggests that 
hysteria is 'a theatre of corporeal elements' (p. 132). In this assertion of the 
performativity of hysteria, he implicitly recapitulates the work of Luce 
lrigaray, who famously argued that the female hysteric over-performs the 
masquerade of femininity. As glossed by Dianne Chisholm, Irigaray's point is 
that 'the hysteric's exaggerated 'miming' of sexual pleasure in bodily 
contortion, in broken speech and/or aphasia, signifies her inability to cope 
52 The Greek script here is a transliteration of the word 'barking'. 
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with the discursive norms of desire and femininity'. lrigaray argues that this 
hysterical performance of mimicry is a result of the 'phallocentrism' of 
representation which leaves no space for an authentic voice of the feminine.53 
Butler helpfully summarises the post-structuralist logic here: 
when lrigaray sets out to reread the history of philosophy, she asks 
how its borders are secured, and how it is that the excluded comes to 
constitute negatively a philosophical enterprise that takes itself to be 
self-grounding and self-constituting? lrigaray then isolates the 
feminine as precisely this constitutive exclusion. 54 
As is well known, Irigaray devises from this reading of hysteria the notion of 
mimesis as a feminist critical strategy, in which a space is created for 'a 
possible operation of the feminine in language' (p. 76) by parodically miming 
the mascu1inist discourse of philosophy. What distinguishes lrigaray's work 
from a naIve celebration of the tragic heroism of the hysteric-and ensures 
that hysteric mimicry maintains a critical distance from the patriarchal 
discourse it mimes-is her explicit redefinition of the hysterical symptom 
from a counter-patriarchal language of the body into a strategic textual 
practice. For it is not a matter of celebrating the disease of hysteria and its 
supposed unconscious rebellion; rather, by textually performing hysteria one 
can I assume the feminine role deliberately', lrigaray writes (p. 76, my 
emphasis). It is only with the caveat of this deliberation that Irigaray argues 
the political power of the hysteric performance. 
S3 Dianne Chisholm, 'Irigaray's Hysteria' in Engaging with Irigaray, edited by Naomi Schor, 
Margaret Whitford, and Carolyn Burke (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 263-83, (p. 265). Luce 
Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), p. SO. 
54 Bodies, p. 37. 
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lrigaray s insistence on the strategic performance of hysteria implies 
that it is at essence an artifice, its performer an aesthetic creator. It is thus not 
surprising that lrigaray describes hysteria in terms of an avant-garde poetics. 
The importance of this for my reading of Diary of a Steak is that Irigaray's 
version of textual hysteria could easily be a description of the book's 
fractured form (as evidenced by the quotation from Diary that began this 
section). 'Sense', she argues, 'will undergo unparalleled interrogation, 
revolution'. She exhorts the feminine writer to: 'tum everything upside 
down, inside out, back to front'; to insist' on those blanks in discourse which 
recall the places of [the feminine's] exclusion'; and to 'overthrow syntax by 
suspending its eternally teleological order'.55 Such textual strategies are 
necessary to reveal the deliberate parodic intent behind Irigarays grand 
theoretical strategy of miming the masculine discourse of philosophy, which 
is thereby subjected through such strategic imitation to its constitutive 
exclusions as described by Butler. 
In fact, Butler takes up where Irigaray falls short here, noting that the 
latter's 'idealising and appropriating' of the space of constitutive exclusion as 
'the feminine' insists that women form the only constituency oppressed by 
philosophy and forgets that many such otherings have been necessary.' After 
all', Butler writes, 'Plato's scenography of intelligibility depends on the 
exclusion of women, slaves, children and animals' (pp. 48-49). Butler, as I 
noted in an earlier chapter, adapts this critique of Irigaray to her own anti-
heterosexist theory, but the implication that pro-animal meaning might be 
55 Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985), p. 142. 
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voiced by a strategic miming of discourse is brought to bear in Diary of a 
Steak. 
The diarist pastiches the meetings of various British politicians, health 
professionals and veterinarians with their European counterparts which took 
place in the wake of the 20 March 1996 announcement. These discussions, 
which of course were as much about what it means to be human as about the 
control of an animal disease, eventually resulted in the 'thirty month scheme', 
the slaughter of millions of healthy cattle over that age as a public relations 
exercise. A particularly sharp example of the diarist's mimicry involves a 
parody of the Major Government's policy of non-cooperation in Europe, put 
into effect on May 211996, a policy that involved Major's exercising the UK's 
power of veto on much EU legislation. This apparently petulant behaviour 
succeeded in rewriting the BSE crisis, for Britain's more xenophobic 
contingent at least, as an anti-European 'beef war'. As the quotation opens, 
the diary incorporates the genre of news reportage, although that discourse 
itself is dialogically contaminated by the diarist's animal-obsessed 
imagination: 
The minister from Whitebait has promised Europa he will do 
everything in his power to avoid lunacy in the English herd -
He made a speech 
Tell the Greeks. 
Tell Luxembourg 
Tell the Portuguese they're 
Tell the French 
Tell the Italians their gnocci has a mental 
disorder 
And the Danish they've lost the plot 
The Neverlands 
The Germans and their bratwurst holograms 
Tell the Spanish about their poppies salamis 
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Tell Belgium they're silly. 
Tell Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
Republic of Ireland 
Tell Poland they're homosexual 
Don't cry, please don't cry (p. 12) 
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As the shocking final line makes clear, there is obviously a profound unease 
in the psyche of the faceless ministerial official caused by BSE and the abject 
encroachment of animal disease upon humanity. The implication is that this 
is Douglas Hogg, but sadly my extensive searches of EU parliamentary 
papers have not yielded a conclusive result on thiS.56 The speech's repetitive 
form also shows that his disquiet leads to an appeal to xenophobic, and 
latterly homophobic, discourse. The expelling force of the repeated 
imperative, 'tell', attempts to force by the power of word alone the repulsion 
of a European otherness that encroaches on the British subject. The collapse 
of normal national stereotypes seems only to underline the unconscious, 
obsessive and frantic nature of this xenophobia. But the real panicky need at 
the heart of government to silence any disruption of carnivorous society's 
human hegemony by the BSE cow-and here I return to its abject transversal 
of the species barrier with which I began this chapter-comes across most 
clearly as the quotation continues. The official discourse can now only 
attempt to silence the BSE-cow's rupture of anthropocentrism via an act of 
56 In fact, Levy may be using a pastiche of Hogg to ventriloquise The Sun. Jon Garland and 
Michael Rowe report that on page four of the 22 May 1996 edition. which I mention above, 
that newspaper informed British consumers of '20 TIIINGS TO STEER CLEAR op' (sic) should they 
wish to hit back at European countries refusing beef imports; the list contained numerous 
offensive stereotypes. See 'War Minus the Shooting: Jingoism, the English Press and Euro '96', 
Studies in Crime, Order and Policing: Research Paper 7 (Leicester: Scarman Centre for the 
Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, 1996), pp. 9-10. 
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pure will that evidences a pathetic desire to 'legislate' the disruptive cows 
into the proper patriotic (or xenophobic) state, as if that could make BSE and 
its worries for humanity go away: 'The official (eyes still closed)/ Telepathic 
legislation to the herd://You are/normal//You are/theINational/Anthem' (p. 
14, see figure three). The text presents this legislation in a way that parodies 
the tabloid press mentality of the government's response to BSE by setting 
the second half of the quotation in red ink and a large font evocative of red 
top newspapers. 
So far, then, it would appear that Diary of a Steak is formally constructed 
of an Irigarayan textual hysteria, a parodic inhabitation of anthropocentric 
political discourse, which aims to give voice to the animal by making clear 
that it is that political discourse's excluded other. However, we must bear in 
mind Irigaray's insistence on the strategic agency of the parodist in such 
matters. For if this is the case then in terms of the literary representation of 
animals Diary of a Steak is in one sense very similar to The Temple of my 
Familiar. There, Walker's argument was seen to be that although the animal 
itself cannot speak, the creative imagination holds the power to give it voice. 
Just so, by deliberately and parodic ally performing the discourse of 
anthropocentrism Levy would wield that same power. The problem with this 
is that the very interest of hysteria in terms of pro-animal politics was that it 
offered a form of protest that was bodily, non-linguistic, and without agency 
as such. These were hysteria's parallels with the animal. However, by 
inscribing an artistic human subject as the agent at the root of hysteria's 
feminist-political power, the Irigarayan reading rules out that parallel. 
This problem is perhaps best explicated by following up the implication 
of the text's Bakhtinian ending, in which the diarist insists: 'I used to be a 
herbivore but I was made into a carnival' (p. 49). As it stands alone on the 
final page, it is hard to overestimate the power of this summary moment of a 
The ffi,ci.d eyes s ill closed) 
11 J~pllrhic legisbtion to the herd: 
Figure 3: extract from Diary of a Steak 
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text that includes so much that is grotesque: from the anorexia and self-harm 
presented in its picture of psychiatric illness to the rotting stench that 
emanates from the steak as it lingers on the shelf. The connection between the 
Bakhtinian carnivalesque and hysteria (two very different kinds of 
performance) has been a fruitful one in terms of understanding the political 
potential of non-official and agent-less discourses. Focusing on the carnival as 
a site of meaning in this text seems apt indeed; for if the feast of carnival 
originally was the 'taking up of meat' after lent (carne-Jevare) then the British 
culture to which Diary of a Steak responds, with a daily consumption of six 
thousand cows, is certainly carnivalesque. Further, as the quotation and 
much of my discussion suggest, the animals who stumble to the ground in 
the iconic images of BSE are themselves transformed into carnivalesque 
performers by television; just as, of course, animals are still so transformed in 
today's vestigial carnival performances of the circus. The problem with the 
BSE-cows' image-performance, though, is that because the cow makes 
explicit a trans-species disease, her freak-show cannot so easily be objectified, 
and hence humorously enjoyed, by the viewer. 
With the transgression of the human-animal binary that goes on when 
human carnival-goers perform various kinds of animality, as well as 
carnival's more general re-coding of high-low power relationships, it would 
seem a fruitful sphere of discussion for pro-animal politics. Also, as with 
hysteria, the fact that carnival seems to offer a mode of both creative and 
political action that foregoes conventional artistic or individual agency would 
also begin to explain Levy's recourse to the carnivalesque in an attempt to 
find a textual voice for the animal. Another intriguing link between animal 
and carnival in terms of animal representations lies in Stallybrass and White's 
argument that the literary carnivalesque form is a space of nostalgia which 
remembers the scene of popular carnival forms at the same time as itself 
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signifying their disappearance.57 It is worth speculating that this influential 
thesis is an unacknowledged but direct descendant of John Berger's claim 
about the zoo in his ground-breaking essay on visual representation, 'Why 
Look at Animals?'. In modernity, metropolitan humans have abjured their 
pre-modem link with animals, and representational forms such as the zoo 
melancholically mourn its passing. 
Public zoos came into existence at the beginning of the period which 
was to see the disappearance of animals from daily life. The zoo to 
which people go to meet animals, to observe them, to see them, is, in 
fact, a monument to the impossibility of such encounters. Modem 
zoos are an epitaph to a relationship which was as old as man.58 
This allows us to keep animals in mind while looking at a key implication of 
Stallybrass and White's work on the nostalgia of the carnivalesque, which is 
to undermine the latter's celebration in contemporary theory as a space for 
political transgression of bourgeois-patriarchal hegemony. Hence, of course, 
the methodological link with hysteria, which has suffered the same fate. 
The very nature of the Irigarayan hysterical performance in Diary of a 
Steak as I have described it highlights the dilemma of what happens to 
carnival's potential when it is incorporated into an avant-garde literary text. 
For if we are to accept that Levy's parody of the anthropocentric discourse of 
government BSE policy opens a space (to paraphrase lrigaray) for 'the 
possible operation of the animal in language' then a key problem remains. 
57 Stallybrass and White, 'Introduction'. 
58 Parts of this essay were originally published in New Soacty in 1977 as separate articles. The 
complete essay appears in About Looking (New York: Vintage International, 1991), pp. 1-28 (p. 
21). Berger'S fiction, notably Pig Earth (1979), responds to the disappearance of peasant life 
and traditions in Europe in a manner that is consonant with Stallybrass and White's project. 
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Stallybrass and White criticise the inherent political romanticism of avant-
garde writers' nostalgic appeals to the carnivalesque as transgression. For 
them, it is a fact that 'bourgeois writing smashes the rigidities of its own 
identity by projecting itself into the forbidden territories of precisely those 
excluded in its own political formation'. This, however, only proves that the 
bourgeoisie 'is perpetually rediscovering the carnivalesque as a radical 
source of transcendence' (p. 200-(1). We can tum this suggestion towards 
Diary of a Steak. Were it to be the case that the pro-animal meaning of Levy's 
avant-garde representation of the animal is only visible with the presumption 
of Levy's strategic (authorial) intent then it seems impossible for the text to 
avoid the taint of Stallybrass and White's critique. Diary of a Steak appears as 
just one more way for the hegemonic group (in this case, a specifically human 
as well as bourgeois one) to spend itself in melancholic nostalgia for its 
always-already abandoned other: the animal. In this sense it is just like 
Berger's zoo. The cow does not really appear in this text, we might say; 
rather, its carnivalesque representation acts as a screen for a romantic 
transcendence of the author's modem humanity. Here, we are uncannily 
reminded of the invisibility of the actual animals in popular cultural 
bemoanings of BSE and foot and mouth disease. 
The text manages to undermine this problematic reading, however, and 
does put a pro-animal inflection on Berger's belief that the space of 
representation puts an unbridgeable distance between human and animal. 
For this to be explained, we need to revisit the text's own avant-garde 
practice in the context of its dramatisation of hysteria. The text explicitly 
includes the actual historical personages of hysteria: Charcot, Breuer, Anna 
O. et al. But it also includes in this scene extracts from The Female Malady, 
Elaine Showalter's feminist critique of the psychotherapeutic institution, 
which argues that doctors have enforced their interpretive will on their 
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patients. Some of these extracts from Showalter are amended, almost garbled, 
and I have italicised them in the quotation from Levy's text below. Showalter 
replicates Lyotard's suggestions about the visibility of hysteria which were 
inspired by the very photographs that the text describes being taken by 
O1arcot's assistant Albert Londe in perhaps Diary of a Steak's most telling 
scene. With characteristic wit, O1arcot's analysis of his patients at the le,ons is 
presented as a 'grilling', whose metaphorical status shifts to a literal one in 
the context of the hysteric-animal parallel. This parallel is expanded to 
correlate Charcot's audience with European BSE officials. It also includes a 
connection between the Parisian doctor and the xenophobic British politician 
discussed earlier, made clear when Charcot's own discourse is similarly 
dialogically polluted by animality: 
I am Jean-Martin Charcoal. 
I will etch and icon you in full hysterical seizure. I will draw you in 
coloured chalks on the blackbird. I will create with you your hysterical 
vocabulary ... but first we doctor I want your baby will rehearse some of the 
exaggerated gestures of French classical theatre doctor I want your baby we will 
watch stills doctor I want your baby from silent movies, we will observe 
together the paintings of Millais doctor I want your baby in particular his 
Ophelia. You will learn timing and perform on cue for my 
photographer, Albert[ ... ] 
I will Charcot grill you 
Buttercup 
Crazy Daisy 
Aberdeen Angus 
Augustine 
Emmy 
Dora 
Anna 0 
Bertha 
Blanche 
serve you to a venerable audience of actors, 
vets, journalists, leading personae of Europa, 
Chapter Three (Mis-)reading the Avant-Garde Animal 154 
scholars, journalists, poets, more vets. (pp. 30-31)59 
Bronfen's incisive analysis helps to explicate the drama of the original 
lerons that are re-described here. She describes them as a 'scene of mutual 
representative complicity, with the physician requiring the poses of the 
patient to confirm the scientific text and the patient, accepting this desire, 
performing the symptoms the physicians sought to discover' (p. 191). The 
hysteric's unconscious desire for affirmation by the doctor (represented in 
the quotation by the small font allusion to Anna O.'s hysterical pregnancy) is 
manifested by her performance of the symptoms that the doctor wants to see. 
These symptoms, as many have noted, mimic cultural representations of 
femininity such as Millais's Ophelia. The patient's symptomatic performance 
is thus inextricably bound up with the doctor's desire to interpret it, and vice 
versa, adding a further layer of meaning to the critique that complains of the 
doctor's exertion of interpretive power over the patient. For 'the cost of 
visualising and objectifying is not simply that it silences the hysteric 
performer but also that it cruelly delineates the limits of the empiricist 
medical enterprise' (p. 201). Empiricism fails because the entity that Charcot 
wishes nosologically to describe, hysteria, is produced by his very attempt to 
analyse it. 
The parallel of animal and hysteric-of Buttercup and Bertha 
Pappenheim and of Aberdeen Angus and Augustine-makes clear that Diary 
59 'The grand finale would be a full hysterical seizure', The Female Malady, p. 148; 'Charcot [ ... ] 
drew on the blackboard in coloured chalk' (p. 150); 'All of her [Augustine's] poses suggest the 
exaggerated gestures of the French classical acting style, or stills from silent movies' (p. 152). 
Showalter report's Stephen Heath's observation that the performing Augustine resembles 
'something of the Pre-Raphaelite Millais's painting Ophelia' (p. 154). 
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of a Steak's representation of animals needs to be understood in terms of 
Bronfen's analysis. This is especially so bearing in mind the description of 
Charcot as a sort of butcher. Perhaps the wards of the Salpetriere, punningly 
known at the time as a charcoterie, would be better termed a charcuterie? For if 
Charcot 'grills' the narrator in the process of his analysis, then it is in 
preparation for a consumption that is obviously a work of power pertinent to 
hysteric and the animal. In the light of Bronfen's analysis, the text's parody of 
Charcot goes one step further than an lrigarayan strategic imitation designed 
to expose the silencing of the hysteric or animal. For in the context of the 
unconscious circuit of interpretation between doctor and patient that Bronfen 
describes, the 'meaning' of hysteria emerges as a dialogic compendium from 
their encounter. It therefore seems ridiculous to suggest that anyone acts 
strategically or with agency in such a mutually implicated scenario. 
Diary of a Steak's avant-garde form finds its raison d'€tre in the textual 
realisation of this effect. For the text in fact makes a major problem of its own 
meaning and interpretation by representing the animal and dramatising the 
scene of hysteria with the sort of extremely unusual language and form that I 
have been describing throughout. The result of this avant-garde form is that 
the reader who would wish to ascertain meaning about cows and meat from 
their representation in Diary of a Steak is drawn into precisely the same 
interpretive position as Charcot, whose interpretive power is so radically 
undermined by hysteria. By its representation of the cow-steak as a hysterical 
performance, so difficult for the reader to make sense of, the text seduces the 
reader's desire to make meaning of either animal or meat. The most practical 
understanding of this is that the text acts out the dialectic of fetishisation and 
projection that characterises the meat industry. Marketers present meat as a 
commodity to be desired by consumers at large; en masse they project cultural 
desire onto meat and view the animal's body as an image of (amongst other 
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things) economic status, national pride and masculinity. Understood in more 
theoretical terms, Diary of a Steak produces a fundamental aporia at the site of 
representation of the animal: its animals are essentially unreadable. The 
reader wants to make meaning of the textual representation of the animal, 
but cannot without exhibiting their own desire to know, a desire that 
constructs the object of interpretation. Just as, in the quotation above, 
Charcot's desire to make meaning of the hysterical patient consumes and 
silences her, so the reader's desire will consume and silence the represented 
animal. 
It is precisely this supremely compromised hermeneutic environment 
that makes a tortuous process of writing about this text and its avant-garde 
animal representations. For one cannot correctly discuss Diary of a Steak as if 
the text is the source of meaning about animals, let alone as if its author 
strategically assumes the hysteric role to offer a pro-animal literary 
representation of cows. These points become especially problematic if we 
remember that the Irigarayan theory of hysterical writing requires a quasi-
artistic authority behind the text to anchor its progressive feminist politics. 
Yet we cannot posit such a source of meaning about animals because one key 
implication of the text's hysterical performance of the animal is that any such 
meaning can only arise from the dialogic interaction (or mutual 
suggestibility) of hysterical text and interpreting reader. Yet there is a second 
implication, one that has serious knock-on effects for the entire project of pro-
animal literary criticism. By interpreting the text (as I have obviously been 
doing) one must always consume and silence the animal that it is the 
apparent point of the text to present. Only in the process of admitting that as 
a textual representation of the animal the artwork must be about a steak (an 
animal objectified and made ready for consumption), can the reader sense 
that it will be always-already about the cows from which such a steak is cut. 
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Now, this may be terribly tentative as an assertion about the pro-animal 
representation of animals. Or, to put it another way, Diary of a Steak enacts 
the very problem it tries to critique (the 'real' animal is rendered absent); it 
will not posit a radically utopian refusal of the humanist terms of animal 
representation. One factor in this is that the political alternative to 
anthropocentrism offered by 'animal advocacy', such as we saw in the 
preceding chapter, is rejected as all-too-human. Its tidy binary opposition of 
humans as active ethical subjects and all animals as passive objects of concern 
at root replicates a conventional humanist paradigm to understand the 
animal. Diary complicates such demarcations, its readers implicated in a 
circuit of desire and meaning with the animals and humans it contains. The 
result is that the text is certainly devoid of any grand political potential. 
Nevertheless, as we look back over all the other stories about BSE, Diary of a 
Steak is the only text that manages to create a place, albeit unsure, in the 
consistently anthropocentric cultural narrative of BSE to think about living 
(or indeed dying) animals in their own right. 
One final thing must be said about the text's thoroughly conditional 
representation of the animal, with reference to its incorporation of 
Showalter's historicism. In fact, as the publication data of the book suggests, 
incorporation is not the right word here. We are told therein that 'the diarist 
has grazed upon, and is indebted to, the research and scholarship of Elaine 
Showalter's The Female Malady'. The result of this grazing, however, is not a 
faithful reproduction of Showalter's work in the text, for the many 
'quotations' that it includes are always more or less modified, never quoted 
directly, as if they have been ruminated and excreted in the explosion of 
grotesque textuality that is Diary of a Steak. The diarist is, perhaps, more 
'shitting' than 'citing' Showalter's words. Such a Bakhtinian confusion of 
bodily and intertextual process seems entirely consonant with my foregoing 
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analysis. For were the text to represent faithfully Showalter's words, it would 
simply install them as the authoritative voice of the text and Showalter's 
feminist historicism would be posited as the authoritative discourse on 
hysteria. lhis, of course, would short-circuit the dialogism of hysterical 
performance and desiring reader with which the text created the space for 
pro-animal meaning. Instead, if we recognise that Diary of a Steak is forged of 
a corrupted amalgamation of other texts-for remember that it quotes many 
other sources than just Showalter-we can see in that corrupt amalgamation 
a way towards pro-animal meaning. It suggests that although we must 
always consume representations of the animal, the possibility remains that 
out of such consumptions, new corrupted meanings, pro-animal meanings, 
might appear. 
Diary of a Steak thus confronts the inherent problem of representation for 
the pro-animal critic, as noted by Berger above, and as explored by Atwood 
in the animal politics of Surfacing: that by representing animals in language 
humanity can only underscore its difference from them. However, this work 
does not follow the profoundly humanist conclusion to the logic of Atwood's 
novel- that because of humanity's being-in-Ianguage, a genuine pro-animal 
politics is impossible. Rather, Diary of a Steak, like Walker's The Temple of My 
Familiar, proceeds from its acceptance that representation separates humans 
and animals to insist that such representations are always-already 
ideological, and that they have material effects on the bodies of animals. 
Despite (or rather because of) this, those representations can always be 
replaced. In this lies Diary of a Steak's great importance and inspiration as a 
literary representation of pro-animal thought. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ANIMAL ETHICS IN THE FICTION OF J. M. COETZEE 
Introduction 
Of all the contemporary writers that have addressed themselves to 
representing our ethical relations with animals, J. M. Coetzee is the one 
whose attention to this issue has been the most continuous, and the most 
exacting. It is visible right across his published work-in fiction and non-
fiction, conversation and memoir. My approach in this chapter will therefore 
be slightly different to the foregoing ones. As in my earlier chapters, I will 
examine one key text for its extended representation of pro-animal thought, 
in this case The Lives of Animals; however, for contextualisation I will look to 
Coetzee's own work more generally. Many of his novels share with Lives an 
ability to interrogate conventional patterns of ethical belief and moral 
conduct, particularly as these affect our social relations in the widest sense 
(that is, both with other humans and animals). So in order to do justice to the 
complexity of Coetzee's engagement with the animal over a period of nearly 
twenty years, this chapter will progress towards its main focus by working 
through the importance of animals in Coetzee's oeuvre. Thus, I hope I will 
offer a chapter that meets the inclusive demand of its title. 
By way of an introduction to the sort of ethical ideas at play here, let me 
bring together two quotations, one from Coetzee and the other from Derrida. 
This seems entirely fitting for my purposes since their work on animals is the 
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subject of an intriguing coincidence. Derrida first presented his important 
lecture on animals and ethics, 'The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)" at a colloquium on his work in Cerisy la Salle on 15 July 1997-
precisely three months before Coetzee delivered the first of two lectures that 
would become The Lives of Animals. Among their many consonances are a 
critique of the anthropocentrism of Reason; criticism of canonical 
philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant for their theorisations of 
the animal; the comparison of factory farming and the industrialisation of 
animal death to the Nazis' treatment of Jews; and, structuring all of these, a 
profound concern with the meaning of authorial self-disclosure. 1 The 
quotations I want to cite do not come from these lectures, however, but from 
two prefiguring texts that touch on ethics and animals: Derrida's is from the 
interview, "'Eating Well"', in which he coins the term carno-phallogocentrism 
to designate, in preparation for its future deconstruction, the schema that 
'installs the virile figure at the determinative centre of the subject [who] 
accepts sacrifice and eats flesh' (pp. 280-81); Coetzee's is from an article that 
comments, from the perspective of a somewhat ambivalent vegetarian, on 
the anthropology, biology, psychology, theology and cultural history of meat 
eating.2 
1 Derek Attridge alludes to such similarities, without citing them, in his 'Age of Bronze, State 
of Grace: Music and Dogs in Coetzee's Disgrace', Novel, 34 (2000), 98-121 (p. 113). 
2 Coetzee, 'Meat Country', Granta, 52 (1995), 42-52. This piece contains both autobiography 
and discursive prose; one is left scratching one's head as to how to respond to the 
ambivalence of Coetzee's self-deprecating admission (almost confession) of his 
vegetarianism-a lifestyle he characterises as 'eccentric and dated', 'comic', yet 'perfectly 
sane' (pp. 43-44)-whilst professing some essentialist ideas about omnivorousness being 
'human nature' (p. 46) and some (to say the least) contentious ones about meat's nutritional 
'goodness' (p. 51). 
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In '''Eating Well"', Derrida prepares to deconstruct what he calls the 
'sacrificial structure' that underpins (for everyone, meat eater and vegetarian 
alike) the discursive construction of 'the human' (p. 278). Derrida's concept is 
not dissimilar to what Judith Butler terms 'constitutive exclusion', which I 
addressed in chapter one. As Matthew Calarco puts it in his painstaking 
reading of the '''Eating Well"', Derrida aims to complicate the strict 
distinction between this constitutive symbolic sacrifice inherent in the logic 
of discourse and the actual sacrifice of animals; the result is that, within 
Derrida's broader understanding, even vegetarians do not escape the logic of 
sacrifice.3 The most rigorous critique of the sacrificial logic, therefore, cannot 
simply say that vegetarianism is the most moral practice because it avoids 
sacrifice. The best we can do is to determine 'the best, most respectful, most 
grateful, and also the most giving way of relating to the other and of relating 
the other to the self' (pp. 281-82). In light of this, for Derrida the 'moral 
question' regarding the ethics of food is not' should one eat or not eat, eat 
this and not that, the living or the non-living, man or animal' (p. 282) but 
rather 
how, for goodness sake should one eat well [bien manger]? And what 
does this imply? What is eating? [ ... ] And in what respect does the 
formulation of these questions in language give us still more food for 
thought? In what respect is the question, if you will, still 
carnivorous? (p. 282) 
For Coetzee, too, 'the question of whether we should eat meat is not a serious 
question' because it 
3 'Deconstruction' (forthcoming). 
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is on the same level of logic as posing the question, 'Should we have 
words?'. We have words; the question is being posed in words; 
without words there would be no question. So if there is going to be a 
question at all, it will have to be a different question, one I have not 
even begun to frame. (p. 46) 
With the comments of both writers, we find ourselves with what is by now a 
familiar argument. Our ethical relation to animals is apparently 
predetermined (that is, towards acceptance of their being killed) by the basic 
facts of linguistic cognition. Language-use is explicitly linked to meat-eating; 
speaking and carnivorousness are regarded as the always-already of 
humanity. 
What is interesting about these statements, however, is the more or less 
explicit possibility they leave open, as Coetzee puts it, of 'framing a question' 
that voices the moral dilemmas raised by the killing of animals for human 
food without recourse to the logic of 'should', the logic of morality. Taken as 
a more general dilemma about pro-animal thought, this is to an extent the 
essential question towards which the main texts I have discussed are 
pushing. How does one use literature to think ethically about animals when 
that very process is stymied by literature's essential precondition-language? 
Or, to put it another way: can literature find a way to get beyond itself in 
order to respond ethically to the otherness of the animal? 
Of course, while Coetzee's statement can be used as a way to highlight 
issues of concern in his work, it should not be read as an authoritative 
comment on it. For Coetzee's fiction, nowhere more so than in The Lives of 
Animals, relentlessly does away with any clear-cut authority, moral or 
otherwise, and whether voiced by character or narrator. nus ensures that it 
is an open-ended commitment to ethical thinking. It is noteworthy that 
Coetzee gestures towards the question, not the answer, about animal ethics, 
for this is precisely how we should approach Lives-as an interrogation of the 
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potential for pro-animal thought in literature. This means taking it seriously 
as an important literary text in its own right, something that is all the more 
necessary because of the initial response to it; Lives is yet to receive proper 
critical attention. To the extent that it has been caught up in the academic 
stampede towards Disgrace it has largely been used as a foil for discussing 
the ethical dilemmas of that text.4 And while critics have generally paid lip-
service on a broad philosophical level to the interest of the animal-ethical 
issues raised by Lives, they have at best failed to consider these as woven into 
the fabric of a holistic and coherent literary work. Or (what is worse) they 
have subordinated the text's ethical issues to its literary aspects.s In contrast, 
the ultimate purpose of this chapter will be to find in The Lives of Animals an 
exposition of that elusive question fo~ those writers addressing themselves to 
pro-animal thought: how do we use literature to think our ethical relation to 
the animal in a way that responds to the animal's otherness? 
4 The amount of recent commentary on Disgrace encourages me to exclude it in the main from 
my discussion here; it has already had two journal issues dedicated to it (Scrutiny 2, 2 (2002) 
and Interventions 4.3 (2002». Two recently published articles discuss animals in Disgrace, at 
length, in terms of a theory of ethics inspired by Derrida's work that I myself use here. See 
Lucy Graham, 'IIYes, I Am Giving Him Up": Sacrificial Responsibility and Likeness with 
Dogs in JM (sic) Coetzee's Recent Fiction', Scrutiny 2, 7 (2002), 4-15, and Attridge, 'Age', pp. 
111-15. 
S For the literary focus, see especially Garber's untitled piece in Lives. The 'philosophical' 
focus is clear in all of the secondary comment in Lives; one particularly notable strand focuses 
on Elizabeth's comparison of the meat industry to the Holocaust. See both Gutmann and 
Singer in Lives, pp. 6-7, 86; Jacqueline Rose, 'Apathy and Accountability: South Africa's Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission', Raritan, 21.4 (2002), 175-95 (pp. 192-95); Simons, pp. 127-
31; and the only article-length response to the text, Timothy M. Costelloe, 'The Invisibility of 
Evil: Moral Progress and the "Animal Holocaust''', Studies in Practical Philosophy 
(forthcoming, 2(03), http://courses.arts.rochester.edu/nobis/animals/costello-coetze.doc. 
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I. Coetzee's Animals 
J. M. Coetzee's novels contain a veritable bestiary; time and time again his 
imagination returns to theriomorphic description. In this first section I will 
survey the many complex and serious ways in which animals are engaged in 
the five novels that lead up to The Lives of Animals.6 Generally speaking, two 
distinct modes are involved, which I will discuss in turn. The first is a 
representation of animals in metaphors that, when read closely, often extend 
beyond simply carrying meaning about human characters to form a 
sophisticated discourse on animals. The second is a representation of actual 
encounters with animals that grants animals a tentative yet genuine ethical 
presence in each respective work. One major effect of surveying these two 
modes will be the implication that much more work needs to be done on the 
animal ethics (and animal politics) of these earlier texts, in order to elucidate 
what is a desperately under-researched aspect of Coetzee's work. However, 
my main intention here is to provide a context for the more thorough 
exploration of the potential of fiction to perform an ethical engagement with 
animals in The Lives of Animals. 
Coetzee's narrator in Waiting for the Barbarians, a colonial magistrate, 
uses animal metaphors to explore many different aspects of sexual desire. 
This usage multiplies the meanings that animality takes on within the 
rhetoric of eroticism and it complicates, in particular, the idea of sexual 
predation. By doing so the novel moves beyond the one-dimensional 
6 Waiting for the Barbarians (London: Minerva, 1997); Life & Times of Michael K (London: 
Vintage, 1998); Foe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987); Age of Iron (London: Seeker & Warburg, 
1990); The Master of Petersburg (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1994). 
Otapter Four Animal Ethics in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee 165 
critique, made by feminists and pro-animal critics alike, of the inherent 
misogyny of animalised rhetoric in the context of sex? 
Troubled by doubt and the contradictions of his oblique passion for a 
barbarian girl, the magistrate 'prowls about her [ ... ] without entering her or 
finding the urge to do so'. Yet still he 'hunts back and forth seeking entry' 
that he cannot find (p. 46). Elsewhere, he bathetically describes his physical 
exploits as 'the spasms of a dying anima!'; during them he is 'awkward as a 
lobster' (p. 35). If these images undermine the sense of active sexual prowess 
that animalised rhetoric can connote for masculinity, other images suggest 
that the ultimate result of this logic of dominance is in fact submission before 
an autonomous desire that is beyond rational control. The magistrate 
describes his penis as 'an animal living parasitically upon me [ ... ] anchored 
to my flesh with claws I could not detach' and he wonders what difference it 
would make were it 'rooted in a cat or dog instead of in me' (p. 49). After 
eventually having sex with the girl, he lies on her 'with the weight of a dead 
ox'. Oblivious to the post-coital self-loathing that this animal figure implies, 
she herself 'purrs in her sleep'. (pp. 69-70)8 
While these observations suggest an interest in how the discourse of 
species underwrites masculine sexuality, we can also find animal figuration 
7 See, for example, Adams, Sexual Politics, chapter two; Brian Luke, 'Violent Love: Hunting, 
Heterosexuality, and the Erotics of Men's Predation', Feminist Studies, 24 (1998), 627-55; and 
Joan Dunayer, 'Sexist Words, Speciesist Roots' and Marti Kheel, 'Licence to Kill: An 
Ecofeminist Critique of Hunter's Discourse', both in Animals and Women, ed. by Adams and 
Donovan, pp. 11-31; 85-125. 
8 Of course, the possibility of misogyny emerging in such moments as this is a structural 
necessity of Coetzee's willingness to represent masculine experiences of sexuality without 
any narratorial reserve. A similar effect is felt in the work of a philosophical writer who also 
multiplies the meanings of human sexuality by the proliferation of animal metaphors, but 
who actually does so in a much more ecstatic tone than Coetzee: Alphonso Lingis. See his 
'Animal Body, Inhuman Face', in Wolfe (ed.), pp. 165-182. 
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at the heart of the novel's more explicitly violent but nonetheless related 
themes of imprisonment and torture. After being captured, the magistrate 
describes his cell as a 'den' (p. 128): 'I guzzle my food like a dog', he thinks, 'a 
bestial life turning me into a beast' (p. 87). On escaping, he flees 'from hole to 
hole like a mouse' (p. 110). Recaptured and after suffering humiliation that he 
cannot resist because he is I a tired old bear made tame by too much baiting' 
(p. 127), he is tortured and strung up on a tree. 
Someone gives me a push and I begin to float back and forth in an arc 
a foot above the ground like a great old moth with its wings pinched 
together, roaring, shouting. 'He is calling his barbarian friends,' 
someone observes. 'That is barbarian language you hear'. (p. 133) 
When the human body in pain is compared to an abused insect, the 
traumatic nature of the event seems at first disproportionate to the bathetic 
context of this metaphor - a cliche of childish violence. One effect of the 
metaphor drawing attention to itself, by collapsing into illogic at the word 
'roaring', is to replicate the magistrate's disorientation; but another is to hint 
that such violence against insects might itself be taken more seriously. 
Some readers might find it outrageous to extract and focus on the plight 
of a metaphorical moth in response to the representation of such public 
human torture. This worry will be particularly acute in the context of a novel 
written at the height of apartheid, and especially so when the novelist's work 
is already implicated in heated debate over South African writers' social 
responsibility to represent the violent inequalities of a corrupt political 
regime.9 To answer this point, it is worth noting the importance of an animal 
9 These issues are addressed in Michael Marais, "'Little Enough, Less than Little, Nothing"; 
Ethics, Engagement and Change in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee', Modern Fiction Studies, 46 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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in Coetzee's own foray into this debate, written during apartheid in 1986.10 
Discussing Nadine Gordimer's Burger's Daughter, Coetzee relates its chief 
protagonist's response to the disturbing sight of a donkey being flogged by a 
drunken black man on the outskirts of the Johannesburg townships. She is 
unwilling to condemn the man for visiting the social abjection he has 
suffered himself on the donkey; yet this would be to accept abuse just 
because liberal humanitarianism towards animals in such an endemically 
racist context might look suspiciously like a way of ignoring human 
oppression. The protagonist reluctantly passes by but soon abandons South 
Africa. 
In his reading, Coetzee does not dispute this tacit agreement with the 
man's ethical primacy over the donkey. However, the key point about the 
scenario is that the animal's needs are granted genuine validity vis-a-vis the 
man's, thus making its body the site of an (almost) irresolvable cross-species 
ethical drama. In the radical constriction of the protagonist's choices to I either 
looking on in horrified fascination as the blows fall or turning one's eyes 
away' Coetzee finds a symbol of the South African novelist's dilemma over 
the representation of torture in a police state (p. 368, his emphasis). By 
representing the torture scene s/he is enthralled by but forbidden to see, the 
novelist capitulates to the state's power to create such a mysterious 
obscenity; under such conditions, to fictionalise torture with moral authority 
is impossible. The irony, of course, is that Coetzee's willingness in this essay 
(2000), 159-182 (pp. 159-61), and Derek Attridge, 'Literary Form and the Demands of 
Politics: Otherness in J. M. Coetzee's Age of Iron', in Aesthetics and Ideology, ed. by George 
Levine (New Brunswick. N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994), pp. 243--63 (pp. 244-49). 
10 See Coetzee, 'Into the Dark Chamber: The Writer and the South African State', in Doubling 
the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. by David Atwell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), pp. 361-68. 
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to do justice to human torture by insisting on its invisibility is effected 
precisely by way of the compelling visibility, and eventual avoidance, of 
animal torture in Gordimer's novel. Nevertheless, Coetzee looks forward to a 
point, after apartheid, when I all human acts, including the flogging of an 
animal, will be returned to the ambit of moral judgement' (p. 368). 
Coetzee's response to these issues in Waiting for the Barbarians, of 
course, is to forbid his narrator access to the barbarians' torture, while later 
narrating his own. We can now return to this text with a proper 
understanding of animals' relation to human oppression. The magistrate's 
pained body is aligned with the supposedly irrational barbarians, echoing 
other descriptions of the barbarians as animals (pp. 19-21). We can see a 
nexus of parallel oppositions emerging: 
reason pain 
language agonised cries 
freedom imprisonment 
mind body 
coloniser barbarian 
human animal 
This nexus patterns the novel's intersection of the discourses and practices of 
colonialism and speciesism.ll Nothing more clearly suggests this intersection 
than the magistrate's description of the colonial community's violent reaction 
11 Arguing that literary representations of caged zoo animals suggest that animals' pain is 
allowed by the result of imaginative failure on the part of real zoo-goers, Randy Malamud 
explicitly modulates a claim by philosopher Elaine Scarry that pain marks the point at which 
human language and imagination collapse. For Malamud, this is also an effect of zoos as 
imperialist institutions, Reading Zoos, pp. 180-81 and chapter two. 
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to the arrival of migrating birds, metaphorically described as 'a rival city'. 
Trappers succeed in 'huge catches: birds with their necks twisted, slung from 
poles row upon row by the feet, or crammed alive into wooden cages, 
screaming with outrage, trampling each other, with sometimes a great silent 
whooper swan in their midst' (p. 62). Yet the blankness of the magistrate's 
comment on this, containing within its positive phraseology only the barest 
unconfirmed hint of irony, indicates a reticence in the novel to provide a 
clear moral context for judging such practices. The catch represents 'nature's 
cornucopia: for the next weeks everyone will eat well' (p. 62). This moral 
reticence, as we shall see, is a characteristic of Coetzee's writing on animals. 
Moving on, we find the animal at the heart of Michael K's summary 
self-description in the final pages of his 'life and times': 'I am more of an 
earthworm [which] is also a kind of a gardener. Or a mole, also a gardener, 
that does not tell stories because it lives in silence' (p. 182). Throughout the 
novel, in fact, animal descriptions are attached to K. He thinks of himself, for 
example, as a 'termite boring its way through a rock' (p. 66); 'like an ant that 
does not know where its hole is' (p. 83); 'like a parasite dozing in the gut'; 
and 'like a lizard under a stone' (p. 116). A vital effect of the presence of such 
descriptions is that they can be seen to measure K's attempt to absent 
himself, in a reaction to the dominance of police-state ideology that pervades 
his war-tom country, from any mode of self-narration or interpretation: he 
wants to achieve the 'silence' of the mole and live 'like a beast [ ... ] that leaves 
no trace of its living' (p. 99},12 
12 Wolfe offers a sophisticated discussion of Derrida's claim that neither humans nor animals 
can erase their traces 'of their own accord' in his 'Wittgenstein's Lion', pp. 1-11; see Derrida's 
'The Animal', p. 401 and his' And Say the Animal Responded', in Wolfe (ed.), pp. 121-46 (pp. 
135-39). 
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Of course, one of the most important of these interpretive modes in the 
novel is the medical officer's attempted diagnosis of K, though this is 
ultimately a futile attempt to read the 'trace of his living' in K's fasting body. 
K's silence only solicits further inquiry when it is brought to bear in his 
refusal to respond to medical questioning. 'When he tried to explain himself 
to himself, there remained a gap, a hole, a darkness [ ... ] into which it was 
useless to pour words' (p. 110). The representation of K here evokes that of 
the hysteric-animal in Diary of a Steak. Muteness, of course, was evoked in 
that text as a key symptom of hysteria. Moreover, at another point the female 
patient and the BSE-cow are collocated at the site of two terms very pertinent 
to K: anorexia and nothingness: 
In 1873 Nervosa Anorexia was born. 
=0 
Perhaps that's where she is? Not here. Hardly there. There she is. 
There. There. 
000 
Lacking the appetites of the earthly 
Buttercup13 
K's position vis-a-vis the medical officer is consequently suggestive of the 
hysteric-animal's seductive undermining of interpretation that was central to 
my reading of Diary of a Steak's animal politics. 
13 Levy, p. 24. On K, interpretation and anorexia see Maud Ellman, The Hunger Artists: 
Staroing, Writing and Imprisonment (London: Virago, 1993), pp. 108--10. 
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However, we can also locate a slightly different way of bringing the 
animal into play here. Working in part against this kind of theorising of K's 
muteness, Derek Attridge reads Michael K for what he calls its 'literal' 
evocations of human experience. His conclusions lead him to disagree with 
the critical consensus that K can be read as a figure for the 'force of differance' 
(one way of describing the effect of the hysteric-animal in Diary, in fact). This 
is mainly because this consensual opinion repeats the unreliable medical 
officer's own suggestion that K allegorises the way that 'meaning can take up 
residence in a system without becoming a term in it' (Michael K, p. 166). Yet, 
despite this belief, the officer himself exempts K from physical exercise 
because that 'would be like trying to teach a rat or a mouse or [ ... ] a lizard to 
bark and beg' (p. 163). Doing so repeats the catechristic way that K's 
meaninglessness is consistently given meaning in animal terms. In 
attendance to this fact, Attridge's 'literal' reading can actually be reinforced 
by taking Coetzee's animal metaphors seriously as also a discourse about 
animals. 14 
At times, especially in his period of 'going native', K is reminiscent of 
the narrator of Surfacing, in whom the furrowing out and eating of raw 
vegetables signified the untenable end-point of thinking ethically about 
animals. 
He also ate roots. He had no fear of being poisoned, for he seemed to 
know the difference between a benign bitterness and a malign one, as 
14 I Against Allegory: Taking J. M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians and Life & Times of 
Michael K Literally', presented at the Department of English Literature, University of 
Sheffield, 20 November 2002. Attridge does not focus on animals, but he does find a tentative 
and moral-free resistance to exploitation of the earth in K 
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though he had once been an animal and the knowledge of good and 
bad plants had not died in his soul. (p. 102) 
Yet there is a clear difference between the two texts. When the narrator eats 
raw plants in Surfacing it is an attempt to renounce the power over others 
inherent in her humanity and begin a future life assimilated completely into 
an animal realm considered powerless. On the other hand, the animal nature 
represented by K's botanical knowledge is suggested only as a comparison, 
he remains a human anomaly. K's putative animality is also figured as the 
vestigial trace of a lost pre-history. K seems to have learned the lesson of 
Surfacing that becoming utterly natural cannot be achieved. Similarly, the 
narrative's occasional attempts to align him with an animality that is 
performatively figured as empty of significance are also bound to fail. The 
proliferating animal metaphors that attach themselves to K ironically defeat 
any attempt at 'silent' or 'trace/-free meaninglessness by themselves 
occupying the site of meaning that might be thus vacated. Equally, of course, 
they ensure that animals cannot be regarded as essentially meaningless 
either. 
Part of the power of Michael K lies in the stringency with which it 
worries away at its protagonist's possible meaninglessness. Susan Barton-
the narrator of Foe, Coetzee's re-writing of Robinson Crusoe-resorts to animal 
comparison to represent her own profound sense of insignificance when 
contemplating the island of which she and Cruso (sic) are de facto colonisers. 
She imagines asking Cruso: 
have you never been struck of a sudden by the living, breathing 
quality of this island, as if it were some great beast from before the 
Flood that has slept through the centuries insensible of the insects 
scurrying on its back [ ... ]? Are we insects, Cruso, in the greater view? 
Are we no better than the ants? (p. 89) 
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Similarly, Friday's absolute muteness-his actual insignificance-in response 
to Susan's language lessons evinces an incipient scepticism that forces her to 
confront her own adjacency to animals: Iwhen I take the spoon from his hand 
[ ... ] and say Spoon, how can I be sure he does not think I am chattering to 
myself as a magpie or an ape does' (p. 57). 
In fact, if we can judge by Coetzee's own statements about his fiction, 
there is another way to transcend the species barrier on the subject of 
muteness and scepticism. Referring specifically to Friday, but also 
adumbrating my discussion of Waiting, Coetzee has claimed that the 
suffering body is a Istandard' in his work against the scepticism that results 
from the kind of linguistically bounded universe that Foe's metafictionality 
suggests: IFriday is mute, but Friday does not disappear because Friday is 
body'. Chiming with my critique of Margaret Homans in chapter two, 
Coetzee says that Ithe body is not IIthat which is not," and the proof that it is 
is the pain that it feels. The body with its pain becomes a counter to the 
endless trials of doubt'.15 The pain of the suffering body therefore commands 
an I authority' that Coetzee does not limit in terms of species difference. For 
him, his fiction is a response to his Ibeing-overwhelmed' by I the fact of 
suffering in the world, and not only human suffering' (p. 248, my emphasis). 
Nonetheless, Susan's sense of futility in the face of scepticism reminds 
us of a human-animal relationship we have already seen in The Temple of My 
Familiar, when she later realises that she talks to Friday las old women talk to 
15 Doubling, p. 248. Coetzee's claims predate Butler's explanation, on which my critique of 
Homans draws, of how to sidestep the problem of scepticism while insisting on a discursive 
construction of the body (Bodies, pp. 4-12). In 'Wittgenstein's Lion', Wolfe discusses the issue 
of muteness when exploring the ethical status of the animal in Cavell's philosophical 
scepticism (pp. 1-11). 
Chapter Four Animal Ethics in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee 174 
cats, out of loneliness, till at last they are deemed to be witches, and shunned 
in the streets' (p. 77). Such moments make clear the extent to which Friday's 
muteness throws into confusion the conventional human-animal dichotomy 
that the concept of human linguistic rationality maintains. 
Of course, Mrs Curren, the epistolary narrator of Age of Iron is another 
woman who befriends cats (pp. 11,22,33). But that novel is marked by many 
types of animal imagery-canine, feline, avian-that adhere to almost every 
character. Perhaps the most important of these is entomological imagery, 
underwriting as it does the novel's concern with one woman's experience of 
the desire for personal and social regrowth in the harsh climate of apartheid 
South Africa. Mrs Curren dreams about her cancer, imagining it as a fly: 'it is 
upon me, it is here: it struts across me, a creature from another world' (p. 24); 
she describes the white children of her neighbourhood having the 'innocence 
of beegrubs, plump and white', in opposition to the black children (who are, 
incidentally, 'rapacious sharks' (pp. 6-7»; elsewhere, she is herself like 'a 
grub in a hive' (p. 144) and remembers the joy of riding a bike, feeling 'as a 
butterfly must feel when it is being born, or bearing itself' (p. 14); the 
homeless man Vercueil is 'an insect [ ... ]emerging from behind the skirting-
boards when the house is in darkness to forage for crumbs' (p. 12). That such 
imagery does not just attach to one person but spreads across the many 
characters of the novel makes clear the complex political demands placed on 
the individual by the need for widespread social regrowth after apartheid. 
Moreover, as well as being signifiers of these competing demands, animals 
themselves are subject to them-a fact felt bluntly by the cats whose exile 
from Mrs Curren's hearth is the effect of her hospitality to Vercueil and his 
dog (p. 180). 
Progressing finally to The Master of Petersburg, the tortured attempts of 
Dostoevsky, its main focaliser, to come to terms with the death of his stepson 
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Pavel are an exercise in the use, and ultimate incapacity, of animal 
metaphors. He remembers Pavel as the typical adolescent boy: 'fullgrown, 
but can't leave the nest yet. Feathered but unable to fly. Always eating, 
always hungry. They remind me of pelicans: gangling creatures, ungainliest 
of birds, till they spread those great wings of theirs and leave the ground' (p. 
221). Dostoevsky believes it better to have fathered Pavel 'at a distance, like a 
frog or a fish' (p. 207). In this novel, more so than the others I have 
mentioned, the animal imagery takes on a gothic tone, often used to describe 
characters' unconscious desires, fears, or disgusts. Feeling jealous of his son's 
sexual conquests, the father is 'like an old grey rat creeping in afterwards 
upon the love-scene to see what is left for him. Sitting on the corpse in the 
dark, pricking his ears, gnawing, listening, gnawing' (p. 107). Dostoevsky's 
powerful unconscious desire to reach the dead son, as well as the traumatic 
sense that such a project is doomed to failure, plays itself out in a dream of 
being part-human, part-turtle. He dives towards the son, figured as a baby 
who sleeps (with a strange dream-logic) on a riverbed. When he tries to call 
to his son 'each syllable is replaced by a syllable of water' (p. 17). Dostoevsky 
is alienated within a body that is unable to achieve the animal's comfort in its 
environment; the human bizarrely drowns because of the weakness of his 
exhaled words. The otherness of animals is here juxtaposed with the 
otherness of the dead, two ontological states that Dostoevsky's unconscious 
signally fails to access, just as do his other Orphic methods in the novel: sex 
and imaginative writing.16 
16 A full discussion of this novel would need to take account of the extremely complex 
relation of animals, language and death in it; see especially p. 20. The best guide to such 
philosophical discussion would be Matthew Calarco's exacting analysis of Derrida's work on 
animals and death in Aporias, 'On the Borders of Language and Death: Derrida and the 
Footnotes continue on the following page 
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Now, despite the weaving of ideas about animals into the linguistic 
fabric of Coetzee's novels, it will not be entirely surprising if their readers 
remain unfamiliar with the number therein of extremely compelling actual 
human encounters with animals. However, if such incidents as appear in the 
majority of Coetzee's earlier work do so only briefly, and if their place in the 
structure of each text as a whole remains elusive, then this fact should not 
itself be entirely unexpected. For as critics are beginning to realise, 
encouraged by influential readers such as Derek Attridge and Gayatri 
Spivak, Coetzee's fiction offers an exploration of ethical demands occasioned 
by the events and characters he portrays, but it is an exploration undertaken 
with an abiding concern not to assimilate those demands to conventional 
contexts and patterns of meaning. Attridge writes of the 'figures of alterity' 
that one finds in the novels, 'usually as subordinate third-world individuals', 
noting that 'the task Coetzee has set himself is to convey the resistance of 
these figures to the discourses of dominant culture [ ... ] and at the same time 
to find a discursive means of representing the claims they make on us'P That 
we consistently find encounters with animals accompanying the 
representation of such people, however, is not something that has been seen 
Question of the Animal', Angelaki, 7.2 (2002), 17-25. Marais discusses at length in "'Little 
Enough'" the many revisitations of the Orpheus/Euridice myth in Coetzee's fiction, 
particularly in relation to Maurice Blanchot's description of the literary writing as an Orphic 
movement, propelled by a desire to reach and capture the Other that also ensures its failure. 
See also Blanchot's The Space of Literature, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982), pp. 171-76. 
17 Attridge, 'Literary Form', pp. 249-50. See also Gayatri Spivak, 'Theory in the Margin: 
Coetzee's Foe Reading Defoe's Crusoe/Roxana' in Consequences of Theory, ed. by Jonathan Arac 
and Barbara Johnson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 154-80. An 
exemplary reading that attends to such otherness in terms of history and the body is Samuel 
Durrant, 'Bearing Witness to Apartheid: J. M. Coetzee's Inconsolable Works of Mourning', 
Contemporary Literature, 40 (1999), 430-63. 
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as important to the reading of these novels in genera1.IS Despite being 
consistently apparent, Coetzee's animals seem even less amenable to 
interpretation than those incommensurable I figures of alterity' - even more 
'other' than the human others, we could say. It is worth looking at some of 
these early encounters, then, since they provide the background to Coetzee's 
much more fulsome fictional engagement with the ethical dilemmas of 
human-animal relations in The Lives of Animals. 
Worth mentioning is the wailing, shackled dog in The Master of 
Petersburg, whose plight Dostoevsky eventually ignores because he will not 
accept that the dog might signal an ethical substitute for his lost son (pp. 78-
84); this happens despite his recognition that his refusal to accept the logic of 
symbolic substitution-the distinction of 'things that are things from things 
that are signs' -is the reason for his failure to complete the mourning of 
Pavel's death (p. 83). This scenario must also remind us of Vercueil's dog, 
whose physicality and noise make for a choral presence on almost every page 
of Age of Iron. Mrs Curren asks, four pages from its close: 'is it possible that 
the dog is the one sent and not [Vercueil]?'; she does this after having spent 
the majority of the novel exploring the possibility that to accommodate an 
abject figure such as Vercueil might be to entertain a redemptive presence in 
her life. An answer to her question is certainly suggested when she is at her 
absolute nadir-having given up on life, she is sleeping rough, incontinent, 
and has been physically abused by a group of children. The dog brings her 
18 Although The Lives of Animals has encouraged critics to see the importance of animals in 
Coetzee's recent writing, the interest is confined to that work. To his credit, Attridge is the 
one commentator who at least briefly bucks this trend: see his 'Expecting the Unexpected in 
Coetzee's Master of Petersburg and Derrida's Recent Writings' in Applying - To Derrida, ed. by 
John Brannigan, Ruth Robbins and Julian Wolfreys (HoundmilIs: MacmilI~ 1996) pp. 21-40 
(pp.28-31). 
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back from unconsciousness by sniffing her and 'licking up the salt of [her] 
tears', by giving her 'kisses, if one wanted to look at them that way' (p. 146). 
The dog relates to her in such a physical way that it seems to reaffirm her 
being in a world that she has given up on trying to interpretively 
understand.19 
Other ethical encounters occur in various scenes of animal slaughter, of 
which there are several in Coetzee's work. Each time the event occasions 
ambivalence.2o Her traumatic viewing of a chicken slaughter incites Mrs 
Curren to meditate critically on the cultural invisibility of both the 
'enterprise' of animal killing and the effort of the (predominantly black) 
workers it requires (pp. 38-41). The narrator of Coetzee's childhood memoirs 
watches a sheep being slaughtered on a farm and thinks of' all the things that 
a sheep has inside it that he has inside him too'. Despite this somatic 
identification he does not act to protect the animals because of what he sees 
as sheep's recognition that eventual slaughter is 'the price of life on earth'.21 
We might think also of the' apes' - in fact they sound like monkeys of some 
kind-that are clubbed to death as pests by Cruso and Friday in Foe, despite 
the fact that Susan 'saw no harm in them' (p. 21). The real reason of course, is 
19 Simon Glendinning offers a sophisticated path through the philosophical Scylla and 
Charybdis of behaviourist naturalism and Romantic anthropomorphism when representing, 
as Coetzee does here, a dog's ability to form an ethical relation with a human subject. See 
'From Animal Life to City Life', Angelaki, 5.3 (2000),19-30. 
20 In a short text entitled 'Following Derrida' for the internet journal Tympanum, Attridge 
reports an incident when, in response to a paper on Levinas, Coetzee asked him 'are you also 
being addressed by the face of the other when the eyes that are looking at you are those of 
the slaughter-ox?', http://www.usc.edu/dept/comp-lit/tympanum/4/attridge.html. Attridge 
does not answer the question about Levinas's animal ethics, but it has been by Calarco in 
'Deconstruction' (forthcoming) and by David Oark in 'On Being liThe Last Kantian in Nazi 
Germany": Dwelling with Animals after Levinas', in Ham and Senior (eds.), pp. 165-98. 
21 Boyhood: A Memoir (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 98, 102. 
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that their skins are an excellent source of shoe-leather. Yet their presence in 
the novel indicates that Cruso's arrival on Friday's island is in fact a second 
form of human colonisation of this land. Finally, if K is the figure of alterity 
in Michael K, then we can think of the goat that he desperately tracks and kills 
as that text's other (animal) other. Rather than providing physical 
sustenance, as K had hoped, the goat is eaten only partially and with 
apparent distaste, the useless majority of its body buried (pp. 52-57). Each of 
these fictional situations is worthy of extended analysis; however I want to 
end this survey with two key incidents from Waiting for the Barbarians. 
A silver-fox is purchased by the magistrate and given as a pet in a failed 
attempt to infantilise (and perhaps to domesticate) the barbarian girl who is 
the novel's main figure of alterity. 'Animals belong outdoors', the girl says, 
but will not let the magistrate release it because it is too young and will 
starve to death. Being the object of this irresolvable double-bind, the cub 
lingers about half-wild, unwanted and barely tolerated. The girl is 
impervious to the magistrate's attempt to alleviate the problem by humour-
he jokes that 'people will say I keep two wild animals in my rooms' (pp. 36, 
37). The girl's implacability, however, only reinforces the joke's alignment of 
her with the animal. Rather like Michael K's goat, both remain completely 
unassimilated. Their persistent and uncanny presence in the magistrate's 
home environment is a result of the text's refusal to categorise girl or animal 
under the sign of any conventional moral rubric, the most obvious of which 
would, I suppose, be 'humanitarian' concern as embodied by the liberal 
magistrate. As the word implies, such concern is part of a domesticating 
process that necessarily lessens the otherness of the animal. 
In another incident, the magistrate finds himself unable to complete a 
hunt by killing a ram, shaken from a pastime that usually offers him bucolic 
escapism (pp. 9,41-42,62). He describes an aestheticised moment of mutual 
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recognition on spotting the ram, one that can be compared with the other 
moments of animal looking that I discuss in earlier chapters. As the 
magistrate reports, the ram 'turns his head and sees me. His hooves touch 
the ice with a click, his jaw stops in slow motion, we gaze at each other' (p. 
42). Yet, unusually, it is not the integrity of the individual animal's existence 
that is perceived as a result of this look and which stops the magistrate from 
shooting. Rather, the moment seems to transport him into the realisation that 
he and the ram have become participants in an event that is at once so 
cliched and so overcoded with symbolism that it denegates the magistrate's 
own self-present individual will. The hunt 'loses its savour' because of 
the sense that this has become [ ... ] an occasion on which either the 
proud ram bleeds to death on the ice or the old hunter misses his 
aim; that for the duration of this frozen moment the stars are locked 
in a configuration in which events are not themselves but stand for 
other things. (pp. 42-43) 
The buck' disappears into the tall reeds' with an insouciant 'whisk of the tail' 
while the magistrate tries to 'shrug off this irritating and uncanny feeling' (p. 
43). 
This experience is exemplary for delimiting a particular kind of 
engagement with the animal that betokens a development from the human-
animal interactions we have seen in earlier chapters of this thesis; as such, it 
can introduce the issues raised by the texts I will discuss at greater length 
below. Something clearly happens to the magistrate so that he finds himself 
perceiving the animal in a way that stops him killing it. However, the 
encounter does not follow usual patterns of identification such as respect for 
the rights, or empathy with the suffering, of another individual. Instead, it is 
experienced only when the encounter passes into the realm of symbolism 
(and as we saw in both Age of Iron and The Master of Petersburg there is 
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significance for animal ethics in the difference between' things that are signs' 
and 'things that are things'). The magistrate as 'old hunter' allows the buck 
as 'proud ram' to escape. 
In fact, we should be more precise, since the categories of rational 
freedom and moral decision are invisible here. The ram's escape is an effect 
of the magistrate's hesitant recognition that he cannot avoid being spoken by 
a discourse that is beyond him. This recognition, at most only partly inspired 
by the sight of the animal, occasions in the magistrate a profound sense of 
otherness to himself. 'Never before have I had the feeling of not living my 
own life on my own terms', he tells the barbarian girl (p. 43). It is not at all 
clear, however, what terms he is living on; nor is it clear, more specifically, 
whether they are the animal's (nor indeed what the animal's terms might be). 
Thus the ethics at play in the magistrate's interaction with the ram 
certainly cannot be straightforwardly categorised as pro-animal; it would be 
ridiculous to suggest that the magistrate's actions here, or anywhere else in 
the novel, are based on a morality of animals' rights. The magistrate, clearly 
struggling for the right term to describe what he has experienced, describes 
what he feels about the ram as an 'obscure sentiment', but I would prefer to 
call it an ethical relation. It is an encounter in which a man finds himself, in 
even the obscurest of ways, bound to an animal because his actions affect it. 
This definition of the ethical relation is deliberately open-ended, and 
can be applied to a great variety of human-animal encounters. This flexibility 
is useful because it encourages the discovery and interrogation of valuable 
ethical meaning as it usually occurs in Coetzee's fiction: in unconventional 
places like this hunting scene. On the other hand, the broadness of the 
description explicitly forestalls any predetermined sense of what a 'good' or 
'bad' ethical relation to the animal might be, a sense for which I will reserve 
the term moral to avoid confusion. The reason for holding open the 
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possibility of an ethical relation beyond the blunt calculation of right and 
wrong required by this sense of morality is that such a calculus can foreclose 
the possibility of new and unexpected configurations of the human-animal 
relation, constricting our understanding within already accepted norms. This 
conception of ethics is indebted to Derrida's distinction between justice, 
which he characterises as incalculable, and law, which is calculable.22 This is 
a distinction that Derrida makes clear is absolutely tied to the consideration 
of animal ethics. Elaborating the concept of carno-phallogocentrism that I 
touched on at the start of this chapter, he claims that I carnivorous sacrifice is 
essential to the structure of subjectivity, which is also to say the founding of 
the intentional subject and to the founding, if not of law, at least of [ ... ] the 
difference between justice and law'.23 
The ram incident's importance is that it foregrounds the way that 
Coetzee's writing presents our ethical relation to animals as intrinsically 
discursive. That is, encounters with animals occur amongst the admittedly 
diverse context of ideas in which both animals and ethics are already 
understood. Thinking of animal ethics as always-already discursive is 
categorically different from thinking of an unmediated experience of animals' 
22 This distinction is elaborated in Zygmunt Bauman in a book length discussion of ethics that 
subtends my comments here, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); for some worries 
about and complications of Bauman's Levinas-inspired ethics from a pro-animal perspective, 
see Wolfe, Animal Rites, pp. 194-207. 
23 'Force of Law: The "Mystical" Foundation of Authority', Cardozo Law Review, 11 (1990), 
920-1045 (p. 953), see also pp. 945-57. On camo-phallogocentrism, see also IIIEating Well"', 
pp. 272-283 and The Gift of Death, trans. by David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), pp. 66-71. These issues are discussed elsewhere by Baker, pp. 76-78; Calarco 
'Deconstruction' (forthcoming); Cark, pp. 176-78; Wolfe, 'Wittgenstein's Lion', pp. 25-28; 
and Wolfe and Elmer, pp. 145-47. Coetzee has himself spoken of his interest in 'an idea of 
justice, somewhere, that transcends laws and lawmaking', Doubling, p. 340. 
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value-a precondition of the notion of animal rights.24 To see how this idea is 
explored at its fullest, we have to tum to The Lives of Animals. 
24 This idea of unrnediated value subtends, in different ways, the two major strands of animal 
rights philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition. The theory of rights based on 'inherent 
value' is applied in its purest form to animals by Regan. Peter Singer's approach in Animal 
Liberation contrasts because its utilitarian conception of ethics is based on calculating overall 
social happiness rather than on intrinsic value per sei yet that calculation is itself based on 
equal treatment of similar intrinsic qualities in human and animal (for a detailed critique, see 
Wolfe, 'Old Orders', pp. 33-34). Martha Nussbaum's recent analysis in terms of the 
'capabilities approach' explicitly bases ethical treatment on a respect for different beings' 
intrinsic needs and capabilities. Interestingly, this forms part of her own Tanner Lectures 
titled 'Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice', presented at the Australian 
National University on 12 and 13 November 2002; the text is available at 
http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/tanner/. 
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II. Vegetarianism and the Performance of Animal Ethics in The Lives of 
Animals 
Anti-illusionism-displaying the tricks 
you are using instead of hiding them - is a 
common ploy of postmodernism. But in 
the end tFiere is oruy so much mileage to 
be got out of that ploy. Anti-illusionism is, 
I suspect, only a marking of time, a phase 
of recuperation, in the history of the novel. 
The question is, what next? 
J. M. Coetzee25 
In these two elegant lectures we thought 
John Coetzee was talking about animals. 
Could it be however, that all along he was 
really asking, 'What is the value of 
literature?' 
Marjorie Garber26 
Coetzee offered his own small step forward in answer to his question when, 
on 15 and 16 October 1997, he delivered the Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values at Princeton University, under the title 'The Lives of Animals'. His 
performance took the concept of metafiction, with its blurring of the 
boundary between the authorial and the textual, to a new level. The lectures, 
individually named 'The Philosophers and the Animals' and 'The Poets and 
the Animals', narrate the story of a novelist called Elizabeth Costello who has 
been invited (like Coetzee) to speak at an American college on a subject of 
her choosing-she chooses animal ethics. Moreover, 'The Lives of Animals' 
combines within its narrative frame many more discursive contexts in 
addition to the lecture-performance. The more distinctive of these are the 
25 Doubling, p. 27. 
26 In Lives, p. 84. 
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classroom seminar and the public debate, but we also find social milieus 
more conventionally found in fiction - the prestigious dinner, the family 
visit, the conjugal argument and the intimate confession. With the addition of 
academic discourse to the eventually published book in the form of scholarly 
footnotes, we can call it a novella only by profoundly limiting its sense of 
generic diversity. Nevertheless, that book, published in 1999 as The Lives of 
Animals is, first and foremost, the text of Coetzee's performancesP I draw 
attention to these issues of genre at the outset in order to focus on the 
absolute importance of attending to the context of performance that 
conditions The Lives of Animals-in particular, the way this context 
adumbrates its status as written fiction. For I want to argue that the text's 
representation of pro-animal thought hinges on its cross-pollination of 
writing and performance, and on its management of the competing aesthetic 
and ideological implications of such different generic modes. Therefore, 
despite the false binary imposed by Marjorie Garber, The Lives of Animals is 
indeed about animals precisely because it is about the value of literature. 
In terms of the present thesis, as well as of Coetzee's oeuvre as a whole, 
Lives is important firstly because of the explicitness of its address to animal 
issues, specifically its inclusion-through the character of Elizabeth-of 
progressive theories about animals as subjects of philosophical and literary 
representation. During the course of her lecture, for instance, Elizabeth 
develops an argument that underpins the contemporary feminist pro-animal 
27 Oearly, we are dealing with a tricky textual environment here, which it will be important 
to attend to precisely. Because I occaSionally need to maintain a distinction between 'The 
Lives of Animals' the performance and The Lives of Animals the published book, I reserve the 
term 'lectures' to refer to the former and place their title in quotation marks while italicising 
the title of the latter and using conventional textual terms of reference. 
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theory I addressed in chapter one, and which allowed me in chapter two to 
compare her views to those underpinning The Temple of My Familiar. From 
critiquing the human-centeredness of the Cartesian discourse of rationalism, 
she moves instead to a consequent valorisation of the body, and finally 
argues for the ideal of imaginative sympathy based on 'embodied 
knowledge' of other animals' being.28 Her debate with Thomas O'Heame 
about animal rights, while the least compelling part of the text in literary 
terms, could serve as a primer for those interested by theoretical 
developments in animal ethics over the past ten years or SO.29 She also 
touches on a number of issues mentioned in this thesis, from the compelling 
power of animals' silence (p. 25), to the problems of extending conventional 
human rights to the animal realm (pp. 25-26), and from the importance of 
concepts like instrumental technicity, scepticism, imprisonment and torture 
for our philosophical consideration of animals' lives (pp. 28-33, 59), to the 
need to understand animals' place in the history and representations of 
colonialism (pp. 57-58). 
28 See pp. 22-35. Elizabeth's clearest philosophical similarities are with the work of Josephine 
Donovan; the first two stages are explored in Donovan's 'Animal Rights', the third in 
I Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for the Ethical Treatment of Animals', both in 
Beyond Animal Rights, ed. by Adams and Donovan, pp. 34-60, pp. 147-69. 
29 The text offers sources for some of these issues, though many of the points not referenced 
can be found in recent writing about animals: Q'Hearne's first argument that animal rights 
reproduces Western Imperialism is played out in Julia V. Emberley, Venus in Furs: The 
Cultural Politics of Fur (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); his second (Kantian) argument that 
animals are objects not subjects of ethics is debated at length in Regan; Elizabeth's insistence 
on the need to 'interrogate the whole question of rights' (p. 62), points to Wolfe's project in a 
number of essays, especially 'Old Orders'; although O'Hearne's final claim-that animals 
cannot comprehend, nor therefore experience, death-is deconstructed by Derrida in Aporias 
(see note 15) it nonetheless forms the basis of Lippit's theoretical approach to animals, which 
is heavily influenced by deconstruction. 
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On a more literary level, Elizabeth's critique of what amounts to a 
certain Platonism in Ted Hughes's poetry lucidly describes the point at 
which an environmentalist or ecopoetic representational ethic differs from a 
pro-animal one by prioritising the abstract species over the individual animal 
(p. 53); I touched on this opposition in Atwood's work. John's disagreement 
with Elizabeth on this point voices an oft-repeated critique of animal rights: 
that it trades on the aesthetics of sublime animals (gorillas, pandas) to save 
the ridiculous (rats, prawns). 
Jaguar poems are all very well, he thinks, but you won't get a bunch 
of Australians standing around a sheep, listening to its silly baa, 
writing poems about it. Isn't that what is so suspect in the whole 
animal rights business, that it has to ride on the back of pensive 
gorillas [ ... ] because the real objects of its concern [ ... ] are not 
newsworthy? (p. 55) 
Unsurprisingly, however, there are indeed Australian poets who do not 
share John's prejudice for wild over domestic animals.30 John also has a 
lengthy discussion with Norma about what she dismissively calls the 'French 
irrationalism' concluded by Elizabeth's critique of reason's anthropocentrism 
(a charge which I negotiated in my discussion of Walker). Indeed, there is an 
unlikely alliance between Norma and Peter Singer on this point-one finds 
resistance to what we might loosely term postmodern pro-animal thought in 
30 Primarily under the aegis of vegan poet Coral Hull's internet journal Thylazine 
(http://www.thylazine.com) and John Kinsella's editorship of the Salt publishing house in 
Sydney (http://www.saltpublishing.com/zoo.html). To see played out the difference that 
Elizabeth marks between ecopoetic and pro-animal literary approaches to animals, compare 
Jonathan Bate, 'Poets, Apes, and other Animals', in The Song of the Earth (London: Picador, 
2(01) with Randy Malamud, 'The Culture of Using Animals in Literature and the Case of Jose 
Emilio Pacheco', CLC Web Journal, 2 (2000) http://clcwebjourna1.lib.purdue.edulclcwebOO-
2/malamudOO.html. 
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the most unlikely of places.31 However, even more interesting to me than 
these many points of what we might call theoretical interest is the narrative 
that contains them, in particular its deft fictionalisation of the social drama 
occasioned by Elizabeth's vegetarianism. Addressing these two realms 
together, one within the other, the text offers a fascinating study of the effect 
of fiction on the moral philosophy of pro-animal thought. Thus, while Lives is 
a short work, the sheer intensity of its focus on pro-animal themes sets it 
apart even from the other texts I have discussed. I will be addressing these 
matters throughout this section. 
However, I will also dedicate much of my discussion to exploring the 
impact on its pro-animal themes of the text's form: to put it quickly, the way 
that the published work is simultaneously a fictional text that narrates its 
own conditions of production (the narrative of a visiting novelist to an 
American college) and a text of the physical performance of that fiction 
(Coetzee's reading). This arrangement is important to the extent that it 
seriously undermines any opposing of the stable and authoritative meaning 
conventionally expected of a lecture to the plurality of meaning that is the 
province of fiction. I will explain these suggestions shortly in order to show 
that by thus problematising the authority of its own discourse Lives insists on 
the complexity and variety of discursive contexts that mark the pro-animal 
thought it contains. And by discursive context, here, I do not mean simply a 
specific social arena or a single set of formal and linguistic conventions, but 
rather the realisation of the social relations, suffused as they are with very 
real differences of power, through the languages and concepts that people 
31 See Singer in Lives, pp. 88-89. 
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use. Pro-animal thought, particularly as it is practised in vegetarianism, is 
represented in The Lives of Animals as a performative animal ethics that 
emerges as part of a network of many inter-related discursive contexts. But 
before I get into the devilish complexities of what is going on in Lives in terms 
of literary form, let me exemplify what I mean about the discursive 
emergence of vegetarianism in it. 
The opening pages establish Elizabeth's vegetarianism in an 
environment highly charged with interpersonal power-relations. Elizabeth 
and her daughter-in-law, we are told, ~ do not get on' (p. 15). Throughout the 
text, however, antipathy on Elizabeth's part is not actually presented, it is 
only occasionally reported as if it is a fact; indeed, her only comment on the 
matter mentions Norma's ~kindness' (p. 69). On the other hand, Norma's 
hostility is repeatedly and explicitly evidenced by her own comments, both 
presented and reported in the narrative. The following is a particularly 
telling example: 
Norma and his mother have never liked each other. Probably his 
mother would have chosen not to like any woman he married. As for 
Norma, she has never hesitated to tell him that his mother's books 
are overrated, that her opinions on animals, animal consciousness, 
and ethical relations with animals are jejune and sentimental. (p. 17) 
The narrative method is one Coetzee has used elsewhere, notably in The 
Master of Petersburg, and Disgrace. Events are related by a third-person 
narrator but consistently through the consciousness of the text's chief male 
protagonist (here, Elizabeth's son John); yet the narration does remain 
essentially external to him. There are very occasional moments where the 
text's more usual method of indirectly reporting John's thoughts is replaced 
by direct reporting, not distinguished by quotation marks; this can then slip 
into free indirect discourse. John's comment about jaguar poems is a good 
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example here. Such important moments very briefly allow the narrators 
voice to reinforce John's less self-restrained attitudes. However, the much 
more usual effect of free indirect discourse in the text is that the assimilation 
of character and narrator seems inconclusive, as in the second sentence of the 
above quotation. 
Nevertheless, the consistent use of John as the narration's focaliser 
ensures that there is little or no distance between his and the narrators 
opinions. The text thus offers the reader no vantage point from which to 
judge the accuracy of John's perceptions. This means we are strenuously 
encouraged to take the narrated analysis at face value, and when it comes to 
reports of behaviour external to the text we have little option; this results in 
complicity with John's hardly tolerant attitudes about his mother and 
Norma's uncharitable response to her.32 On the other hand, there is a telling 
lack of external validation for these opinions and this means that doubts can 
creep in. 
In the above quotation, for example, several possibilities are sparked. 
Might John's willingness to imagine such negative scenarios for both 
women-which rests on the word 'probably' and the phrase 'he would not 
be surprised' - suggest an unconscious investment in positioning himself as 
an object of contestation between these two women? Doesn't there seem to 
32 In early reviews of the book, this has manifested itself as hostility towards Elizabeth's 
vegetarianism. The reviewer for The Times finds her a 'crank' (May 23 1999) and Elizabeth 
Lowry claims that it is Elizabeth who cannot extend her sympathy with animals to her 
family, as a result of her own 'fears [ ... ] about her place in the hierarchy: 'Like a Dog', review 
of The Lives of Animals and Disgrace by J. M. Coetzee, London Review of Books, 21.20 (1999) 
available online at http://www.lrb.co.uk!v21/n20/lowr01_.html. For a more empathetic and 
theoretically sophisticated attitude, see Ian Hacking, 'Our Fellow Animals', review of The 
Lives of Animals by J. M. Coetzee and Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights 
Movement by Peter Singer, New York Review of Books, 29 June 2000. 
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be something of a misogynistic fantasy in this idea of the dutiful son caught 
between overbearing mother and combative (almost hen-pecking) wife? His 
mother is a prize-winning feminist novelist; it seems at least unlikely that she 
would ignorantly subscribe to such a cliche, even if there does seem to be 
enough evidence elsewhere of Norma's spitefulness, and a plausible 
explanation suggested for it in terms of her professional jealousy (p. 17). 
The unreliability that marks the narration is played out more clearly 
over the 'hostilities' between Elizabeth and Norma that are claimed to be 
'renewed almost at once' about the family's eating arrangements (p. 15). Both 
John and the grandchildren effectively become counters in what is 
represented as a cross-generational battle for control. Elizabeth twice pushes 
Norma for an explanation of the children's absence from the dinner table. 
Norma pressurises John to reply, again placing him as the tug-of-Iove 
object-an expectation he fulfils with resignation, explaining that it is 
because the children are to eat chicken. Their absence is thus portrayed as a 
straightforward concession to what Norma rather patronisingly calls "'your 
mother's delicate sensibilities'" (p. 16). It is worth noting at this point, 
though, that this imputed touchiness over others' eating habits is nowhere 
actually voiced by Elizabeth (notably not in the lengthy dinner scene, for 
example). Similarly, there is no obvious hostility in Elizabeth's questions-or 
rather, if there is, it is only of an unconsciously passive-aggressive sort. The 
questions about the grandchildren's whereabouts tacitly reveal Elizabeth's 
(possibly resentful) sadness at not seeing them, something which seems quite 
understandable having just flown in from her home thousands of miles 
away. My point, however, is not to suggest that Norma is hostile and 
Elizabeth is not; in fact, by its very inconclusiveness over John's psychology 
the text leaves the possibility of Elizabeth's hostility open, albeit as 
unconscious. Instead I want to point out the way that Elizabeth's 
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vegetarianism has become caught up in other dynamics altogether-in this 
case a submerged contest over the maternal or spousal role in which all 
family members are embroiled. 
The narrative therefore requires of its readers a stance of quite some 
critical vigilance if they are to read against the grain of John's perception of 
events, and this is often necessary if one is to appreciate the profundity of the 
text's representation of vegetarianism. Another way of bucking against the 
narrative's most apparent trajectory is to attend to ironic resonances in its 
language. Norma's reference to Elizabeth's 'jejune' ideas about animal ethics 
is one such moment. This word jars because it seems a little obscure for its 
context, effectively the report of a dismissive attack on Elizabeth by Norma. 
The synonym 'naive' would perhaps ring more truly beside the other 
adjectives used, 'overrated' and 'sentimental'. The OED reports that behind 
this denotation of 'jejune', and its other meaning of 'dry and uninteresting', 
the original sense of the word was 'without food' and hence 'not 
intellectually nourishing'. Behind that, the Latin root jejunus means 'fasting, 
barren'. I want to leave to one side for the moment the apparent irony of 
tautologically referring to a vegetarian's ideas about animal ethics as 
'without nourishment', or as 'fasting', although this irony does imply that 
there is a certain vacuity to Norma's complaints. But the addition of the idea, 
etymologically faint though it is, that Elizabeth's ideas are barren is of equal 
significance here. For we certainly find Elizabeth represented in Lives more 
generally in terms of her anomalous status within a discursive network that 
fans out around the principal concept that defines her: motherhood. She is 
figured on the one hand in terms of weakness, tiredness and age-the 
conceptual opposites of a hearty and fecund maternity-and yet as 
fundamentally child-like on the other. 
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I have already mentioned Norma's characterisation of Elizabeth's 
vegetarianism as an example of sentimental 'delicateness', which echoes 
quite stereotypical associations of meat eating with moral and emotional 
fortitude.33 Elizabeth is also repeatedly figured in terms of senescence. The 
book's opening paragraph very efficiently brings motherhood and age 
together by introducing Elizabeth in terms of John's shock at how his mother 
has aged (p. 15). This perspective guides other crucial moments, such as 
when she gets up to read her lecture (p. 18); just before an aggressive 
question from Norma after it (p. 36); after the Faculty Oub dinner (p. 44); and 
in the compelling final scene of Elizabeth's breakdown (p.69). 
This last is perhaps the most disturbing example; it is, for me, the most 
compelling pro-animal moment in contemporary literature. In it we see the 
devastating effect on an ethical vegetarian's emotional life of the competing 
claims of human community and justice to animals. Elizabeth is distraught 
by the contradiction of believing that the kindness she sees in the eyes of her 
family masks complicity in 'a crime of stupefying proportions' against 
animals, but more so by her failure to come to terms with it. John pulls the 
car over and 'takes his mother in his arms. He inhales the smell of cold 
cream, of old flesh. "There, there," he whispers in her ear. "There, there. It 
will soon be over''' (p. 69). There is an almost queasy ambiguity to John's 
words here that simultaneously renders Elizabeth senile and infantilises her; 
in either case John usurps his mother's parental position by assuming the 
role of either the care-giving son or the attentive father to her. His final 
statement simultaneously suggests complete bafflement by her problem 
33 See Nick Fiddes, Meat: A Natural Symbol (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 65-93. 
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while also managing to be consoling and yet condescending, hopeful yet 
utterly resigned. Not only these, it could be self-addressed, voicing his relief 
at his mother's imminent departure. And since he is so troubled by her age, 
we can sense lying behind all of this John's resignation to, or perhaps even 
unconsciously matricidal hope for, Elizabeth's (he believes) impending 
death. Just as we saw with the scene of the family dinner, the expression of 
Elizabeth's pro-animal beliefs here becomes thoroughly entrenched within 
parental-filial dynamics. 
What are we to make of Elizabeth's positioning as both redundant old 
woman and needy child at such profound moments in the text? Taking this 
alongside Elizabeth's supposed 'hostilities' with Norma, why is there such 
instability over the parental role? And what is the function of that instability 
in a work that on first glance mainly concerns the development of moral 
arguments about animals? The best answer to these questions can be found 
by returning to Derrida's comments on camo-phallogocentrism, with which I 
began this chapter. Derrida explains that 'authority and autonomy' are 
attributed 
to the man [ ... ] rather than to the woman, and to the woman rather 
than to the animal. And of course to the adult rather than to the child. The 
virile strength of the adult male, the father, the husband, or brother 
[ ... ] belongs to the schema that dominates the subject. The subject 
does not want just to master and possess nature actively. In our 
cultures, he accepts sacrifice and eats flesh. (pp. 280-81, my 
emphasis) 
The representation of Elizabeth, it seems to me, bears out the truth of 
the inter-relations that Derrida sets out in this passage; indeed it truly 
captures the spirit of the emphasised dyad, which might now also be read 
conversely as 'to the mature child (son) rather than to the senile adult 
(mother),. As a vegetarian, Elizabeth's refusal 'to sacrifice and eat flesh' 
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ensures that she is on the wrong side of the dominant, carno-phallogocentric 
schema of the subject. This creates a sense of fit when John's way of 
conceptualising her is not just as a mother and as a rival to his wife, but as a 
weak old woman (which completely divests her of any power she might have 
had in these other roles). His behaviour might seem a perfectly normal filial 
response to an apparently ailing mother. However, that John's attitudes are 
in fact ideologically undergirded by the discourse of carno-phallogocentrism 
is suggested in several ways: the availability of alternative attitudes (say, 
genuine respect for her achievements as a world-famous novelist); the fact 
that Elizabeth seems perfectly at ease in other discursive contexts than the 
lecture; the possibility that the 'hostilities' between his wife and mother are a 
way of centring attention on him; and the way that his treatment of Elizabeth 
so quickly slips into infantilising her. 
Of course, the very normativity of carno-phallogocentrism allows both 
Elizabeth's age and her vegetarianism to be regarded as anomalous in the 
first place, and thus appropriate subjects of John's paternalistic attention. 
Moreover, this combination of normative context and anomalous behaviour 
conditions the suspense that drives the narrative at two critical moments: 
Elizabeth's lecture and the Faculty Club dinner. This is no coincidence. John 
makes quite clear that prestigious dinners are usually meat-based affairs; 
while the public speech, as a prime site of 'authority and autonomy', is the 
camo-phallogocentric arena par excellence. As Derrida puts it, focussing on a 
different kind of speechmaker, 'who would stand a chance of becoming a chef 
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d'etat (a head of state) by publicly, and therefore exemplarily, declaring him-
or herself to be a vegetarian?'. 34 
So there is already something outrageous in the very idea of Elizabeth 
lecturing about vegetarianism, or even dining at a high-status event. This is 
borne out in the narrative itself; think of the way that the two events are 
portrayed as nerve-wracking experiences. The presentation of both instances 
is filtered through John's concerns, thus encouraging the reader to become 
complicit in his worried supervision of Elizabeth's actions. In the first 
instance we are convinced that Elizabeth gives a poor lecture (and will fold 
under questioning from Norma) because she is so 'old and tired', and 
because we are told that when she does speak she 'lacks animation' (pp. 18, 
19); in the second, we worry that she cannot be trusted to behave well 
enough in company to keep her vegetarian opinions to herself (pp. 37-38). 
But whether she is figured as in her dotage or as a petulant adolescent-such 
a vegetarian cliche-John's (and thus our) surveillance remains a 
paternalistic act. In another register we would call his attitude to the elderly 
ageism (there doesn't yet seem to be an equivalent concept for what 
vegetarians suffer), yet it shows that he implicitly understands the logic of 
carno-phallogocentrism. John sits in the front row with Norma before the 
lecture, looking at his mother, and 'tries to will strength into her' because of 
her perceived invalidity (p. 18). The phrase betrays the unpleasant Oedipal 
economy that sub tends John's attitude towards his mother, which comprises 
of a chaotic mix of need, paternalism, envy, guilt, resentment, loathing and 
sexuality. 
34 'Eating Well', p. 281. 
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And therein lies the rub, for the problem with both portrayals of 
Elizabeth is that, once again, her actions give them the lie and suggest that 
they must have another source. Elizabeth's lecture as quoted is perfectly 
clear, coherent and compelling, to judge by my own response; and this is 
confirmed by most critical readers, even those who eventually disagree with 
her claims. Her extremely self-aware discussion of the pitfalls of reason as a 
theoretical discourse, which nonetheless prefaces her strategic use of it, is 
close enough to orthodox deconstructive methodology to demand at least 
recognition and respect, if not agreement, from a university audience. And 
while it would be disingenuous to suggest that she does not make her 
opinion of the meat trade perfectly clear, her attitude could not be further 
from hectoring; indeed she twice sidesteps questions that implicitly ask her 
for a moralising or politicised response (pp. 37, 43). Similarly, the points she 
makes at the dinner are most often neutrally anthropological; she makes no 
attempt whatsoever to put constraints on her companions' normal eating 
habits or to make them uncomfortable. Only under the most direct and 
persistent of personal questioning does she make statements in defence of 
vegetarianism; they are not an attempt directly to induce any kind of moral 
change. 
As I said, readers have to be quite vigilant to pick up on these 
inconsistencies-or at least, as is no doubt the case with many, be aware of 
the conventional prejudices against the elderly and against vegetarians that 
are a submerged part of them. In fact, with such vigilance a compelling 
sociological analysis could be made of the book along specifically vegetarian 
lines, finding examples in it of the sorts of social interaction that occur again 
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and again between vegetarians and meat eaters, both within the family and a 
in broader social context.35 Still, the inconsistencies in the book suggest that 
Jom's and Norma's negative attitudes towards Elizabeth-expressed as they 
are through the three interlocking discourses of age, motherhood, and meat-
eating that come together under the umbrella of camo-phallogocentrism-
must be seen as strategies for controlling a profound unease that Elizabeth's 
abject characteristics occasion. I want to hold off an explanation of how these 
strategies impact on animal ethics per se in the text until my detailed analysis 
of the crucial dinner scene in which the philosophy of diet becomes the focus 
of discussion. But it should at least be dear how utterly intractable 
Elizabeth's vegetarianism is from the discursive contexts through which it is 
voiced in the text, and in relation to which it operates. lhis fact about the 
way vegetarianism is represented is easily overlooked when a large chunk of 
the text comprises the direct quotation of Elizabeth's limpid argumentation 
about animal ethics. Yet this is precisely why it is important to attend to the 
discursive context of The Lives of Animals itself. 
35 See for example Carol J. Adams's Living Among Meat Eaters: The Vegetarian's Survival 
Handbook (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002); it describes many such scenes that have 
resonance for Lives, in order to suggest methods for vegetarians to negotiate them. By writing 
what is essentially a self-help book, Adams embraces (albeit tacitly) the theory that 
vegetarianism is first and foremost a set of discursive practices. Adams intriguingly posits 
that the not-so-convivial arguments of which vegetarians can find themselves unwitting 
instigators are in fact ways for the meat-eater to avoid addressing animals' ethical demand 
not to be eaten 
Chapter Four Animal Ethics in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee 199 
If we look at 'Lives' first of all as a performance, it is obvious that it revisits 
those' anti-illusionist tricks' of high postmodernism mentioned by Coetzee in 
the epigram to this section; these made visible literature's own conditions of 
possibility, and thus blurred the lines between creator, text and world. 
However, it is not quite right to say that Coetzee creates a conventional mise 
en abfme effect by fictionalising the creative process-such as we find in, say, 
Salman Rushdie's Midnight's Children, or more profoundly in John Barth's 
'Life-Story' -although, the text has been read this way.36 Rather, the effect is 
worked from the opposite direction, as it were. One has to remember first of 
all that in performance Coetzee reads Elizabeth's lecture as part of his own, 
and as such the boundary between character and author starts to break 
down. This cannot happen completely, of course, but the effect is strong 
enough to result in an uncanny inhabiting by Coetzee's fictional creation of 
the performing space that he himself assumes. This is quite different from the 
author-function fictively inhabiting the text. Of course, it is a perfectly 
normal state of affairs for a dramatic performance, but it clearly is not for a 
written fiction or a lecture. 
Because Coetzee's lectures were given on the occasion of his being 
invited to present a discourse on the august moral topic of 'human values', 
36 On metafictional mise en abfme, see Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 112-28. For this reading of Lives see both Lowry and Garber, p. 76. 
Using a rather hasty analysiS of the text's metafictional effects Garber somewhat myopically 
reads it as an example of the academic novel genre, ignoring the wider significance of these 
effects for the representation of animal ethics. She does so despite recent academic novels, in 
the form of Disgrace and Philip Roth's The Human Stain, having been the site of some of the 
profoundest contemporary thinking about the meaning of 'the human'. For example, Garber 
is titillated by speculation about Coetzee's possible sources of personae and locations for the 
novella, but doesn't stop to examine the ontological implications of relating text and world in 
such a way. 
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their fictionality already troubles the opposition between spoken, 
argumentative prose and narrative fiction. To put this more explicitly, 'The 
Lives of Animals' submits the lecture form to the polyphonous potential of 
fiction. Even if it is true that, as rhetorical performances, lectures cannot 
strictly be monologic, we can at least agree that the genre conventionally 
expects moral argument in the form of a univocal expression of authorial 
meaning. The work thus teeters on a certain ambivalence. In the 'anti-
illusionist' set-up of written metafiction, the author-function is foregrounded 
as part of the aesthetic event; yet this simply draws attention to the 
unavailability of actual authorial meaning, which is endlessly deferred by its 
textual expression. But when the metafictional effect is realised in a context 
that presumes authorial meaning is being expressed via univocal 
argumentative rhetoric, and when the author is physically there to express it, 
that deferral comes to inhabit authorial meaning itself. The result is that 
Coetzee's own beliefs, as authorial meaning, become explicitly imbricated in 
the lectures as one factor of their already plural fictional meaning. This is 
obviously an unusual claim to make since avoidance of discussing authorial 
intent is a shibboleth of academic literary criticism. But I should be clear that 
I am not suggesting Coetzee has found a way to halt the play of the signifier 
and transmit meaning with no supplementary trace, but rather the converse: 
he has found a way to render fictional the reality of authorial intent that is 
supposedly deferred by its writing. 
Obviously, such an effect is going to have an influence on the fictional 
representation of having, acting on and professing moral values about 
animals-apparently the raison d'etre of these 'Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values'. But before I examine that effect, let me look at the published version 
of the lectures to show the way that meaning in this text is complicated by a 
further confusion of discursive modes. As Elizabeth begins to read her 
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lecture, she discusses a previous lecturing visit to the United States; she 
describes the lecture she then gave (it was a discourse on Kafka's 'Report to 
an Academy). The published book at this point includes a non-editorial 
footnote that refers us to another published text, authored by Coetzee, called 
'What is Realism?'.37 At this point we are spun into a vertiginous 
metafictional spiral, which I will take the time to navigate. The earlier text is 
similar in form to Lives, being the published version of another American 
Coetzee lecture that also tells the story of one Elizabeth Costello's lecturing 
trip to the United States. Obviously, it was Coetzee who actually made such a 
trip, but the addition of the footnote to Costello's lecture suggests that both 
the real event and its fictional counterpart are now wholly subsumed into 
their printed realisation. Moreover, the Elizabeth of 'What is Realism?' is 
clearly different to the woman of Lives. Although they are superficially 
similar, important details of her personal history, and of her son John's, as 
well as of the Appleton College setting, are substantively different in this 
version. Almost more importantly, there are also profound inconsistencies in 
characterisation. For example, Elizabeth happily discusses the Kafka text 
with reference to the epistemological questions it raises, calling it a 'zoo of 
ideas', but with no sense whatsoever of the ethical dilemmas (either of zoos 
or of epistemology as such) that we see in Lives.38 The most obvious result of 
this is the sheer ontological fluidity of 'Elizabeth Costello'. She is represented 
as a person who can be held neither to a proper history, nor (more 
importantly in the present context) to consistent moral attitudes. 
37 Salmagundi, 114-15 (1997), 60-81. See also Franz Kafka, 'Report to an Academy', in Franz 
Kafka: The Complete Stories, ed. by Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken, 1971), pp. 250-59. 
38 These aspects of 'What is Realism?' are discussed by Gareth Cornwell in 'Realism, Rape, 
and J. M. Coetzee's Disgrace', Critique, 43 (2002), 307-22 (pp. 307-12). 
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In fact, the issue of Elizabeth's fictive nature is further complicated by 
the publication of two more 'Costello texts' in which she assumes John's role 
as the subject, rather than the object, of the narrative focalisation. Like both 
Lives and 'Realism', these texts are at base complex meditations on the ethico-
political value of literature and the humanities in general, but differ by firmly 
rooting their discussion in the context of postcolonial Africa.39 However, let 
us just look at one incident-from The Novel in Africa-that has animals as its 
focus. Elizabeth arrives at Macquarie Island, off Tasmania, on a day trip from 
a cruise she has embarked on as an after-dinner speaker. This is a place that 
we are told Elizabeth knows was the centre of an industry that boiled down 
hundreds of thousands of penguins into oil, yet Elizabeth is perfectly blase 
about this fate, and the way those penguins' descendants 'seem to have 
learned nothing' and approach humans without caution (pp. 16-17).40 We 
hear that she has to be carried ashore, but only' as if she were an old woman' 
(p. 17, my emphasis). She is suddenly confronted by an albatross, which 
(again drawing attention to the animal's look) 'regards her steadily'. 
Sticking out from beneath it is a smaller version of the same long 
beak. The fledgling is more hostile. It opens its beak, gives a long 
silent cry of warning. 
So she and the two birds remain, inspecting each other. 
Before the fall, she thinks. This is how it was before the fall. I 
could miss the boat, stay here. (p. 17) 
39 The Novel in Africa, Occasional Papers of the Doreen B. Townsend Centre for the 
Humanities: 17 (Berkeley: The University of California, Berkeley, 1999); The Humanities in 
Africa (Munich: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 2001). Another, 'Elizabeth Costello and 
the Problem of Evil', is to follow; Coetzee presented it at the University of Chicago in 
November 2002. 
40 This enterprise, under the entrepreneurship of one Joseph Hatch, lasted about thirty years 
from 1886. See 'The History of Sealing at Macquarie Island', http://www.dpiwe.tas.gov.au! 
inter. nsf/webpa ges/UT AR-S2XVRM?open. 
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This is one of the few references to animals in these two later Costello texts, 
which are almost exclusively confined to The Novel in Africa. 
One could spend much time discussing the albatross here, with its 
heavy intertextual baggage as an emblem of Romanticism. The roots of 
Romanticism stretch deep into The Lives of Animals, as is suggested by my 
invocation at the end of chapter two of Elizabeth's comments on writing 
about animals; these exemplified the claim of the imaginative writer to 
transcend human separation from nature through empathic creativity. The 
provenance of such ideas could hardly be made clearer than by Elizabeth's 
comment on the effect of poetry: 'when we read a jaguar poem, when we 
recollect it afterwards in tranquillity, we are for a brief while the jaguar' (p. 
53).41 What is most notable about the albatross is the way that it is very 
affectively portrayed, its stark presence well-captured, and yet its portrayal 
cannot but, somewhat knowingly, involve Romanticism itself in the text as 
one layer of its discourse. We experience the epiphanic appearance of the 
physical albatross at one and the same time as the trace of Coleridge's 
literary one. Similarly, we experience the physical and the created at the 
same time in Coetzee's metafictional inhabitation by Costello during the 
lecture. 
41 There is a similarity here with David Lurie's presentation in Disgrace in terms of his love of 
Romanticism, most notably as a scholar of Wordsworth and Byron. Others have dedicated 
more time than I can here to the influence of Romanticism on the ethics of both books. See 
especially Jane Taylor, 'The Impossibility of Ethical Action' review of Disgrace, ZA@Play 
Books, http://www.chico.mweb.co.za/mg/books/9907/990727-disgrace.html. Her arguments 
are sophisticatedly debated by Mike Marais in 'The Possibility of Ethical Action: JM (sic) 
Coetzee's Disgrace', Scrutiny 2,5.1 (2000),57-63. 
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The final thing to say about this extract, to return to the analysis of 
discontinuity in Elizabeth's characterisation, is that her Edenic fantasy is 
entirely incongruent with her overall attitude in Lives, where such utopian 
imaginings are utterly redundant. However, although this discontinuity is 
unusual and effective, it is hardly a groundbreaking metafictional tactic. 
Beyond it, I want to focus attention again on the boundary between Costello 
and Coetzee, between the character and the author who has written (and 
reads) the words that narrate her. The scholarly footnotes as we now have 
them were not part of the original performance - the most profound site of 
the work's metafictional effectiveness-so it seems pertinent at first to take 
them at face value as conventional authorial statements. Occasionally, they 
can seriously intervene on points at issue in the text-such as at the moment 
when a quotation from a biography of Kafka seems to correct Norma's claim, 
part of a scathing attack on Elizabeth, that Kafka's eating habits (like hers) 
represent a self-aggrandising 'sick game' (p. 68). Such intervention would 
imply active involvement on Coetzee's part in the text's moral dilemmas, 
something which-consonant with Elizabeth's own intention not to 
'enunciate principles' -he steadfastly refused to do during the questions that 
followed the lectures.42 However, when Elizabeth mentions that her own 
lecture is 'backed up with footnotes' (p. 26) there is definite cause for 
confusion over the stability of the authorship that such references imply, 
especially since those footnotes appear consecutively numbered with others 
in the printed text. The result is that, as with the reference to 'What is 
42 See p. 37. Details of the Princeton event were reported by Derek Attridge (personal 
correspondence, 24 February 2003). The lectures were first published with the footnotes on 
the Tanner website (http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu); the text published by Princeton 
UniverSity Press is identical. 
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Realism?', the 'Coetzee' whom we might imagine to possess, in the final 
instance, the authority that the footnotes imply merges into a shared textual 
realm with Elizabeth. 
What we are left with, then, is a situation where not just' authorship' 
but 'authority' itself is subject to endless deferral. Coetzee's own moral 
theses about animals lose any remainder of autonomy to become utterly 
entrenched in his text's discursive conditions of production. The Lives of 
Animals thus enacts the discursive emergence of morality at a formal level-
reinforcing precisely what happens at the level of content in the portrayal of 
Elizabeth's vegetarianism. 
In terms of the overall development of the present thesis, we can 
therefore distinguish in Lives a modulation from Levy's work, particularly in 
terms of its profound implications for the very ideas of pro-animal literature, 
and pro-animal literary criticism. Diary of a Steak inveigles the reader into the 
world of the text, situating both as two poles in a dialogic interplay of 
meaning, desire and interpretation; as readers we are enjoined to recognise 
our active complicity in the textual production of meaning about animals. 
The result was that it became difficult to discuss that book in terms of its 
animal politics, or indeed to describe the pro-animal meaning or 
argumentation that it might be imputed to contain. Yet if we do read literary 
works in this way as a political acts-and the very idea that literature might 
holistically enact a progressive moral line seems to assume that we do-it is 
really the author who comes to stand metonymic ally for moral autonomy 
itself. It seems difficult, although I admit it is certainly not impossible, to 
conceive of a form of representation that might persuade us of the need for 
moral change without sourcing that representation in an intentional subject 
who does the persuading. The literary-critical process of such politicised 
reading works something like this: author x has written a novel with 
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something progressive to say about pro-animal morality, a pro-animal novel; 
and here is an analysis of that novel's pro-animal thought. 
However, by drawing the author-not just Elizabeth Costello but 
Coetzee himself as author-into the fictional world, the methodology of Lives 
mitigates against such a conceptualisation of literary pro-animal thought. We 
are reminded that however much we, as readers, understand our complicity 
in the text's creation of meaning, there is strictly no place outside of the 
discourses in which the text operates to stake a moral position. The resultant 
effect is best summed up in terms of the Butlerian analysis I elaborated in 
chapter one. The Lives of Animals cannot strictly be said to be a moral work; 
rather, it performs its morality (I should say, now, its ethics) as an effect of 
the discourses it contains. We do not encounter-either within the text or via 
the text as a whole-a statically held set of beliefs about right. Instead we 
experience the effects of a competing set of discourses, which to be sure 
command varying degrees of power. Elizabeth's ethical vegetarianism is just 
one of these; the moral lecture, seminar analysis and argumentative debate 
she is asked by the college to offer are others; Norma's scientific rationalism 
and is one more; and John's camo-phallogocentrism is yet another. 
The Lives of Animals is at its most compelling and original when showing this 
theoretical framework in practice, and I would like to focus in the final part 
of this chapter on the most important of such moments: the dinner 
conversation about vegetarianism. The discussion proceeds by way of 
various anthropological comments about what religious dietary codes, such 
as rabbinical prohibitions, tell us about human-animal relations. Its guiding 
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concept is exclusion: how and why certain foods are made taboo and thus 
excluded from the body; how and why such taboos become cultural 
shibboleths and thus function as mechanisms of social exclusion. The 
ubiquitous functioning of exclusionary power, it will be remembered, is of 
paramount importance to Butler's political theory; for her, 'every discourse 
operates through exclusion'.43 We can therefore offer a reading of this section 
of Lives that explains vegetarianism, as an ethico-political practice, in 
Butlerian terms. 
The various contributors take the discussion through a series of 
conceptual turns that will be recognised by readers of Mary Douglas's 
seminal book Purity and Danger, or indeed of Kristeva's Powers of Horror, 
which redirects Douglas's anthropological conclusions into the realm of 
psychoanalytic philosophy.44 To abbreviate, the stages in the debate are as 
follows: dietary taboos are to do with the concepts of cleanness and 
uncleanness; these latter are really to do with patrolling the human sense of 
shame; animals are unclean, thus unlike humans, because their sexuality is 
not predicated on shame; the 'religious horror' taboos effect is closely related 
to the human sense of disgust; religious taboos are, in fact, just arbitrary 
cultural formulae, 'folkways' that do not signify any consistent biological or 
ethical differences (pp. 39-42). For Norma, vegetarianism is best described in 
terms of this conceptual framework: 'the ban on meat eating that you get in 
43 Bodies, p. 189. 
44 Purity and Danger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969). Interestingly, the key 
concept for both Douglas and Kristeva-the fact that taboos forbid objects (animals or 
otherwise) that transgress boundaries-is not explicitly mentioned. A compelling Kristevan 
analysis of Lives is a definite possibility: Kristeva's central claim in Powers of Ho"or is that 
incomplete separation from the mother is at the root of every form of abjection, whether it is 
patrolled by phobic behaviour, defilement rite, rabbinical taboo or Christian confession (pp. 
32-132). 
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vegetarianism is only an extreme form of dietary ban [ ... ] and a dietary ban is 
a quick, simple way for an elite group to define itself; vegetarians mobilise 
the logic of taboo 'to self-define themselves, negatively, as an elite' (p. 42). 
By this reckoning, vegetarianism doubly operates through exclusion, 
first of certain foods, then of the people who eat them - as such, it is a 
discursive mechanism of power. John trails the suggestion that 
vegetarianism is a quasi-religious rite when he wonders whether the college 
will treat Elizabeth's vegetarianism with the deference it would accord 
kosher requirements (pp. 37-38). And Norma's off the cuff evidentiary 
reference to the asceticism of 'the Brahmins' suggests that she roots her 
argument in a fairly blunt assessment of the function of vegetarianism in the 
Hindu caste system (p. 42). Leaving aside whether or not Norma mistakes 
the historical complexities of Hinduism's attitude to animal ethics, as is 
suggested by Wendy Doniger's contribution to the Lives volume (pp. 93-106), 
it does seem that vegetarianism, as a moral code, has a case to answer here. 
And this is where the text's foregrounding of discursive contextualisation 
comes most importantly into play. It encourages us, as readers, to look at the 
vegetarian exclusiveness Norma diagnoses as just one incident in a diverse 
pattern of exclusions that resurfaces throughout the text. 
We might think here, looking to the familial context, of the already-
mentioned grandchildren, or even the significant absence of John's dead 
father (a more psychoanalytically-minded argument might compare this to a 
correlative absence of the mother in Disgrace). But the most pertinent aspect 
of this issue is the way Elizabeth's visit is frequently felt, by both John and 
Norma, to be an intrusion; Elizabeth herself is implicitly felt as a 
contaminating presence that needs to be purged, abjected, excluded. This is 
usually expressed in terms of frustration at Elizabeth's pro-animal views, 
although it is clear enough from the foregoing analysis that the other threats 
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she poses as an aging mother are projected onto this issue. We are told John 
believes that 'if she wants to spend her declining years making propaganda 
against cruelty to animals, that is her right. In a few days, blessedly, she will 
be on her way to her next destination' (p. 17). 
In parenthesis, an interesting fact about this idea of Elizabeth as a 
contaminant is its consonance with her own suggestion that the apathy of 
those Germans who acquiesced to the Holocaust leaves a polluting stain on 
the character of their entire generation. This is her way of explaining the 
complicity with horror that she perceives in meat-eating society. By doing so 
she displaces explicit argumentation about the rights and wrongs of meat-
eating, reconfiguring the moral discussion in terms of another discursive 
framework entirely: that of anti-Semitism and Holocaust memory. Elizabeth 
pays her addressees 'the honor of skipping a recital of the horrors' of 
animals' lives and deaths, instead citing the statistics of Treblinka and 
suggesting that animal killing 'rivals anything the Third Reich was capable 
of' (p. 21).45 I do not want to go into the ethics of such a comparison in detail, 
as has been done at length elsewhere in several different spheres.46 I simply 
45 This is one of the most salient of Coetzee's similarities with Derrida, who creates very 
much the same effect in the context of his animal-holocaust comparison; he circumlocutes the 
actualities of animal abuse, saying they are what 'is well known' and that which 'no one can 
deny', 'The Animal', pp. 394,396. 
46 See note 5. See also Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the 
Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books, 2(02). The analogy is the source of a current campaign 
by the pro-animal group PETA, 'Holocaust on Your Plate'; they justify it with reference to a 
moral injunction, expressed by some official Holocaust memorial institutions, that we must 
use the Holocaust to help reduce other atrocities (http://www.masskilling.com). Elizabeth's 
reference to Treblinka here carries a reference within it to a quotation from Isaac Bashevis 
Singer that gives Patterson his title: 'for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka', 'The Letter 
Writer', in The Seance and Other Stories (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1968), p. 270. 
The Holocaust comparison has a history within critical theory too, having been tackled by 
Adorno, Derrida, Heidegger, and Levinas at least (see Oark, pp. 165-75). 
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want to note that by using analogic comparison rather than literal evocation, 
Elizabeth gives us cause to wonder whether, as Coetzee himself had hoped 
in his comments on Gordimer, the end of apartheid has indeed returned 
animal abuse' to the ambit of moral judgement'. The comparison serves very 
effectively to position her audience in a contradictory position of knowing 
ignorance vis-a.-vis the abuse of animals that structurally repeats the 
deliberate not-knowing of acquiescent Germans during the Third Reich. 
Apathy, of course, is hardly exclusive to Nazi Germany, and it is difficult not 
to detect in this discussion a gesture to the South Africa of apartheid.47 For 
Elizabeth at least, it seems that when animal abuse is considered in and of 
itself, the institution of speciesism that underwrites it simply replicates for 
animals the conditions of representation that apartheid's racism had brought 
to bear, in Coetzee's analysis, on human torture. 
But to return to the representation of Elizabeth herself, in the following 
quotation, taken from just before the dinner scene begins, the text's most 
intensive use of free indirect discourse signals the vehemence with which 
John experiences the feeling of contamination by his mother's very presence. 
He wishes his mother had not come. It is nice to see her again [ ... ] 
but the price he is paying and the price he stands to pay if the visit 
goes badly seem to him excessive. Why can she not be an ordinary 
old woman living an ordinary old woman's life? If she wants to open 
her heart to animals, why can't she stay home and open it to her cats? 
(p.38) 
47 The issue of South Africans' apathy and the responsibility of the intellectual to continue to 
counter it is the focus of Rose's lucid remarks on Lives. 
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Again, camo-phallogocentrism rears its ugly head. I would argue that the 
distinguishing formal properties of this moment push us to read it along 
such lines as a symptom of this much more pernicious discourse of exclusion 
by which Elizabeth herself is rendered abject by her son and daughter-in-law. 
One looks in vain in the text for definitive evidence of such a 
symptomatology; but how else, other than as the paranoiac projections of 
someone who feels her authority to be under threat, are we to read Norma's 
words about Elizabeth and her vegetarianism: 
It's nothing but food-faddism, and food-faddism is always an 
exercise in power. I have no patience when she arrives here and 
begins trying to get people [ ... J to change their eating habits. And 
now these absurd public lectures! She is trying to extend her 
inhibiting power over the whole community!48 
This after Elizabeth, in her lecture, has explicitly renounced the function of 
polemical rhetoric to divide people into 'the saved and the damned' (p. 22), 
precisely the words that Norma uses to describe the exclusiveness of 
Elizabeth's behaviour (p. 68). 
On this issue, the distinction of ethics from morality (and behind this 
Derrida's separation of justice and law) becomes vital to the animal politics 
of the text. It is understandable that from the perspective of the confirmed 
meat-eater, Elizabeth's comparison of the abattoir to the death camp will be 
felt as the criminalisation of an implicitly held way of life. Yet Elizabeth 
explicitly states that she has 'never been much interested in proscriptions, 
48 Lives, p. 67. T. Coraghessan Boyle's The Road to Wellville (London: Granta, 1998) is a literary 
work that, while not addressing pro-animal thought per se, builds its comedy around 
puncturing the power-hungriness of more faddish tendencies in the American history of 
vegetarianism. 
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dietary or otherwise. Proscriptions, laws' (p. 37). Like the magistrate of 
Waiting for the Barbarians, Elizabeth seemingly struggles for a language that 
does justice to the non-judgemental sort of imperatives she is trying to 
describe in the lecture, but she can only offer gnomic vagueness: 'I was 
hoping not to have to enunciate principles [ ... ]. If principles are what you 
want to take away from this talk, I would have to respond, open your heart 
and listen to what your heart says' (p. 37). Despite Elizabeth's caution in this 
regard, Norma mistakes what is really an attempt to encourage, rather than 
command, a genuinely ethical responsibility to animals; she takes it as 
advocacy of a new morallaw-'thou shalt not put to death the living in 
general', as Derrida puts it in '''Eating Well'" (p. 279). 
Since Elizabeth tries to sidestep the more authoritarian effects of moral 
argumentation, the question is: how do we correctly understand the power-
laden function of exclusion in the case of vegetarianism? It seems clear that 
Norma's analysis of 'faddism' is at least partly viable, even if it is not 
pertinent to the ethical stance Elizabeth enacts. It is certainly true that there 
are pro-animal, vegetarian and more broadly ecological discourses, of which 
we should be wary indeed, that rely on the rhetoric of naturalism, asceticism 
and purity-discourses which have a chequered political history, to say the 
least.49 Furthermore, to the extent that pro-animal thought achieves moral 
and political influence, it cannot avoid excluding the moral claims of at least 
some others. One sees the effects of this regularly, in debates ranging from 
the rights of ethnic groups such as the Micah to hunt whales, to the 
acceptability of Jewish or Islamic slaughter practices (shechitaldhabh). More 
49 For example, during the Nazi era; see Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, trans. by Carol 
Yolk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 93-107. 
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importantly still, as Matthew Calarco points out in his careful reading of 
u'Eating Well'" from the point of view of veganism, vegetarianism itself 
remains an exclusive, or in Derrida's terms 'sacrificial', practice. Although 
ethical vegetarianism does work against camo-phallogocentrism by avoiding 
meat, vegans have a more stringent assessment of what constitutes the 
acceptable sacrifice of animals to the extent that they will not allow chickens 
to remain in battery farms and cows in industrialised milking units.5o 
Nevertheless, the problem with Norma's position is that by investing all 
of her energy in critiquing the exclusionary logic of vegetarianism as a 
dietary taboo, she fails to recognise the way that such exclusionary power is 
at work in the camo-phallogocentrism that underpins in her own attitudes 
towards Elizabeth. It is only in the final scene, when we hear of the utter 
psychological devastation Elizabeth silently suffers as a vegetarian in her 
family's meat-eating world, that we can recognise the profound irony in 
Norma's argument, spoken during the dinner scene with Elizabeth present 
before her, that vegetarians wield their social power by withdrawing from 
the carnivorous society they regards as inferior. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the text's sharing of exclusionary 
powers across both vegetarian and camo-phallogocentric discourses is that 
ethical reasoning needs more precision than simply ascertaining which 
discursive practices are exclusive and which not, since all are. Elizabeth 
herself gestures towards an explanation of how to do this in her comments 
on Mahatma Gandhi's vegetarianism, which, as she says, 'can hardly be 
conceived as the exercise of power' because 'it condemned him to the 
50 'Deconstruction' (forthcoming). 
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margins of society' (p. 43). In this light, Norma's paranoid attitude towards 
Elizabeth's 'inhibiting power' appears to replicate for carno-
phallogocentrism the well-known backlash against 'political correctness'; it is 
a very efficient method of entrenching social hegemonies by imagining them 
to be under unnecessary threat from groups who actually have relatively 
little power. 
From this point of view, Elizabeth's ethical vegetarianism, even if it 
were the hectoring and exclusionary moral assault that Norma imagines, 
would still be different from the behaviour of John and Norma herself. For it 
is ludicrous to deny that in the contemporary western world there is a 
substantive difference in the wealth of socio-cultural power that the discourse 
of vegetarianism and the discourse of carno-phallogocentrism each 
possesses. The narrative's portrayal of John, Norma and Elizabeth, as I have 
elucidated it through much of this chapter, reveals this disparity of power 
more than anything else. And in a world where 'every discourse operates 
through exclusion', as Butler would have it, this is the salient difference.51 
This revelation is made all the more profound, I would argue, by the text's 
self-awareness about its own discursive conditions of possibility. For these 
allow the two speakers in this text, Elizabeth Costello and J. M. Coetzee, to be 
divested, through fiction, of the carno-phallogocentric authority that inheres 
in the Tanner Lectures on Moral Values. 
The best summation of the achievement of The Lives of Animals can be 
made by revisiting the comments with which I began this chapter, and by 
reflecting critically on the idea that language and meat-eating are together at 
51 Bodies, p. 189 
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the very essence of our humanity. For if there is anything to be taken away 
from Lives, it is that awareness about the inextricability of all morality from 
the power of discourse, an awareness encouraged and redoubled by self-
conscious literary experimentation, can indeed point the way to pro-animal 
ethics. David Wood admirably condenses this logic: 
camo-phallogocentrism is not a dispensation of Being towards which 
resistance is futile; it is a mutually reinforcing network of powers, 
schemata of domination, and investments that has to reproduce itself 
to stay in existence. Vegetarianism is not just about substituting 
beans for beef; it is-at least potentially-a site of proliferating 
resistance to that reproduction. 52 
The Lives of Animals, I have argued, leads its readers to this very realisation by 
performing it at both the levels of characterisation and form. To that extent, it 
offers the most profound and compelling literary representation of pro-
animal thought that I have considered in this thesis. 
52 'Comment Ne Pas Manger-Deconstruction and Vegetarianism', in Steeves (ed.), pp. 15-35 
(p.33). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
ON READING THE ANIMAL ETHICS OF FICTION 
If the foregoing chapters have made it clear that the representation of pro-
animal thought is a profound, complex and fascinating area of study in 
contemporary fiction, then this thesis has achieved its main aim. The issue of 
humans' ethical responsibility to the animal world, and to animals in their 
very singularity-as my discussion of the BSE crisis makes all too clear-is a 
pressing one, and it gets more pressing every day. My intention in this thesis 
has been to examine how recent fiction has signalled, and perhaps attempted 
to meet, that responsibility. The texts I have studied were chosen because 
they contain in this regard many more possibilities than can be exhausted by 
a single critical approach; yet if the readings that I have offered can open the 
way for other, different readings of pro-animal literary thought, then another 
of my aims will have been met. 
Looking back over those texts, it is clear that there has been one 
worrisome issue that comes up again and again: the hierarchical opposition 
of humans to animals in terms of the possession of language. The four 
authors have each offered different fictional responses to the entrenched 
nature of this opposition. These responses have been rooted both in content 
and in literary form. Atwood offers opaque images of birds being attracted 
by a woman's giving hand; these images signify a tentative attempt to 
transcend species difference. Walker gives form to just such a transcendence 
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in the character of Lissie, who embodies a Romantic ideal of sympathetic 
imaginative creativity that has been revised by awareness of social 
oppression. The texts of both Levy and Coetzee, on a formal level, have 
wrought pro-animal meaning from a profound challenge to conventional 
ways in which fiction is created and read. These formal tactics divest 
language, hierarchically considered, of its camo-phallogocentric power. 
It would be a mistake to conclude from my readings of these matters, 
however, that the representation of pro-animal thought in contemporary 
fiction straightforwardly suggests utterly new patterns of ethical meaning. 
For in just the same way that an effect of modernist or postmodernist literary 
experimentation is often to defamiliarise aspects of fictional creation that are 
present yet thoroughly taken for granted in realist modes of writing, so too 
Levy's and Coetzee's pro-animal formal experimentation should return us to 
all fictional representations of human-animal relations with a perspective 
that is aware of animal ethics. And if we look more broadly at all of the 
writers discussed here, the primary conclusion to be taken from the 
foregoing readings is that contemporary literary writers have found ways by 
which to make ethical meaning about animals visible. 
I hope that by explaining the underpinnings, the workings and the 
effects of such literary strategies, this thesis-more than just promoting more 
readings of literary pro-animal thought-leads towards a renewed 
understanding of the representation of human-animal relations more 
generally. And by this I mean not only the kind of understanding that leads 
to the symptomatic reading of speciesist texts that is admirably represented 
by Cary Wolfe's work; rather, that understanding would follow more the 
model of my own reading in chapter four of the novels Coetzee published 
before The Lives of Animals. These works do not at all wear pro-animal 
meaning on their sleeve for all to see; rather an ethical sense of the way 
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characters interact with animals inheres in the those texts in a cryptic way, 
displaced by the immediate concerns of the novels' human protagonists; yet 
it nonetheless emerges from beneath those concerns. 
The ability to read for pro-animal meaning in such inhospitable places 
becomes all the more pressing when one generally surveys the 
representations of pro-animal thought I have discussed in this thesis from 
the perspective of their generic mode-something I have not often done. It is 
hard not to be struck by the way that they are suffused with tragedy. One 
thinks of the attempt by the narrator of Surfacing to live an ethical life by 
identifying with the animals; it is a way of living that leaves her prey to 
illness and, it is clear, imminent death. Or again, we might think of the 
traumatic images of the stumbling BSE cow in Diary of a Steak; these are not 
only emblematic of the destruction of animals' autonomy by factory farming, 
but a reminder that as cows are represented in Diary of a Steak (and the title 
clearly suggests this) they are always-already dead. Although these 
dystopian scenarios are to an extent countermanded by the imaginative 
empathy with animals of a character like Lissie in The Temple of My Familiar, 
the negative underside of Lissie's mode of being is the profound alienation 
from meat-eating society felt by Elizabeth Costello. She will feel that 
otherness until her death: "'There, there. It will soon be over''', she is told, 
with little consolation.1 A dispirited tone seems inevitable in writing that 
expresses pro-animal meaning explicitly (that is, rather than cryptically), 
simply because the apparent omnipotence of humans over animals, and the 
sheer omnipresence of human violence towards animals, traps animal-ethical 
discourse in a tragic mode that seems to offer no catharsis. 
1 Lives, p. 69. 
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From the perspective of reading the animal ethics of fiction, then, it is 
all the more exciting that in recent decades the fiction shelves of English 
language bookshops have become a veritable literary ark; the animals are 
everywhere. A survey of novels from the past thirty years that are structured 
around representations of the animal world reveals not only under-read yet 
fascinating work by authors who remain relatively unheard of, but also 
important books by a plethora of well-established literary figures. I have only 
mentioned a fraction of these many writers. Just to focus on the more well 
known, the list would include novels by Margaret Atwood, Paul Auster, 
Julian Barnes, John Berger, William Burroughs, J. M. Coetzee, Timothy 
Findley, Ursula Ie Guin, Will Self, Jane Smiley and Alice Walker.2 We find 
explorations of humans' relationships with animals in different but 
interlacing contexts-from the domestic (pet-keeping, horse racing) to the 
wild (hunting, fearful encounters) and from the technological (scientific 
observation and experimentation, meat production) to the imaginary 
(worship, mythologizing, mimicry and identification). Alongside these, we 
find fully developed animal characters; animal narrators; the representation 
of animal consciousness; humans turning into animals and vice versa. 
If this enumeration suggests nothing else, it is that the figure of the 
animal should be a fascinating one for critics of contemporary fiction. 
Whether those texts should and will be read with a view to unpicking their 
animal ethics is a question that the texts I have discussed-and this thesis 
itself, I hope-answer in the positive. 
2 The relevant works by these authors are listed in a bibliography of contemporary literary 
fiction focusing on animals appended to this thesis. 
APPENDIX 
ANIMALS IN CONTEMPORARY LITERARY FICTION 
To attempt to compile a bibliography of all works of contemporary literature 
(even of literary fiction) that include representations of animals in them 
would be too great a task; such a bibliography would include almost every 
published novel. This bibliography attempts the much more modest task of 
listing literary fiction in which interest in animals themselves is (at least) one 
of the most important factors in the text itself. Therefore, it does not attempt 
to include non-literary or children's fiction. Also, because of the focus of my 
research in this thesis into specifically pro-animal literature rather than, say, 
science fiction or ecological literature, certain kinds of texts have largely 
escaped my remit; the most obvious examples of this is the hunting narrative 
Games Dickey's Deliverance would be an example here). Neither does it 
attempt to cover animals in other genres: an excellent introduction to animals 
and theatre is 'On Animals', edited by Alan Read, a special issue of the 
journal Perfonnance Research, 5.2 (2000); on poetry, see Randy Malamud, Poetic 
Animals and Animal Souls (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003); for information on 
animals in film, see Jonathan Burt, Animals in Film (London: Reaktion, 2002). 
Lastly, the category of zoo representations, of which John Irving's Setting Free 
the Bears (London: Black Swan, 1995) and Russell Hoban's Turtle Diary 
(London: Picador, 1977) are good examples, has been excluded because a 
large bibliography of such texts can be found in Randy Malamud, Reading 
Zoos: Representing Animals in Captivity (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1998). 
Texts are categorised either by animal, or for those texts that do not 
focus on one particular animal, by concept such as animal-human hybridity; 
cross-species identifications; the literary ark; animal activism; animals and 
women. Occasionally, some texts which would well fit in two categories have 
been placed in the one that best characterises them. 
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Literary Animals 
Primates 
Boyd, William, Brazzaville Beach (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993) 
Brophy, Brigid, Hackenfeller's Ape (London: Vintage, 1993) 
Burroughs, William, Ghost of a Chance (London: Serpent's Tail, 2002) 
Chandra, Vikram, Red Earth and Pouring Rain (London: Faber, 1995) 
French, Sean, The Imaginary Monkey (London: Granta, 1993) 
Goldsworthy, Peter, Wish (Sydney: Flamingo, 1992) 
H0eg, Peter, The Woman and The Ape (London: Harvill, 1997) 
Quinn, Daniel, Ishmael (New York: Bantam, 1992) 
Self, Will, Great Apes (London: Penguin, 1999) 
Cats - Domestic and Wild 
Burroughs, William, The Cat Inside (London: Penguin, 1992) (Domestic/other) 
Hogan, Linda, Power (New York: Norton, 1998) ijaguar) 
Le Guin, Ursula, 'May's Lion', in Buffalo Gals and Other Animal Presences 
(London and New York: Plume, 1988) (Lion) 
Le Guin, Ursula, 'Schroedinger's Cat', in Buffalo Gals and Other Animal 
Presences (London and New York: Plume, 1988) (Domestic) 
Leigh, Julia, The Hunter (London: Faber, 2000) (Tasmanian Tiger) 
Lessing, Doris, The Old Age of EI Magnifico: A Cat's Tale (London: Flamingo, 
2000) (Domestic) 
Martel, Yann, Life of Pi (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2002) (Bengal Tiger) 
Walker, Brenda, Poe's Cat (London: Penguin, 2000) (Domestic) 
Wilson, A. N., Stray (London: Walker, 1987) (Domestic) 
Cows (and the Meat Industry) 
Agee, James, I A Mother's Tale', in Fifty Great American Short Stories, ed. 
Milton Crane, (New York: Doubleday, 1972) 
Coe, Jonathan, What a Carve Up! (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995) 
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Faber, Michel, Under the Skin (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2000) 
Francis, Geoff, Babylon Farm (London: Animus Books, 1998) 
Levy, Deborah, Diary of a Steak (London: Bookworks, 1996) 
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Mazza, Chris, I At the Meat Counter', in Animal Acts (New York and Boulder: 
Fiction Collective, 1988) 
Noon, Jeff, Automated Alice (London: Black Swan, 1996) 
Ozecki, Ruth L., My Year of Meat (London: Picador, 1999) 
Reyes, Alina, The Butcher, trans. by David Watson (London: Minerva, 1992) 
Sterchi, Beat, The Cow (London: Faber, 1999) 
Dogs 
Adams, Richard, The Plague Dogs (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978) 
Auster, Paul, Timbuktu (London: Faber, 1999) 
Bakis, Kirsten, Lives of the Monster Dogs (London: Sceptre, 1997) 
Berger, John, King (London: Bloomsbury, 2000) 
Coetzee, J. M., Age of Iron (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1990) 
Coetzee, J. M., Disgrace (London: Vintage, 1999) 
Coetzee, J. M., The Master of Petersburg (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1993) 
Kundera, Milan, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (London: Faber, 1985) 
McEwan, Ian, Black Dogs, (London: Vintage, 1998) 
Mazza, Chris, Dog People (Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 1997) 
Horses 
Findley, Timothy, The Wars (London: Faber, 2001) 
Hawkes, John, Sweet William (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 
Hawkes, John, Whist1ejacket (New York: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1988) 
McCarthy, Cormac, All the Pretty Horses (New York: Knopf, 1992) 
Smiley, Jane, Horse Heaven (London: Faber, 2001) 
Other 
Flannigan, Richard, Gould's Book of Fish (London: Atlantic, 2003) (Fish) 
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Gowdy, Barbara, The White Bone (London: Flamingo, 1999) (Elephants) 
Literature with Animal-Related Concepts 
Human-Animal Hybridity 
Dahl, Roald, 'Pig', in The Collected Short Stories of Roald Dahl (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1991) (Human-Pig) 
Dariussecq, Marie, Pig Tales, trans. by Linda Coverdale (London: Faber, 1997) 
(Human-Pig) 
Emschwiller, Carol, Carmen Dog (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1990) 
(Human-Dog) 
Ie Guin, Ursula, 'Buffalo Gals, Won't you Come out Tonight', in Buffalo Gals 
and Other Animal Presences (London and New York: Plume, 1988) 
(Human-Coyote) 
West, Paul, The Rat Man of Paris (London: Paladin, 1988) (Human-Rat) 
The Literary Ark 
Barnes, Julian, A History of the World in 10112 Chapters (London: Picador,1990) 
Findley, Timothy, Not Wanted on the Voyage (London: Arena, 1986) 
Jensen, Liz, Ark Baby (London, Bloomsbury, 1998) 
Roberts, Michele, The Book of Mrs. Noah (London: Vintage, 1999) 
Winterson, Jeanette, Boatingfor Beginners (London: Minerva, 1990) 
Cross-Species Identifications 
Atwood, Margaret, The Edible Woman (London: Virago, 1998) (rabbits) 
Findley, Timothy, The Piano Man's Daughter (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1995) 
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